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1Introduction
The years before the outbreak of the banking crisis in September 2008 saw rapid growth
in the international banking business. Banks expanded globally. They entered foreign
markets not only by means of cross-border activities but also by launching a network of
foreign affiliates. The degree of financial integration seemed to ever intensify. However,
freezing interbank markets in the wake of the Lehman collapse in 2008 and scarce liquidity
ever since have apparently stalled this process if not reversed it. As the Economist (2012)
ascertains “The ability and willingness of banks to compete is unravelling”.1
My thesis addresses both stages of financial integration: the global expansion as well
as the retreat of banks from international markets. Withdrawing banks from the interna-
tional stage might suggest the outset of the financial sector’s disintegration.
The first part studies the determinants of international banking.2 The second part
examines whether international activities shape the risk-market power tradeoff that is
inherent to the banking business. Both papers rely on the pre-crisis period and thus
reflect times of global expansion. The third part considers how ruptures in the funding
conditions of banks lead to balance-sheet reallocations and the associated changes in
leverage. Thus, the third part deliberately captures the banking crisis, but also the
termination of guarantees for public sector banks in July 2005. A brief outline of all three
parts follows after sketching the international activities of German banks and a choice the
core literature on international banking with special emphasis on the crisis in 2008.
1The Economist, “The retreat from everywhere”, 404, 8781 (2012), pp.30-32.
2My thesis uses the terms “global” and “international” interchangeably once referring to any cross-
border transactions or foreign commercial presence of banks. The term “multinational” indicates that a
bank maintains a network of foreign affiliates.
2 1. INTRODUCTION
International Activities of German Banks
Two datasets collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank form the backbone of my empiri-
cal analysis: “ Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics” and the “External Position Report”.
Both datasets capture comprehensive data on all banks headquartered in Germany. The
“External Position Report” distinguishes cross-border activities from foreign commercial
presence by means of branches and subsidiaries. Indeed, individual external position
reports serve as the German microdata underlying the “International Consolidated Bank-
ing Statistics” and “International Locational Banking Statistics” provided by the Bank
of International Settlements.
Germany’s banking sector is divided into public sector banks, cooperative banks and
commercial banks. On average, foreign activity accounts for 40% of the balance-sheet
total, ranging from 10% in case of small cooperative or savings banks to 70% in case of
large banks. Thus, the volume of foreign activity is very concentrated: the 20 largest
banks attract more than 80% of the foreign business (see Fiorentino et al., 2010). Figure
1.1 shows how the financial crisis has shaped the different patterns of cross-border and
branches’ activities. German banks cut down their external assets by almost 25% between
October 2008 and December 2009. In parallel to the trade literature, my thesis differen-
tiates between the intensive margin as the volume of foreign activity and the extensive
margin as the respective countries in which banks report any kind of business. Figure 1.2
plots the intensive against the extensive margin to describe the geographical distribution
of German banks’ international activities. Remarkably, most banks are heavily engaged
in the UK, the US and Switzerland. In terms of the intensive margin, the UK and Spain
play the dominant role. To conclude, German banks are an important player on global
financial markets and have contributed to the deepening of financial integration. Insights
from the German data might hence apply to a broader set of industrialized countries.
Recent Literature
This section reviews the most recent literature on international banking, the financial crisis
in 2008 and banks as contributors to the global transmission of shocks. My objective is to
situate the underlying papers of my thesis in a quickly growing body of mainly empirical
work.
3Figure 1.1: Total Foreign Assets and Liabilities
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4 1. INTRODUCTION
A branch of the banking literature discusses whether foreign bank entry serves as
a source of stability to domestic lending. Claessens and Van Horen (2011) point out
that foreign banks on average have stronger balance sheets. With respect to developing
countries and non-dominant foreign banks, they find that foreign banks cut lending more
than domestic banks once affected by the crisis. De Haas and Van Horen (2011) distinguish
between cross-border activity and foreign commercial presence. Based on syndicated loan
data, they stress that banks exhibit higher commitment to those countries hosting an
affiliate.
Frequently, these papers refer to internal capital markets to explain the different be-
havior of purely domestic and multinational banks. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) find
that foreign affiliates benefit from parental support and thus can adjust their lending more
flexibly than purely domestic banks. Similarly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) address the
role of internal capital markets and monetary policy transmission. They point out that
internationally operating banks manage liquidity on a global scale and thus exhibit less
sensitivity to domestic policy shocks.
The following papers rely on microdata while dealing with the 2008 crisis’ impact
on international banking in Europe. Popov and Udell (2010) focus on eastern European
countries and find a link between balance-sheet conditions and foreign banks tightening
credit standards. Puri et al. (2011) refer to German savings banks that belong to the
group of public sector banks. They provide evidence that savings banks associated with
head institutions that were severely hit be the US subprime crisis reject significantly more
loan applications.
Concerns about the effectiveness of government support schemes has sparked interest
in the response of multinational banks. The question arises whether governments put
banks under pressure to prioritize domestic customers. Rose and Wieladek (2011) use
information on local lending by foreign banks residing in the UK to analyze how support
measures targeted at these banks affect their lending. They find that after nationalization,
foreign banks reduce the share of their loans going to the UK. Buch et al. (2011a) differ-
entiate between German government support measures and the “TAF program” launched
by the US Federal Reserve. According to this, German bank affiliates with access to
the “TAF program” propagate the effect to associated affiliates located in other foreign
5countries. Further, Buch et al. (2011a) show that affiliates of those banks that enjoyed
support from the German government, expanded their foreign business, but they have
not expanded relative to other banks’ foreign affiliates.
Indeed, the literature on contagion and the spillover of local financial shocks into for-
eign markets dates back to the seminal work on Japanese banks by Peek and Rosengren
(1997, 2000). Devereux and Yetman (2010) provide more theoretical background. They
develop a model in which leverage-constrained investors with an internationally diversified
portfolio propagate shocks induced by the impact of asset prices on their balance sheets.
Turning back to most recent empirical research, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) show that
once multinational banks are hit by a funding shock, the treatment of foreign affiliates
differs according to their profitability. Bruno and Shin (2012) or Shin (2011) paint the
broader picture of European banks as borrowers on wholesale US funding markets and
re-channeling these funds via conduits to the US market of credit supply. Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2012) expand on this twofold role of foreign banks before and after the financial
crisis of 2008. They find that the slimming down of foreign affiliates’ balance sheets serves
as an example of international shock transmission and as an indicator of internally oper-
ating capital markets. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) link the collapsing banking markets
to their portfolio reallocation: a “flight home” effect reflects the substitution of foreign
loans for domestic syndicated loans.
To conclude, evidence on German microdata underlying my thesis can provide valuable
insights for three reasons. First, German banks have substantially contributed to the
surge of global banking, the interconnectedness of the business and the deepening of
financial integration. Second, the richness and granularity of supervisory datasets can fill
gaps uncovered by survey data and aggregates. Third, the architecture of the German
banking system allows researchers to distinguish between various types of banks in terms of
their institutional background (public sector, cooperative and commercial banks), business
model and funding structure.
Outline of the Three Papers
The first paper explores the determinants of international banking. It draws a parallel to
the internationalization of firms and distinguishes between bank-level and country-level
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determinants. Large, internationally active banks contribute to the integration of financial
markets but also to the spreading of shocks across countries. Considerable heterogeneity
exists among banks in terms of their productivity and risk preferences that possibly drives
bank internationalization. This first paper estimates the ordered probability of banks
selecting into distinct modes of foreign market entry (extensive margin) and links it to the
volume of international assets (intensive margin). Methodologically, the paper enriches
the conventional Heckman selection model to account for a hierarchy of entry modes on
both estimation stages. This paper yields three key findings. First, the fixed costs of
engaging in FDI are significantly higher than the fixed costs of engaging in cross-border
trade. Second, in addition to productivity, risk factors matter for international banking
and, third, gravity-type variables have an important impact on international banking
activities.
The second paper analyzes how bank internationalization shapes the domestic market
power and risk that is inherent to the banking business. We measure market power by the
Lerner index and risk by the official declaration of regulatory authorities that a bank is
distressed. Internationalization is proxied by the number of countries in which banks are
active (extensive margin) and the volume of foreign activities (intensive margin). A key
contribution of this paper is the ability to distinguish different foreign market entry modes.
The paper yields three core findings. First, higher market power is associated with lower
risk after accounting for internationalization and tackling simultaneity and endogeneity
concerns. Second, banks with higher volumes of foreign activity (intensive margin) enjoy
higher market power at home. Yet, banks with exposures to more countries (extensive
margin) see their domestic market power decline. These phenomena are driven by servic-
ing foreign markets via foreign branches rather than cross-border transactions. Managing
a too far-flung, complex empire may be increasingly difficult and only the largest, most
productive banks are able to reap the profits at home from costly acquired additional
information abroad. Third, empirical evidence on the effect of internationalization on
bank risk is rather weak. We obtain significant results only when considering the business
of foreign branches and the repercussion effects on domestic parent banks. In this light,
activities on more foreign markets (extensive margin) reduce the domestic parent bank’s
risk, whereas a higher intensity of foreign operations conducted by branches (intensive
7margin) seems to raise the risk of the domestic parent bank. Diversification benefits thus
seem to partly vanish once foreign operations grow large.
The third paper separates short- and long-run dynamics of bank leverage by use of
cointegration analysis. With respect to the long-run, if banks’ leverage ratio or related
liability shares are constant over time, they form a cointegrating relationship. Thus,
cointegration tests indicate whether banks target certain liability ratios and whether they
have been able to achieve this aim during the banking crisis in 2008. My results reveal
that liability ratios are cointegrated only after accounting for structural breaks in the
funding conditions of banks. By estimating coefficients on these structural breaks, I can
trace the channels of banks’ leverage adjustment and unveil their liability reallocations in
response to key changes in their funding conditions. With respect to the short-run view, I
study the interplay of bank liabilities to correct for deviations from the long-run ratios and
their adjustments to changes in financial market risks. In brief, my findings suggest that
substantial heterogeneity governs the adjustment patterns of different banking groups to
both, key ruptures in their funding conditions and changes in financial market risks.

2Margins of international banking:
Is there a productivity pecking
order, too?1
Large, internationally active banks drive the integration of financial markets, but they
can also contribute to the propagation of shocks across countries. This is one reason why
regulators aim at imposing higher capital requirements on large and systemically impor-
tant banks.2 Given the importance of international banks, a number of questions about
the internationalization of services firms and, in particular, banks remain unanswered.3
To what extent are the internationalization decisions of banks determined by productivity
and risk preferences of banks? Which factors affect the extensive (foreign investment de-
cision) and intensive (volume of activities) margins? And which factors affect particular
modes of activities? In contrast to prior research4, we explicitly account for bank het-
erogeneity in terms of productivity and risk preferences. We distinguish among different
modes of market entry (international assets, foreign branches, foreign subsidiaries), and
1This chapter draws on joint work with Claudia M. Buch and Michael Koetter. It relies on an updated
version of Buch et al. (2009). A more concise version of this chapter was published as Buch et al. (2011b)
in the Journal of International Economics (2011, Copyright by Elsevier). Section 2.4 details on my
contribution to these papers.
2See Blinder 2010 or Feldman and Stern 2010 for a discussion of current reform proposals.
3Bonfiglioli (2008) provides country-level evidence that financial integration reflected in liberalization
spurs total factor productivity in the economy but does not analyze the specific role of banks.
4See, e.g., Berger et al. 2003; Ruckman 2004; Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005; Buch and Lipponer 2007.
Goldberg 2004 discusses the links between literature on financial and non-financial firms’ FDI, with a
focus on the impact on developing countries. Cetorelli and Goldberg 2008 show how differences in the
degree of internationalization of banks can have implications for the effects of monetary policy.
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we analyze the extensive margin as well as the intensive margin.
There is a rich body of literature suggesting that heterogeneity in terms of productiv-
ity can explain the foreign expansions of non-financial firms. Larger and more productive
firms are more likely to export and engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) than are
smaller and less productive firms (see Helpman et al., 2004; Bernard et al., 2006, 2007;
Tomiura, 2007; Yeaple, 2009). The explanation for these stylized facts involves the in-
teraction between firm-level productivity and the costs of market entry Melitz (2003);
Helpman et al. (2008). Domestic fixed costs are lower than the costs of exporting, which
are lower than the costs of FDI. Exporting also entails higher variable costs. Thus, firms
self-select into different modes of entry, realizing that the higher the fixed costs of a mode
of entry, the higher is the required productivity, which results in a “pecking order of
productivity”.5
Consistent with this literature, Buch et al. (2011a) show patterns of international ac-
tivities of (German) banks, which correspond to a productivity pecking order But their
results also show that other sources of heterogeneity matter as well. Here, we use a
regression framework to explicitly account for such other features and to model the sort-
ing of banks into different modes of internationalization. In banking, portfolio effects of
international activities are likely to play a role as well. International activities provide
the opportunity to diversify risks, but international activities also expose banks to ad-
verse shocks from abroad. Empirically, we therefore include bank-level information on
the degree of risk aversion of banks, and we explore how these factors affect internation-
alization. We find that banks with a higher revealed degree of risk aversion are less likely
to go abroad but, once being abroad, the volume of activity is higher.
In addition, our study goes beyond previous evidence in three regards. First, we use
a novel and comprehensive dataset that provides detailed information about the inter-
nationalization choices of German banks. The “External Position Report” provided by
the Deutsche Bundesbank contains information about the international assets of German
banks, their foreign branches, and their foreign subsidiaries, year-by-year and country-
by-country. There have been no minimum reporting thresholds since 2002. Therefore, we
have detailed information about all domestic and internationally active German banks.
5In international finance literature, the term “pecking order” also describes the structure of different
types of international capital flows Daude and Fratzscher (2008).
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We find that, in contrast with non-financial firms, many (small) banks hold international
assets. In line with evidence for non-financial firms though, few banks have foreign affili-
ates.
Second, we model the self-selection of banks according to the different modes of foreign
activities using an ordered probit, similar to Barattieri (2011). We enrich a conventional
Heckman (1979) model by including hierarchical categories in the selection equation. We
also show that selection into foreign markets has a significant impact on the volume of
activities. Most previous studies focus on large, internationally active banks only,6 which
means they ignore the selection bias inherent in heterogeneous firm (productivity) models.
Third, we take into account the differences in banks’ production processes compared
with those of non-financial firms. We estimate bank productivity using an empirical
methodology often applied to non-financial firms, in the spirit of Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) and applied to banks by Nakane and Weintraub (2005). Alternatively, banking
studies often rely on a dual approach in which they estimate deviations from optimal cost
frontiers, so-called (in)efficiency, which is an established measure of relative performance in
the banking literature Berger et al. (1997); Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003).7 We find clear
evidence for a productivity pecking order in international banking using either measure.
Productivity is especially important for smaller banks, such as savings and cooperative
banks.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we offer
some background. Section 2.2 contains our data and descriptive statistics, our empirical
model, and our measure of bank productivity. After presenting the estimation results in
Section 2.3, we conclude in Section 2.4.
2.1 Bank Heterogeneity and Internationalization:
Theory
To recognize how bank-level productivity and the degree of risk aversion may influence
international banking, consider a simple portfolio model of an international bank. In
6See Berger et al. (2003); Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) or Cerutti et al. (2007).
7Because (in)efficiency estimation approaches usually neglect the bias that results from the simultane-
ity between input choices and productivity, we have a preference for the former measure.
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the Appendix, we show how a baseline closed-economy portfolio model (Freixas et al.,
1997) can be extended to model banks’ choice to service foreign markets. Banks can
hold international assets through either their domestic headquarters (Mode 1) or foreign
affiliates (Mode 2).8 We assume that banks invest but do not borrow abroad.9
The expected profits of a domestic bank i holding international assets in country j
depend on the returns on its domestic and international assets less variable costs and the
fixed costs of foreign activities. The fixed and variable costs of international operations
vary across host countries. We set the fixed costs of domestic operations to 0. We further
assume that the fixed costs of operating under Mode 2 are higher than the fixed costs of
Mode 1 (see Cerutti et al., 2007). Variable and in particular information costs are lower
though if banks maintain a foreign affiliate. Our specification thus involves a trade-off
between the fixed and variable costs of foreign activities, similar to that known in trade
literature.
Both raising deposits and granting loans is costly for banks because of the costs of
handling loan applications, maintaining a branch network, or performing payment ser-
vices. We assume that banks differ with regard to their productivity (ωi) and that more
productive banks enjoy lower costs: cij,• = cij,• (ωi) with
∂cij,•(ωi)
∂ωi
< 0. Each bank thus
is characterized by a specific productivity level, which also transfers to its foreign affili-
ates. The costs of supplying financial services internationally are higher than those in the
domestic context, due to institutional and regulatory differences across financial systems
and lack of familiarity with the pool of foreign borrowers.
Thus far, our model shares several similarities with models of non-financial firms. The
main difference between banks and non-financial firms is that the former care about the
risk of their activities. We follow Rochet (2008) and assume that the bank’s objective
function increases with expected profits and decreases with risk.
We use this model to analyze the intensive and extensive margins of banks’ foreign
activities.10 As to the extensive margin, the bank chooses to be active in the foreign
8Our terminology differs from the World Trade Organization classification of foreign modes. In the
language of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), we focus on cross-border supply (Mode 1)
and commercial presence (Mode 3). In the empirical model, we also allow for the possibility of remaining
a purely domestic bank and distinguish between foreign branches and subsidiaries. Adding these options
does not affect the qualitative results of the theoretical model.
9Relaxing these assumptions leaves the main qualitative results of the following analysis unaffected.
We also abstract from exchange rate risk.
10We summarize the results of the comparative static analysis in Table A.2.
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country if its expected utility is positive. It is straightforward to show that the proba-
bility of investing abroad is higher with (i) lower fixed costs of foreign activity, (ii) lower
information costs, (iii) higher bank productivity, and (iv) lower degree of risk aversion.
Moreover, banks prefer Mode 2 over Mode 1 if their productivity exceeds a threshold (ω)
– such that banks with ωi < ω choose Mode 1, but banks with ωi > ω choose Mode 2 and
maintain affiliates abroad – and if the savings of fixed costs associated with entering via
Mode 2 are small relative to the higher variable costs under Mode 1.
The volume of international activities, the intensive margin, can be analyzed by dif-
ferentiating the objective function with respect to the volume of international risky assets
The model shows that banks will increase the volume of their international assets when
they experience higher gross returns, lower information costs, higher productivity and thus
lower variable costs, lower risk, lower correlations between domestic and foreign returns,
and lower degrees of risk aversion.
In summary, our model shows that bank heterogeneity, with regard to productivity
and risk aversion, affect internationalization strategies. It also shows some differences
and similarities between banks and non-financial firms. For both types of firms, foreign
entry becomes more likely when the fixed costs of foreign activity are lower, the savings
associated with variable costs are higher, and productivity is higher. The volume of
activities also increases with productivity and falls with variable costs. However, banks
also take the risk–return trade-off of their foreign activities into account.
2.2 Empirical Methodology
2.2.1 Data about Patterns of Internationalization11
We analyze the patterns of bank internationalization using a unique and detailed database
on banks’ international assets, the so-called “External Position Report” filed by the
Deutsche Bundesbank (see also Buch et al., 2011a). The dataset provides comprehen-
sive information about the international assets of domestic banks, their foreign branches,
and their foreign subsidiaries year-by-year and country-by-country. Because we are inter-
ested in the longer-run patterns of international banking, we study the database for the
11We provide the details in the Data Appendix
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pre-crisis years 2002–2006. Reporting thresholds for international assets were abolished
in January 2002, therefore, we have exact information about the extensive and inten-
sive margin of banks’ foreign operations and do not face any problems associated with
truncation or censoring.
To obtain information about the extensive margin of banks’ foreign operations, we
manually link branches and subsidiaries located in country j to their domestic parent
bank i. We subsume information about the intensive margin of a parent banks’ foreign
operations by aggregating all assets held in country j across the different modes of foreign
activity. We use a composite foreign asset and do not distinguish between different types
of assets to keep the analysis tractable. Most of the assets we include are interbank
assets. We also complement the External Position Report with information from the
annual balance sheets and income statements of all banks operating in Germany between
2000 and 2006. Each bank that holds a German banking license must submit these data
to the supervisory authorities.
Our dataset therefore contains observations for each bank (i = 2,235), each destination
country (j = 58), and each year (t= 5). Our data cover both, members of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries and yields
a comprehensive picture of German banks’ foreign activities. We distinguish the following
modes of operation: (i) purely domestic banks without foreign activities (Mode 0), (ii)
banks that hold international assets through their domestic headquarters (Mode 1), (iii)
banks that maintain foreign branches (Mode 2a), and (iv) banks that maintain foreign
subsidiaries and/or foreign branches (Mode 2b).
Each observation coded as bank-year-country observation, can be included only once
in any of these modes. Hence, our modes are mutually exclusive observational units.
The ranking of the modes follows the presumed fixed costs involved. Subsidiaries are
legally independent, hold their own equity, and are subject to host-country supervision,
so they demand the highest costs in terms of capital requirements and regulatory burden.
In addition, foreign subsidiaries often enable large-scale retail operations, which again
implies the highest fixed costs, in addition to the regulatory start-up costs (Cerutti et al.,
2007).
Buch et al. (2011a) use a similar dataset to establish some stylized facts concerning
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the internationalization of German banks. They show that only a few, large banks have a
commercial presence abroad, consistent with the size pecking order documented for manu-
facturing firms. These large banks are also active in a larger number of countries and have
above-average volumes of activity. However, the relationship between internationalization
and productivity also yields two inconsistencies with recent trade models. First, virtually
all banks hold at least some foreign assets, irrespective of size or productivity. Second,
some fairly unproductive banks maintain commercial presences abroad. In our empirical
analysis below, we go beyond this evidence to show how bank productivity affects the
extensive and the intensive margin of international banking, and which additional source
of heterogeneity matter.
2.2.2 Modeling Extensive and Intensive Margins
Our basic empirical setup is a self-selection model, in the spirit of Heckman (1979).
Similar to Barattieri (2011), we replace the conventional selection equation with an or-
dered probit model to mirror the hierarchy of modes of activities. The extensive margin
(EM) reflects the discrete decision of banks, whether and through which mode to be
present in a foreign market. Our model of bank i’s operation in country j in year t thus
takes the following form:
IMijt = αXijt + σIMuijt (2.1)
EMijt = βZijt + vijt
where IMijt describes the intensive margin, and σIM is the standard error of the in-
tensive margin’s error term. The error terms uijt and vijt are assumed to follow a standard
bivariate normal distribution with mean zero, unit variance, and correlation coefficient ρ.
12 Errors are independent from the covariates X and Z. We can identify the extensive
and the intensive margin if vector X includes a subset of variables in vector Z entering
the intensive margin estimation (Wooldridge, 2002). For this reason, we use dummies
for different banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The covariates capture productiv-
ity, other bank-level, and host country-specific variables, which we describe subsequently
(Section 2.3.1). Because we can observe the intensive margin only if EMijt > 0, and
12This specification allows us to apply a standard normal distribution in the correction term, drawing
on Winkelmann et al. (2006).
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because the error terms are correlated, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of α
would suffer from a selection bias.
We model the extensive margin as an ordered probit model, which yields consistent
coefficient estimates of β, as well as threshold values µ1, µ2a, µ2b , and , which separate
the categories. The probability that a bank self-selects into either one of four mutually
exclusive ordinally scaled modes is given by:
Pr (EMijt = 0 | Zijt) = Φ (µ1 − βZijt)
Pr (EMijt = 1 | Zijt) = Φ (µ2a − βZijt)− Φ (µ1 − βZijt)
Pr (EMijt = 2a | Zijt) = Φ (µ2b − βZijt)− Φ (µ2a − βZijt) (2.2)
Pr (EMijt = 2b | Zijt) = 1− Φ (µ2b − βZijt)
This exposition underpins the pecking order of the different modes of foreign activity,
because we must have µ1 < µ2a < µ2b for the probabilities to be positive. Checking
whether the threshold parameters µ indicate an ascending order with significant coeffi-
cients and further yield economically reasonable distances from one category to the next
supports a pecking-order of entry modes. This is because the estimated cut-off values
can be interpreted as proxies for the fixed costs of foreign activity that banks must cover.
Equations (A.2) and (A.4) illustrate these fixed costs.
To estimate the determinants of the intensive margin, we must take the bias induced
by the selection of banks into the different modes into account. For this purpose, we take
the conditional expectations of the intensive margin:
E [IMijt | Zijt, EMijt = k] = αXijt + σIME [uijt | Zijt, EMijt = k]
where k = 1, 2a, 2b . Using the assumption about the correlation of errors across
margins, we can simplify the conditional expectations of the error term in Equation (2.3)
to 13
E [ρvijt | EMijt = k, Zijt] = ρE [vijt | µk − βZijt < vijt < µk+1 − βZijt]
13See Technical Appendix A.1.2 for details.
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which resembles the inverse Mills ratio in a standard Heckman model. We replace
the conventional selection equation by an ordered probit model, so our corresponding
correction term λkijt depends on the specific mode chosen by bank i. The intensive margin
thus transforms into:
E [IMijt | Zijt, EMijt = k] = αXijt + σIM (2.3)
with
λ1ijt = =
φ (µ1 − βZijt)− φ (µ2a − βZijt)
Φ (µ2a − βZijt)− Φ (µ1 − βZijt)if EMijt = 1
λ2aijt =
φ (µ2a − βZijt)− φ (µ2b − βZijt)
Φ (µ2b − βZijt)− Φ (µ2a − βZijt)if EMijt = 2a
λ2bijt =
φ (µ2b − βZijt)
1− Φ (µ2b − βZijt)if EMijt = 2b
The correction term specified in Equation (2.3) performs a function analogous to that
of the inverse Mills ratio in a conventional sample selection (Heckman, 1979). Neglecting
this term would lead to an omitted variable bias, following from the assumption that
uijt and vijt in Equation (2.1) are not independent but instead are bivariate normally
distributed. Our hierarchical modeling of the extensive margin thus contains information
that affects the estimation of the intensive margin.
2.2.3 Measuring Bank Productivity
The availability of an unbiased measure of bank-level productivity ωit is key to our em-
pirical model. Several banking studies measure total factor productivity using a dual
approach, which implies the estimation of cost or profit functions, then attribute pro-
ductivity changes to factor accumulation, technological change, or changes in efficiency
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). We use a more direct approach based on a production
function. As argued by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), this method avoids the violation of
the (often implicit) independence assumption between productivity and the factor input
choices of banks (see Technical Appendix A.1.3). The approach is less common in bank-
ing literature though (cf. Nakane and Weintraub, 2005, for Brazilian banks). Details are
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given in the Appendix.
In Table A.2, we summarize descriptive statistics for the variables we use to estimate
bank productivity; in TableA.3, we report the parameter estimates for the production
functions. These estimates are fairly similar to those reported by Nakane and Weintraub
(2005) for Brazilian banks. We reject constant returns to scale (β1 + β2 + β3 = 1). Our
productivity estimates instead indicate slightly decreasing returns to scale, in line with
indirect evidence from dual approaches used to estimate scale cost economies in German
banking. For comparison, we also report results from basic OLS regressions, which high-
light the severe bias in parameters when we neglect the simultaneity of production choices
and bank productivity. The OLS intercept can be interpreted as a Solow productivity
residual. Because the estimate of productivity ωit is bank-specific, the left-hand panel in
Table A.3 lacks this entry. We also do not report the parameter estimate of the interme-
diate input (equity) in the Levinsohn-Petrin specification, because equity is an ancillary
parameter, required only to obtain unbiased estimates of productivity.
We report bank productivity and bank-level covariates for the different modes of in-
ternationalization in Table A.4. With regard to the CAMEL variables, the patterns in
the data are quite clear: More complex and more costly modes of international operations
are associated with a lower degree of capitalization, lower reserve holdings, lower loan-loss
provisions, lower cost-to-income ratios, lower return on equity, and lower liquidity. These
findings match the hypothesis that indicates more productive banks are more likely to
be active internationally and function in more complex modes; they also are consistent
with a productivity pecking order. In addition, banks with a lower revealed degree of risk
aversion are more active internationally.
To check the robustness of our results, we also use alternative productivity measures.
The first is cost efficiency, which is obtained from stochastic cost frontier analysis as
the systematic deviation from optimal cost due to higher than optimal factor demand
by the banking firm (Koetter et al., 2010). Cost efficiency is a relative measure that
has been widely used in the banking literature to benchmark banks’ abilities to utilize
their resources most efficiently (see Berger, 1995). To account for the three-tier banking
structure in Germany and for the fact that banks operate under different technology
regimes, we estimate both frontiers as latent classes (see Koetter and Poghosyan, 2009).
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2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Baseline Regression Results
The internationalization decision of banks should, according to our theoretical model,
depend on various bank-level and country-level parameters.14 We present the baseline re-
sults in Table A.6, using four different specifications: (i) a baseline model only including
bank productivity, (ii) the baseline model plus individual bank-level covariates captur-
ing profitability and risk preferences, (iii) the baseline model plus bank- and country-level
covariates (excluding regulations), and (iv) the baseline model plus bank- and all country-
level covariates (including regulations). The F-tests show that all groups of variables are
jointly significant. We lag all variables by one year to mitigate any reverse causality
concerns. We split the country-level covariates into two subgroups, because regulatory
variables are not available for all countries. Our preferred specification is the full spec-
ification (see Columns 4 and 8), which captures the fixed costs of entry. Adding the
country-level variables significantly increases the explanatory power, especially for the
extensive margin (Column 2). In the specification that only features productivity, the R2
is 0.01 for the extensive margin (intensive margin 0.10), but the value increases as we add
bank-level covariates and dummies (0.13 and 0.21) and the country-level variables (0.40
and 0.29).
Is There a Productivity Pecking Order?
Our main measure of bank productivity derives from the production function approach
described in Section 2.2.3. We expect a positive impact. To account for other aspects
of bank productivity, we include the cost-to-income ratio (we expect a negative sign), a
bank’s return on equity (expected positive sign), and an indicator variable to give the
quintile of the size distribution of the bank’s assets (from 1 to 5, expected positive sign)
(for a similar specification, see Greenaway et al., 2007). Our results support a productivity
pecking order in international banking. First, all cut-offs for the extensive margin are
significantly different from zero, which indicates a hierarchy of internationalization modes.
The higher fixed costs of more complex activities abroad appear in the higher cut-off
14See also the Data Appendix and Table A.1 for a summary of the expected signs. All variables except
the dummy variables and those expressed in percentages are in logs.
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values. Simple t-tests show the first-stage cut-offs are significantly different from one
another.
Second, the estimated cut-offs increase more in absolute terms when we move from
Mode 1 to Mode 2a compared with the move from Mode 2a to Mode 2b. Consider-
ing the interval length relative to a particular coefficient, such as that for productivity
(µk+1−µk)/αProd , we note that productivity must increase significantly for a bank to achieve
the next category. According to our estimates, opening a subsidiary does not require
much more productivity, because the bank already maintains a branch in a specific coun-
try (transition from Mode 2a to 2b). In contrast, the additionally required productivity
is considerable if the bank moves from Mode 1 (international assets held domestically) to
Modes 2a or 2b:
(µ2a−µ1)/αProd > (µ2b−µ2a)/αProd (2.4)
Third, the correction term in the outcome equation varies by mode of activity, which im-
plies that it captures the hierarchy of cut-offs. Previous studies fail to take this selection
into a particular mode of internationalization into account; they focus instead on interna-
tionally active banks only. Fourth, productivity has a positive and significant impact on
both margins. Paired with the significant cut-offs, this finding offers evidence of a pro-
ductivity pecking order, which is robust against the addition of other bank-level variables
related to productivity. For example, size and return on equity have the expected positive
effects.
Table A.9 shows the results using alternative productivity measures. Two results
are very robust across the different specifications. First, the cut-off terms are positive
and significant, and there is a clear ranking in terms of the magnitudes. As before, the
cut-offs are higher for the modes involving FDI rather than cross-border activities only.
Second, size has a positive and significant impact throughout. As regards the productivity
measures, the cost efficiency measure yields the same qualitative result as the Levinsohn-
Petrin measure, and it is significant both for the extensive and for the intensive margin.
Labor productivity, in contrast, is not a good measure of bank productivity: it is
insignificant for the extensive margin and negative for the intensive margin. This result
is, in fact, not very surprising because banking is not a very labor-intensive industry, and
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the simple labor productivity measure ignores other relevant inputs for the production
process. Instead, our results suggest that the banks with higher labor productivity have
a lower volume of international activity. This would be consistent with the low degree
of internationalization of savings and cooperative banks, which engage in labor-intensive
retail banking activities at home.
Does Risk Aversion Affect International Banking
The productivity pecking order suggests some similarities between banks and non-financial
firms. But an important difference remains: Banks take the risk of their foreign activities
into account, and this could explain why patterns in the data cannot be explained with
productivity alone (Buch et al., 2011a). A bank’s degree of risk aversion cannot be
observed directly, but the CAMEL profile contains four indirect measures of bank risk.
Specifically, banks with a low degree of capitalization, low hidden reserves, high non-
performing loans, and low loan-loss provisions should have higher levels of risk and, ceteris
paribus, a low degree of risk aversion.
Our results confirm that the degree of risk aversion is important. Banks that are
willing to take on higher risks are more likely to be active internationally; the signs for
capitalization and reserves are negative and significant for the extensive margin. Signs for
loan-loss provisions and non-performing loans may be consistent with this interpretation,
but these variables are not significant in our (preferred) full specification.
The picture changes for the intensive margin, for which the positive signs for capital-
ization and loan-loss provisions and the negative sign for non-performing loans suggest less
risk-averse (more stable) banks do more business. This result may suggest a demand-side
effect. Our dependent variable is a composite asset dominated by interbank activities, and
in interbank markets, trust in the stability of market participants represents an important
determinant of lending relationships.15
Overall, our results indicate that the decision to venture abroad is positively affected
by a low degree of risk aversion. Once abroad, less risky banks generate higher business
volumes.
15The negative sign on hidden reserves is not inconsistent; hidden reserves partly reflect peculiar features
of the German accounting system, which may be difficult to verify for foreign partners.
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Additional Bank-Level Variables
Various dummy variables are included to capture heterogeneity across banks in terms of
the different banking groups and locations. A (0, 1) dummy for banks located in the
former East Germany accounts for the lower degree of international integration of this
region compared with the German average. In the selection equation, we also include
banking group dummies to distinguish large banks, commercial banks, and savings banks
from cooperative banks, as the omitted category.
The dummy variables for the banking groups are significant. Large, commercial banks
are more likely to extend abroad than are cooperative banks (omitted category); savings
banks are less likely to do so. Banks headquartered in the former East Germany are
significantly less active in international markets. Given that the East German banks have
invested abroad though, their volume of activity is above average.16
Market Size
We consistently find a positive impact of market size on the extensive margin, in that
GDP, GDP per capita, and total German FDI are positive and significant. The impacts of
GDP per capita and German FDI are positive and significant on the intensive margin as
well. The volume of foreign assets correlates negatively with market size (GDP), because
we control for the volume of FDI. If we drop FDI, we achieve a positive and significant
coefficient. In this sense, our results confirm studies that indicate a link between trade
and financial integration (e.g., Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010).
Information Costs
In the international finance literature, geographical distance between two countries has
become the standard proxy for information costs (e.g., Portes and Rey, 2005; Aviat and
Coeurdacier, 2007; Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). Providing financial services to more
distant markets or setting up distant foreign affiliates should be more costly than doing
business in nearby markets, so we expect a negative sign for distance. As an additional
proxy of information costs, we specify a composite index for the level of institutional
16A possible explanation could be the follow-your customer motive. Since only a few East German banks
are active internationally, the demand for banking services from home country clients is concentrated on
these banks.
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quality (see also Beck et al., 2006). A higher value indicates better institutional quality;
we expect a positive sign.
Geographic distance, reveals the expected negative sign for the extensive margin. When
distance increases by 1%, GDP increases by approximately 1.7%
(
ˆ−βDist/ ˆβGDP
)
for a bank
that chooses the same mode of entry. The positive coefficient of distance for the intensive
margin again appears due to our inclusion of FDI as our measure for real integration; if we
exclude FDI, distance has a negative impact on the intensive margin, too. The index of
institutional quality is insignificant for the extensive and negative for the intensive margin;
we expected a positive sign. We only find this positive sign for cooperative banks. For
these banks with limited international experience, a good information environment is
more important than it is for the larger banks (see Table A.8).
Macroeconomic Portfolio Effects
For the portfolio effects, we proxy for macroeconomic, country-specific risks using the
standard deviation of GDP growth (growth volatility) in each host country j, computed
over the past five years.17 We expect a negative sign. To measure the correlation between
domestic and foreign returns, we use the growth correlation of German and foreign GDP
growth rates for rolling windows of five-year periods and again expect a negative sign,
because higher correlations imply less potential for diversification. A dummy for countries
in the Euro area provides a proxy of the (absence of) exchange rate risk.
Our results support previous studies that use similar data and empirical approaches, in
the sense that we find positive impacts of volatility and correlation and thus a “correlation
puzzle” (e.g., Portes and Rey, 2005 in equity markets; Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007 for
banking). Both volatility and correlations should have a negative impact on both margins,
but we find this effect only for the impact of volatility on the extensive margin. Lower
exchange rate risk increases German banks’ exposure to Euro area countries. The impact
on the extensive margin is positive if we do not control for country-level covariates, but it
is negative in our full specification. German banks have a below-average presence in Euro
area countries, presumably because those nearby countries can be served from the home
17We compute growth volatility and growth correlations on the basis of residual GDP growth, regressed
on a full set of time-fixed effects, to account for general macroeconomic developments that may influence
GDP growth.
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market. The positive impact of the Euro on cross-border banking (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2010) might cloud different adjustments along the extensive and intensive margins.
Fixed Costs of Foreign Activity
Our first proxy for the fixed costs of foreign activities is activity restrictions faced by
banks. This is a discrete measure which indicates restrictions on services and products
that banks are allowed to offer, and restrictions on non-financial firm ownership and con-
trol (Beck et al., 2006). The expected sign is negative because tighter activity restrictions
deter foreign activity. A similar reasoning applies to more stringent capital restrictions,
which is the sum of initial and overall capital stringency requirements per country. Tighter
activity restrictions and capital regulations have the expected negative impacts on the ex-
tensive margin, in support of our use of these variables as proxies for fixed costs. The
impact of regulatory restrictions on the volume of activities is positive though; that is,
banks that have entered a particular foreign market engage in more activities there. As
shown by Table 7, this positive effect is driven by the large banks, whereas for other
banking groups, activity and capital restrictions have a negative impact on the volume of
activities. Moreover, for these latter banks, the effect of activity restrictions is greater.
Country-Level Control Variables
Finally, we include the concentration of the destination banking market, though we can-
not predict the sign direction a priori. On the one hand, higher concentration could
stimulate entry if it indicates higher returns; on the other hand, higher concentration
could indicate the presence of implicit barriers to entry. Three dummy variables indicate
whether a country is an offshore destination, is a developing country according to the
income taxonomy of the Worldbank, or hosts a financial center.
The concentration results confirm our ambiguous theoretical expectations. Higher
concentration in foreign banking markets increases the probability of foreign activity by
German banks but lowers the volume. In our baseline specification, we find a negative
sign for the offshore dummy, and splitting the sample according to banking group shows
that this effect is driven by cooperative banks (see Table A.8). For the large banks, the
offshore dummy reveals the expected positive sign. The signs for developing countries
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(negative) and financial centers (positive) match our expectations.
Marginal Effects
Marginal effects are presented in Table A.7. Because we use an ordered response model
with discrete outcomes to model the extensive margin, the marginal effects differ across
modes and indicate the extent of change in the probability of choosing one distinct mode
in reaction to a change in a particular explanatory variable (at the mean). As we show in
Table A.7, macroeconomic variables such as GDP and distance have key impacts on bank
internationalization, and they are more important than many of the bank-level variables.
In this sense, our results confirm previous literature for non-financial firms. The marginal
effects for Mode 2a are insignificant because Modes 2a and 2b are very similar.
In summary, we find evidence of a productivity pecking order in international banking
and an impact of bank-level risk on internationalization. Banks with less risk aversion
appear more internationally oriented, though their volume of activity is lower, ceteris
paribus. In addition, banks’ foreign activities increase with market size, low information
costs, and low entry barriers. The impact of macroeconomic volatility is not clear cut,
which is consistent with the “correlation puzzle” (Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007) in previous
literature.
2.3.2 Robustness Tests
We perform several robustness tests based on the panel dimensions of our data and esti-
mates of the model for different banking groups. These unreported results are available
on request. The results consistently confirm the pecking order: The estimated cut-offs
are significant and increase for more complex modes of foreign activity, the interval length
relative to the productivity coefficient declines for more complex modes of activities, and
productivity and size have positive and significant impacts.
Panel Structure We initially ignored the panel dimension of our dataset and pooled
all observations across years, including time- and parent-fixed effects. Estimating the same
model by year-by-year gives stable results for most variables, though particularly for those
that we use to test the pecking order hypothesis. We also cluster the standard errors at
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the bank level, at the country level, and at the bank–country level. We bootstrapped the
standard errors to consider productivity as a generated regressor. The findings are robust
to these variations.
We also use a bank-country fixed effects panel for the intensive margin. The bank-
specific productivity measure becomes insignificant, because there is relatively little within-
sample variation in bank productivity, which is picked up by the fixed effects. The results
for the size measure and the correction term do not change (both are positive and signif-
icant).
Endogenous Regressors We also run a test suggested by Semykina and Wooldridge
(2010) to account for endogenous regressors in the primary equation (our intensive margin
equation), as well as heterogeneously distributed and serially dependent error terms in
the selection and primary equation. We adapt their method and estimate the extensive
margin year-by-year while adding time averages of the bank-level variables. We compute
the correction terms separately for each year and include them in the intensive margin
equation. The productivity, core bank-level, and macro-level covariates preserve their
significance and are qualitatively identical to those reported previously.
Banking Groups An objection to our analysis might note that we pool banks with
different internationalization traditions. Therefore, we split the sample into the different
banking groups: large, commercial, savings, and cooperative banks. The results in Table
A.8 reveal similar findings for the country-level covariates; we already have alluded to the
differences across banking groups.
Our focus on productivity and risk may ignore that smaller (savings and cooperative)
banks might not be as active internationally, despite being highly productive, whether
because they are legally prevented from operating abroad or because they have access
to international markets through their head institutions (e.g., the “Landesbanken” for
savings banks). Our results confirm this expectation only partly. That is, we find a
similar pecking order for small and large banks in qualitative terms, but an increase
in productivity has a much greater impact on both extensive and intensive margins for
smaller than for larger banks. The only banking group for which productivity has a
negative impact are commercial banks, which include private banks that often focus on
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specific segments of the German domestic banking market.
With regard to the risk results, we recognize that smaller banks might be different
because, as an example, savings banks fall under public ownership and thus are covered
by implicit or explicit state guarantees. However, our results do not confirm that the
degree of risk aversion of publicly owned and privately owned banks exert systematically
different impacts on internationalization patterns. If anything, more risk-averse, large
banks appear more likely to enter foreign markets, though they engage in lower volumes
of activities. For the remaining banking groups, risk features matter, but there is no clear
link between the degree of risk aversion and the pattern of activities.
OECD versus Non-OECD Pooling across countries at different stages of develop-
ment might affect our results. Therefore, we re-estimate the model for OECD countries
only; the main results are similar, particularly with regard to the bank-level variables
and productivity effects. The impact of country-level variables, such as market size and
regulations, may differ slightly.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we explore the source of heterogeneity across banks that determine whether
banks expand abroad (the extensive margin) and the volume of their foreign activities (the
intensive margin). We distinguish purely domestic banks, banks that hold international
assets, banks with foreign branches, and banks with foreign subsidiaries and branches and
model the extensive and intensive margins of foreign activity in the spirit of Heckman,
using an ordered probit model for the selection equation. Our correction for selection
explicitly accounts for the selection into different modes.
Our results show that heterogeneity in terms of bank-level productivity matters for
international banking. Our main measure of productivity applies the model by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) to the banking industry. We find that more complex and more costly
modes of internationalization require greater productivity, so more productive banks tend
to engage more internationally than do less productive banks, as well as hold higher
international assets. Selection into foreign status therefore has a significant impact on
the volume of activities. For banks (as for non-banks), gravity variables are critically
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important. Larger distances discourage international banking, larger and more developed
markets promote international banking, and activity restrictions deter banks.
At the same time, risk factors at the bank level affect their foreign activities. More
risk-averse banks are less likely to expand abroad, but they engage in larger volumes of
activities. Risk factors at the country level also matter, but the signs of these effects do
not always reflect theoretical expectations, which mirrors the correlation puzzle found in
the previous literature. Another feature of the data pointing towards the importance of
risk factors is that fact that small banks differ from small non-financial firms. Small, non-
financial firms typically are domestically oriented and do not trade or engage in FDI, but
smaller banks typically hold foreign assets in at least one market. This finding suggests
the smaller fixed costs of holding international assets compared with selling or sourcing
abroad. It also indicates that the motivation for internationalization differs, and portfolio
considerations play an important role for banks.
Our study provides a first step towards the exploration of the extensive and intensive
margins of international banking, and our results have implications for various research
streams. In international finance and macroeconomics literature, it would be interesting
to explore the extent to which adjustments according to the different margins may affect
banks’ responses to macroeconomic shocks and thus the persistence of shocks. Banking
literature could extend our study by exploring how the endogenous sorting of banks into
different modes of internationalization, as driven by bank productivity, affects the size
distribution and productivity of the banking industry as a whole. Such an investigation
ultimately would have implications for the ongoing discussion about the optimal regulation
of banks, especially large banks. We leave these issues for further research.
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Contribution
Generally speaking, I was involved in all stages of creating this paper: collecting ideas,
preparing the relevant data, interpreting results, writing and revising the text. This
section provides details on my most central contribution which lies at the core of our
paper, the empirical approach to reflect the productivity pecking order. In econometric
terms, I have enriched the standard Heckman approach (see Heckman, 1979) with a
hierarchical self-selection of banks into foreign market entry modes on the first stage. To
the best of my knowledge, this approach is novel in the current literature.18 An ordered
probit model replaces the standard probit model on the first stage of the Heckman model.
Results on three empirical devices capture the productivity pecking order. First, as
presented in section 2.2.2 and further elaborated in Appendix section A.1.2 the ordered
probit model links the fixed cost of foreign market entry to the threshold parameter µk.
All estimated threshold parameters µk (k = 1, 2a, 2b) are individually significant and
indicate a hierarchy of fixed costs related to foreign market entry modes.
Second, estimated distances between two threshold parameters suit the intuitive dif-
ferences in fixed costs of supplying banking services abroad. Foreign commercial presence
requires higher fixed costs than cross-border banking. Hence, the productivity pecking
order is reflected by equation 2.4 as the ratio of distance of adjacent threshold parameters
relative to the estimated coefficient on the productivity measure.
Third, resulting threshold parameters µˆk enter the second stage. Error terms on
extensive and intensive margins are correlated which demands for a correction term on
the intensive margin stage conditional on the entry mode on the extensive margin stage.
The correction term thus varies by entry mode which introduces the hierarchy also on the
intensive margin level. Our results confirm the significance of this correction term and
hence the existence of a hierarchy in foreign entry modes and related fixed costs.
My procedure gives also way to interpret other estimated coefficients on the extensive
margin stage in light of the self selection into different market entry modes. Equation
2.4 informs about the differences in fixed costs relative to the estimated coefficients and
compares different foreign market entry modes. As opposed to that, it is also possible to
18Barattieri (2011) presents a similar model while using bilateral aggregates of trade flows and foreign
direct investment. This paper, however, only came to our attention in 2011.
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get an idea about the relative importance of two determinants of foreign market activity
within one foreign market entry mode.
In short, my principal role was to develop and implement an empirical approach which
captures the productivity pecking order in the estimation of extensive and intensive mar-
gins. Yet, the broader concept of the paper was derived jointly and writing was shared
between the authors.
Appendix A
Margins of international banking
A.1 Theoretical Appendix
A.1.1 Theoretical Framework
To organize our thoughts of how bank productivity and bank risk preferences affect the
internationalization, we apply a simple bank portfolio model to an international context.
We assume that, in each period, the bank chooses its optimal portfolio structure, and the
balance sheet restriction for bank i is given by:
Wi +Di = Li + L
∗
i,j +R
∗
i (A.1)
where Wi= initial wealth, Di= domestic deposits (liabilities), Li= domestic loans
(assets), L∗i,j= foreign loans (assets) in country j, and R
∗
i= risk-free assets.
To analyze the bank’s choices, consider the profits earned from two modes of foreign
activities. The expected profit of a domestic bank i holding international assets in country
j depends on the returns on its domestic and international assets minus its variable costs
and the fixed costs of foreign activities:
Π (1)ij = [rL − cij,L (ωi)]L (1)i +
[
(1− τj) r∗L,j − c∗ij,L (ωi)
]
L (1)∗ij + rFR (1)i (A.2)
− [rD − cij,D (ωi)]D (1)i − F (1)j
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where F (1)j = the fixed costs of Mode 1; rL, rD= interest rates on (risky) assets and
liabilities; rF = interest rate on the risk-free asset; τj = country-specific information costs
that lower the return on international assets, with 0 < τj < 1 ; and cij,•= variable costs.
The (1) in this equation denotes the bank’s profit function under Mode 1. The fixed and
variable costs of international operations vary across host countries; we set the fixed costs
of domestic operations to 0.
Both raising deposits and granting loans is costly for banks, and these costs reflect
the resource inputs connected to handling loan applications, maintaining a branch net-
work, or performing payment services. We assume that banks differ with regard to their
productivity (ωi) and that more productive banks enjoy lower costs:
cij,• = cij,• ($i)with
∂cij,•
∂ωi
< 0 (A.3)
Each bank thus is characterized by a specific productivity level, which also transfers
to its foreign affiliates. The costs of supplying financial services internationally are higher
than those in the domestic context, such that cij,L (ωi) < c
∗
ij,L (ωi) , due to the institutional
and regulatory differences across financial systems and lack of familiarity with the pool
of foreign borrowers.
Therefore, the profits of a bank that establishes foreign affiliates (Mode 2) are:
Π (2)ij = [rL − cij,L (ωi)]L (2)i +
[
r∗j,L − c∗ij,L (ωi)
]
L (2)∗ij + rFR (2)i (A.4)
− [rD − cij,D (ωi)]D (2)i − F (2)j
This specification is similar to Equation (A.2) with two exceptions. First, we assume
that the fixed costs of operating under Mode 2 are higher than the fixed costs of Mode
1, F (1)j < F (2)j (see Cerutti et al., 2007). Second, information costs are lower under
Mode 2, because the bank is operating in a foreign country. Without loss of generality,
we set these costs to zero for Mode 2. Our specification thus involves a trade-off between
the fixed and variable costs of foreign activities, similar to that known in trade literature.
The main difference between banks and non-financial firms is that the former care
about the risk of their activities, so we follow Rochet (2008) and assume that the bank’s
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objective function increases with expected profits and decreases with risk1:
U = U
[
E (Πij) , σ
2 (Πij)
]
,
∂U
∂E (Πij)
> 0,
∂U
∂σ2 (Πij)
< 0 (A.5)
With the simplifying assumption that deposits carry no risk, the variance of the port-
folio can be given by σ2 (Πij) = L
2
iσ
2 + L∗2ij σ
∗2
j + 2LiL
∗
ijCOVj , where σ
2
(
σ∗2j
)
is the
country-specific risk of domestic (foreign) assets, and COVj is the covariance matrix of
domestic and foreign returns.
We use this model to analyze the intensive and extensive margins of banks’ foreign
activities2. For the extensive margin, the bank chooses to be active in the foreign country
if its expected utility is positive, that is, if U > 0 holds. Using Equations (A.3)-(A.5),
it is straightforward to show that the probability of investing abroad is higher with (1)
lower fixed costs of foreign activity (F j), (2) lower information costs (τj), (3) higher bank
productivity (ωi) and (4) lower risk of foreign activities (σ
∗2
j ). Moreover, banks prefer
Mode 2 over Mode 1 if their productivity exceeds a threshold (ω) – such that banks with
ωi < ω choose Mode 1, but banks with ωi > ω choose Mode 2 and maintain affiliates
abroad – and if the savings in the fixed costs associated with entering through Mode 2
are small relative to the higher variable costs under Mode 1. The volume of international
activities, the intensive margin, can be analyzed by differentiating the objective function
with respect to the volume of international risky assets (L∗ij)
3:
∂U
∂L∗ij
=
∂U
∂E (Πij)
[
(1− τj) r∗L,j − c∗ij,L (ωi)
]
+ 2
∂U
∂σ2 (Πij)
[
L∗ijσ
∗2
j + LiCOVj
]
= 0 (A.6)
By denoting the degree of the bank’s risk aversion,
λi = −1
2
∂U
∂E (Πij)
∂σ2 (Πij)
∂U
> 0 (A.7)
we can rewrite the first-order condition from Equation (A.6) as
1This specification holds under certain assumptions in an incomplete markets setting; see Rochet
(2008).
2We summarize the results of the comparative static analysis in Table B.1
3The qualitative results are the same for the different modes; therefore, we drop the indices.
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∂U
∂L∗ij
=
∂U
∂E (Πij)
{
(1− τj) r∗L,j − c∗ij,L (ωi)−
1
λi
[
L∗ijσ
∗2
j + LiCOVj
]}
= 0 (A.8)
With Equation (A.8), we obtain comparative static results that demonstrate which
banks will increase the volume of their international assets when they experience higher
gross returns (r∗L), lower information costs (τj), higher productivity and thus lower variable
costs
(
c∗ij,L (ωi)
)
, lower risk
(
σ∗2j
)
, lower correlations between domestic and foreign returns
(lower COVj ), and lower degrees of risk aversion (λi).
A.1.2 Deriving the Correction Term
Deriving the correction term requires us to draw on the standard bivariate normality of
error terms in equations that describe the extensive and intensive margins. The starting
point is equation 2.1
E [IMijt | Zijt, EMijt = k] = αXijt + σIME [uijt | Zijt, EMijt = k]︸ ︷︷ ︸ (A.9)
where k = 1, 2a, 2b
We next focus on the conditional expectations of the error term:
σIME [uijt | Zijt, EMijt = k]
Assuming that the errors of the extensive and intensive margin are correlated, we can re-
state this term as σIME [ρvijt | Zijt, EMijt = k] . We can further simplify the conditioning
part to obtain σIMρE [vijt | µk − βZijt < vijt < µk+1 − βZijt].
If we assume the error term vijt follows a conditional standard normal distribution,
we can explicitly write the conditional expectation as:
E [vijt | µk − βZijt < vijt < µk+1 − βZijt] (A.10)
=
´ µk+1−βZijt
µk−βZijt vijtf (vijt | µk − βZijt < vijt < µk+1 − βZijt) dvijt
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Next, rewriting the conditional expectation while applying the definition of a conditional
density function yields a ratio of the density φ (vijt) and the cumulative density function,
such that we can rewrite Equation A.10 as:
=
1
Φ (µk+1 − βZijt)− Φ (µk − βZijt)
µk+1−βZijtˆ
µk−βZijt
vijtφ (vijt) dvijt (A.11)
Now, it is possible to integrate and exploit the fact that φ′ (vijt) = −vijtφ (vijt):
=
−φ (µk+1 − βZijt)− (−φ (µk+1 − βZijt))
Φ (µk+1 − βZijt)− Φ (µk − βZijt)
=
φ (µk − βZijt)− φ (µk+1 − βZijt)
Φ (µk+1 − βZijt)− Φ (µk − βZijt) (A.12)
In turn, we obtain three distinct correction terms λkOP to address the selection bias.
Their particular shape and conditionality on the realized modes (categories 0, 1, 2a, or
2b) of the extensive margin level distinguish our ordered probit model from Heckman’s
(1979) conventional selection equation. The conditional error term of the intensive margin
σIME [ρvijt | Zijt, EMijt = k] transforms into:
σIMρλ
1
ijt = σIMρ
φ(µ1−βZijt)−φ(µ2a−βZijt)
Φ(µ2a−βZijt)−Φ(µ1−βZijt) if EMijt = 1
(cross− border)
σIMρλ
2a
ijt = σIMρ
φ(µ2a−βZijt)−φ(µ2b−βZijt)
Φ(µ2b−βZijt)−Φ(µ2a−βZijt) if EMijt = 2a
(cross− border and branches)
σIMρλ
2b
ijt = σIMρ
φ(µ2b−βZijt)
1−Φ(µ2b−βZijt) if EMijt = 2b
(cross− border, branches and subsidiaries)
which results in the correction term. In the equation for the intensive margin, σIMρ
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becomes part of the coefficient to estimate, whereas the regressor λkijt carries information
on the different cut-offs that characterize the extensive margin.
A.1.3 Estimating Bank Productivity
We estimate a baseline productivity measure using a model of bank production in line
withNakane and Weintraub (2005) and Mart´ın-Oliver and Salas-Fuma´s (2008). Thereby,
our results are easier to compare with literature investigating non-financial multinational
firms (e.g., Greenaway et al., 2007). We prefer the parsimonious measure of productivity
that focuses on the volume of financial services provided and include covariates to control
separately and more explicitly for the risk characteristics of banks, captured by CAMEL
variables (i.e., capitalization, asset quality, managerial skill, earnings, and liquidity).
Banks are intermediaries between savers and investors (Mart´ın-Oliver and Salas-Fuma´s,
2008), so the aggregate lending volume of a bank is specified as its output (Nakane and
Weintraub, 2005). The first input variable is the sum of deposits and other debt liabili-
ties. The second input is bank staff. In addition, banks must have physical facilities, such
as branches and offices, as well as IT and back-office infrastructures, to provide loans.
Because these variables cannot be adjusted quickly, we include fixed assets as a state
variable.
Unbiased estimation of bank productivity requires the specification of intermediate
inputs that are informative regarding productivity and influence output through their
impacts on factor accumulation. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest specifying inter-
mediate inputs, such as materials or electricity subtracted from gross value added, that
contribute to the production process and depend on productivity. For banks, equity cap-
ital can fulfill the key requirements of such an intermediate input. It is rarely used to
fund loans (Mester, 1997), but it indicates a bank’s risk-taking to markets and regulators
(Berger, 1995) and thus determines funding costs and demand. Because determining op-
timal levels of (costly) equity capital under regulatory constraints is a key task of bankers,
it should correlate with bank productivity.
We estimate bank productivity using a production function approach (Levinsohn and
Petrin, 2003). Consider a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for bank i in year
t:
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lnYit = β0 + βX lnXit + βK lnKit + βZ lnZit + ωit + ηit (A.13)
(A.11) Bank output is denoted as Yit, variable input factors by Xit, production factors
that are fixed in the short-run by Kit, and intermediate inputs required in the production
process as Zit. Of the two error components, ωit denotes unobservable productivity, and is
a random error term uncorrelated with banks’ input choices. Although widely discussed
in empirical literature on production functions, this issue has been virtually neglected in
bank productivity studies (cf. Nakane and Weintraub, 2005). Banks that experience a
positive productivity shock expand their production, which increases their input demand.
A negative productivity shock instead reduces their input demand. Interdependency in
factor choices and (unobservable) productivity creates biased estimates of ωit (Levinsohn
and Petrin, 2003), which indicates productivity is a state variable that influences a bank’s
input decision, leading to simultaneity problems when estimating production functions.
The same problem arises for their dual functions, that is, the cost and profit optimization
problems.
We use the program provided by Petrin et al. (2004) to implement the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) estimator of productivity and refer to them and the Discussion Paper
versions of this paper for further details.
A.2 Data Appendix
We obtained all bank data from unconsolidated balance sheets, profit and loss accounts,
and audit reports reported annually by all banks to the German central bank (Deutsche
Bundesbank). The variables for both the productivity estimation and the CAMEL vector
are corrected for outliers by truncating at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. Level
variables are deflated by the consumer price index. The country-specific variables come
from the various sources indicated next.
Bank-level variables
Borrowed funds Sum of deposits and other debt liabilities in EUR millions.
Capitalization Core capital as a percentage of gross total assets.
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Cost-to-income ratio Personnel expenditure as a percentage of total administrative
cost.
Employees Full-time equivalents.
Equity Gross total equity in EUR millions.
Lending Total customer loans in EUR millions.
Loan-loss provisions Stock of loan-loss provisions as a percentage of gross total loans.
Non-performing loans Loans with latent risks according to central bank auditors as a
percentage of total audited loans.
Physical capital Fixed assets including IT capital stock in EUR millions.
Productivity From Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), estimates of bank productivity.
Reserves Hidden reserves according to §340f of the German commercial code as a per-
centage of gross total assets.
Return on equity (ROE) Operating results, including net interest, fees, commissions,
and trading income as a percentage of equity capital.
Total assets Gross total assets.
Definition of banking groups Large banks represent the head institutions of the sav-
ings (“Landesbanken”) and the cooperative banking sectors, as well as the largest
commercial banks. Commercial banks are privately owned but not necessarily pub-
licly listed banks. Savings banks are (local) government-owned regional banks.
Cooperative banks are mutually owned regional banks.
Country-level variables
Activity restrictions Whether banks are restricted from engaging in securities under-
writing, insurance underwriting and selling, real estate investments, management,
and development. Higher values indicate more restrictions (Source: Beck et al.,
2006).
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Concentration Fraction of total assets held by the three largest banks in the economy
(Source: World Bank).
Capital regulation Combined measure of overall and initial capital stringency, ranging
from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency (Source: Beck et al.,
2006).
Developing country Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country is not a high-income
country, according to the income taxonomy of the Worldbank (Source: WDI, World-
bank).
Distance Geographic distance between Germany and host country j (Source: CEPII,
Paris).
Economic freedom Composite of 10 factors measuring institutional quality and poli-
cies pertaining to trade, government finances, government interventions, monetary
policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices,
property rights, regulation, and black market activity; higher values indicate better
institutions (Source: Beck et al., 2006).
FDI Aggregate volume of FDI in host country (Source: Microdatabase Foreign Direct
Investment (MiDi), Deutsche Bundesbank).
Financial center Indicator variable equal to 1 for Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the
UK, including the Channel Islands, following the definition of the “External Position
Report” (Source: Deutsche Bundesbank).
GDP per capita Gross domestic product in USD millions (2000 = 100).
GDP–growth correlations Correlation of German and destination country GDP in
the preceding five years.
Institutional quality Six dimensions of indices: voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption (Beck et al., 2006).
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Offshore destination Indicator variable equal to 1 for Hong Kong, Singapore, and the
Philippines, following the definition of the “External Position Report” (Source:
Deutsche Bundesbank).
Volatility Change of growth rate residuals, net of cyclical effects in the preceding five-
year period.
External Position Report
Data about the international assets of German banks come from the “External Position
Report” (“Auslandsstatus”) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. They are confidential and can
be used on the premises of the Deutsche Bundesbank only.
International assets Loans and advances to banks, companies, governments, bonds
and notes, foreign shares and other equity, participation abroad, denominated or
converted into euro.
Branches and subsidiaries Foreign affiliates of German parent banks. Branches do not
enjoy independent legal status, whereas subsidiaries do. Assets held by affiliates are
attributed to the country in which they are located.
List of countries United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, In-
donesia, Ireland, Israel, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Cayman Islands, Lithua-
nia, Luxemburg, Latvia, Morocco, Malta, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Swe-
den, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, South Africa.
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A.3 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Theoretical Predictions and Measurements
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Bank Productivity Estimates
Variable Mean S.d.
Percentiles
1st 50th 99th
Lending Y 1,333.6 11,666.6 5.1 197.4 18,939.7
Borrowed funds X1 1,257.9 10,329.0 5.9 233.7 13,023.9
Employees X2 270.6 1,188.4 5.4 92.0 2,593.0
Equity Z 106.0 722.0 1.3 19.2 1,506.1
Physical capital K 14.9 56.1 0.1 5.1 140.6
Notes: In Table A.2, the data are based on 12,569 observations for 2,439 banks between 2000 and 2006.
All monetary volumes are in EUR millions. Employees are full-time equivalents. Borrowed funds are the
sum of deposits and other debt liabilities.
Table A.3: Production Function Estimates
Levinsohn-Petrin OLS
Coefficient S.d. p-value Coefficient S.d. p-value
ln Employees 0.176 0.049 0.000 0.577 0.010 0.000
ln Borrowed funds 0.404 0.067 0.000 0.526 0.007 0.000
ln Physical capital 0.240 0.032 0.000 -0.035 0.007 0.000
Constant -0.129 0.030 0.000
Chi2 p-value F-test p-value
H0 = β1 + β2 + β3 = 1 17.4 0.000 345.8 0.000
R2 0.597
Notes: In Table A.3, estimates are based on 12,569 bank–year observations for the years 2000–2006.
Time-specific fixed effects are included but not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported for
estimates, following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003); OLS estimates are based on robust standard errors.
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Table A.4: CAMEL Profile and Productivity by Internationalization Mode
Domestic International
assets
Foreign
branches
Subsidiaries All banks
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Capitalization 5.85 3.11 5.42 2.62 4.10 3.40 3.78 4.46 5.76 3.02
Cost-income
ratio
44.10 9.17 41.07 10.56 25.65 14.69 26.23 12.09 43.45 9.58
Hidden
reserves
1.41 1.04 1.34 1.05 0.17 0.29 0.16 0.24 1.39 1.04
Loan-loss
provisions
5.40 7.83 5.17 10.61 2.94 4.20 2.54 2.88 5.35 8.46
Non-
performing
loans
0.96 1.21 0.97 1.03 0.81 0.86 0.66 0.61 0.96 1.18
Productivity 11.78 25.63 19.66 33.99 115.53 60.76 112.29 61.60 13.56 28.13
Return on
Equity
10.52 16.32 10.98 14.58 7.50 17.76 5.69 14.63 10.61 15.98
Notes: Descriptive statistics of parent bank-specific variables, measured in percentages except for pro-
ductivity. Parent banks are sorted by their mode of internationalization: Mode 1 (International assets),
Mode 2a (Foreign branches), and Mode 2b (Branches and subsidiaries). Variable definitions appear in
the Data Appendix.
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Table A.5: Country-Specific Variables
Variable Unit Mean S.d.
Percentiles
N1st 99th
Activity
restrictions
Score 8.89 2.53 4.00 14.00 174
Capital
regulation
Score 5.50 1.55 2.00 8.00 174
Concentration
of banking
market
% 64.24 20.54 22.73 99.32 304
Developing
destination
0/1 indicator 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 304
Distance Kilometers 4.92 4.55 0.28 18.12 304
Financial
center
destination
0/1 indicator 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 304
Foreign direct
investment
(FDI)
Bn EUR 11.60 30.90 0.01 212.00 304
GDP growth
correlations
% 35.44 49.63 -80.33 98.79 304
Gross domestic
product (GDP)
Bn USD 597.00 1,610.00 5.25 10,900.00 304
Institutional
quality
Score 3.53 0.52 2.18 4.50 174
Offshore
destination
0/1 indicator 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 304
GDP per
capita (log)
Tsd USD 16.54 16.71 0.57 71.87 304
Volatility of
foreign GDP
% 1.91 1.58 0.36 7.74 304
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Table A.6: Baseline Estimation Results
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Productivity Micro Macro Regulation Productivity Micro Macro Regulation
Productivity and selection
Correction term 3.9406*** -0.4161*** 0.2836*** 0.5669***
(0.0548) (0.0397) (0.0301) (0.0372)
Productivity 0.0048*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0346*** 0.0128*** 0.0146*** 0.0155***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Size 0.2791*** 0.4124*** 0.4356*** 0.1862*** 0.4252*** 0.5262***
(0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0107) (0.0099) (0.0116)
Bank-specific variables
Cost-income ratio 0.0047*** 0.0069*** 0.0071*** -0.0598*** -0.0591*** -0.0561***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Return on equity 0.0015*** 0.0021*** 0.0016*** -0.0003 0.0011* 0.0017**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Capitalization -0.0129*** -0.0185*** -0.0188*** 0.0279*** 0.0195*** 0.0212***
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0038)
Hidden reserves -0.0068*** -0.0131*** -0.0095*** -0.1803*** -0.2281*** -0.2346***
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0098)
Non-performing loans 0.0053** 0.0061** 0.0035 -0.1177*** -0.1006*** -0.0805***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0125)
Loan-loss provisions -0.0005* -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0143*** 0.0147*** 0.0131***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Country-specific variables
Gross domestic product (GDP) 0.1833*** 0.1980*** -0.4378*** -1.0102***
(0.0028) (0.0054) (0.0112) (0.0212)
GDP per capita 0.3570*** 0.1343*** -0.1860*** 0.6595***
(0.0046) (0.0094) (0.0206) (0.0438)
German FDI 0.1996*** 0.2881*** 0.7133*** 0.9179***
(0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0114) (0.0165)
Growth correlations 0.2469*** 0.1278*** -0.0526* -0.0247
(0.0066) (0.0099) (0.0290) (0.0388)
Growth volatility -0.0074*** -0.0740*** 0.1523*** 0.1303***
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0084) (0.0122)
Distance -0.1757*** -0.3426*** 0.1656*** 0.3885***
(0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0119) (0.0172)
Concentration 0.6128*** 0.1565*** -1.6782*** -3.9171***
(0.0135) (0.0211) (0.0502) (0.0825)
Activity restrictions -0.0876*** 0.0244***
(0.0019) (0.0070)
Capital restrictions -0.1109*** 0.0361***
(0.0021) (0.0078)
Institutional quality 0.0096 -0.2245***
(0.0142) (0.0565)
Intercepts and fixed effects
East German banks -0.2115*** -0.3270*** -0.3510*** 0.7536*** 0.6434*** 0.4145***
(0.0072) (0.0087) (0.0108) (0.0326) (0.0308) (0.0357)
Large banks 1.6847*** 2.3272*** 2.3492***
(0.0204) (0.0232) (0.0319)
Commercial banks 0.2607*** 0.4064*** 0.3578***
(0.0084) (0.0097) (0.0125)
Savings banks -0.1059*** -0.1421*** -0.1628***
(0.0057) (0.0068) (0.0086)
Euro Area 0.8850*** -0.1416*** -0.4961*** 1.9278*** 1.7396*** 2.2315***
(0.0047) (0.0063) (0.0095) (0.0305) (0.0214) (0.0359)
Offshore destination -0.3893*** -0.1526*** -0.9356*** -0.7185***
(0.0147) (0.0192) (0.0684) (0.0912)
Developing destination -0.3778*** -0.3885*** 0.1888*** -1.0713***
(0.0106) (0.0194) (0.0501) (0.0943)
Financial center destination 0.8502*** 0.3274*** 0.3207*** 1.1554***
(0.0106) (0.0159) (0.0290) (0.0414)
Constant -1.2847*** 5.8681*** 6.6187*** 10.5808***
(0.0788) (0.1010) (0.3484) (0.5585)
Cut-off 1 0.8998*** 2.0056*** 12.4399*** 8.7965***
(0.0019) (0.0172) (0.0638) (0.1201)
Cut-off 2 3.0711*** 4.6935*** 16.0496*** 12.7090***
(0.0103) (0.0226) (0.0683) (0.1230)
Cut-off 3 3.3637*** 5.0845*** 16.4922*** 13.2597***
(0.0149) (0.0267) (0.0700) (0.1253)
Observations and diagnostics
Observations 632,835 618,786 608,964 343,770 128,745 126,964 126,885 94,329
McFadden R² 0.0133 0.1347 0.4028 0.4125 0.1015 0.2096 0.2922 0.2893
F-tests: All equal to zero 86,490 256,636 170,327 2,246 2,096 1,372
Micro 25,434 35,476 24,818 619.6 995.2 798.5
Macro 114,927 63,585 1,419 938.4
Regulation 5,299 16.27
Banking groups 8,648 12,732 6,942
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Notes: The selection equation (Extensive Margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model and includes
unreported dummies for banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the mode
of foreign activities. The primary equation (Intensive Margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent
variable is the log volume of international assets. Standard errors are in brackets, and time-fixed effects
are included but not reported. Productivity is obtained by the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin
2003. For further variable descriptions, see the Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant
at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.
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Table A.7: Marginal Effects
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
β dlny/δlnxm=0 dlny/δlnxm=1 dlny/δlnxm=2a dlny/δlnxm=2b β dlny/δlnx
Productivity and selection
Correction term 0.5669*** 0.0823***
(0.0372) (0.0054)
Productivity 0.0005*** -0.0020*** 0.0101*** 0.0341 0.0379*** 0.0155*** 0.0614***
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0731) (0.0074) (0.0003) (0.0013)
Size 0.4356*** -0.3911*** 1.9687*** 6.6097 7.3497*** 0.5262*** 0.3958***
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0150) (14.1391) (0.0692) (0.0116) (0.0087)
Bank-specific variables
Cost-income ratio 0.0071*** -0.0922*** 0.4643*** 1.559 1.7335*** -0.0561*** -0.4837***
(0.0004) (0.0055) (0.0275) (3.3237) (0.1034) (0.0013) (0.0109)
Return on equity 0.0016*** -0.0051*** 0.0258*** 0.0867 0.0965*** 0.0017** 0.0039**
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0036) (0.1858) (0.0133) (0.0008) (0.0017)
Capitalization -0.0188*** 0.0324*** -0.1629*** -0.5469 -0.6081*** 0.0212*** 0.0240***
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0104) (1.1718) (0.0390) (0.0038) (0.0043)
Hidden reserves -0.0095*** 0.0039*** -0.0198*** -0.0665 -0.0740*** -0.2346*** -0.0659***
(0.0032) (0.0013) (0.0068) (0.1445) (0.0253) (0.0098) (0.0027)
Non-performing loans 0,0035 -0,001 0,0051 0.017 0,0189 -0.0805*** -0.0163***
(0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0048) (0.0398) (0.0179) (0.0125) (0.0025)
Loan-loss provisions -0,0002 0,0004 -0,0018 -0.006 -0,0067 0.0131*** 0.0142***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0160) (0.0103) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Country-specific variables
Gross domestic product (GDP) 0.1980*** -1.5465*** 7.7850*** 26.1368 29.0633*** -1.0102*** -5.6980***
(0.0054) (0.0429) (0.2141) (55.4173) (0.8149) (0.0212) (0.1202)
GDP per capita 0.1343*** -0.3716*** 1.8706*** 6.2803 6.9835*** 0.6595*** 1.3861***
(0.0094) (0.0260) (0.1310) (13.3213) (0.4903) (0.0438) (0.0921)
German FDI 0.2881*** -1.2747*** 6.4166*** 21.5428 23.9548*** 0.9179*** 3.1511***
(0.0042) (0.0181) (0.0974) (46.2447) (0.3836) (0.0165) (0.0571)
Growth correlations 0.1278*** -0.0155*** 0.0781*** 0.2621 0.2915*** -0.0247 -0.0033
(0.0099) (0.0012) (0.0061) (0.5598) (0.0227) (0.0388) (0.0052)
Growth volatility -0.0740*** 0.0436*** -0.2194*** -0.7366 -0.8191*** 0.1303*** 0.0392***
(0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0077) (1.5826) (0.0292) (0.0122) (0.0037)
Distance -0.3426*** 0.8283*** -4.1697*** -13.9991 -15.5666*** 0.3885*** 0.5976***
(0.0043) (0.0110) (0.0533) (29.9672) (0.2166) (0.0172) (0.0265)
Concentration 0.1565*** -0.0308*** 0.1552*** 0.5209 0.5793*** -3.9171*** -0.5304***
(0.0211) (0.0041) (0.0210) (1.0798) (0.0782) (0.0825) (0.0112)
Activity restrictions -0.0876*** 0.2323*** -1.1693*** -3.9257 -4.3652*** 2.2315*** 0.1565***
(0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0257) (8.3913) (0.0987) (0.0359) (0.0025)
Capital restrictions -0.1109*** 0.1815*** -0.9136*** -3.0672 -3.4106*** 0.0244*** 0.0400***
(0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0174) (6.5596) (0.0675) (0.0070) (0.0115)
Institutional quality 0.0096 -0.0101 0.0507 0.1703 0.1894 0.0361*** 0.0424***
(0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0755) (0.3968) (0.2817) (0.0078) (0.0092)
Intercepts and fixed effects
East German banks -0.3510*** 0.0097*** -0.0488*** -0.164 -0.1823*** 0.4145*** 0.0070***
(0.0108) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.3508) (0.0058) (0.0357) (0.0006)
Large banks 2.3492*** -0.0065*** 0.0327*** 0.1098 0.1221***
(0.0319) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.2348) (0.0020)
Commercial banks 0.3578*** -0.0075*** 0.0376*** 0.1264 0.1405***
(0.0125) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.2705) (0.0050)
Savings banks -0.1628*** 0.0118*** -0.0593*** -0.199 -0.2212***
(0.0086) (0.0006) (0.0031) (0.4259) (0.0117)
Euro Area -0.4961*** 0.0338*** -0.1703*** -0.5718 -0.6359*** -0.2245*** -0.1774***
(0.0095) (0.0007) (0.0033) (1.2261) (0.0127) (0.0565) (0.0447)
Offshore destination -0.1526*** 0.0026*** -0.0131*** -0.044 -0.0489*** -0.7185*** -0.0023***
(0.0192) (0.0003) (0.0017) (0.0945) (0.0062) (0.0912) (0.0003)
Developing destination -0.3885*** 0.0729*** -0.3668*** -1.2316 -1.3695*** -1.0713*** -0.1998***
(0.0194) (0.0037) (0.0184) (2.6047) (0.0689) (0.0943) (0.0176)
Financial center destination 0.3274*** -0.0056*** 0.0281*** 0.0943 0.1049*** 1.1554*** 0.0445***
(0.0159) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.2022) (0.0052) (0.0414) (0.0016)
Constant 10.5808***
(0.5585)
Cut-off 1 8.6399***
(0.1176)
Cut-off 2 12.5524***
(0.1206)
Cut-off 3 13.1031***
(0.1229)
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Notes: The selection equation (Extensive Margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model and includes
unreported dummies for banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the mode
of foreign activities. The primary equation (Intensive Margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent
variable is the log volume of international assets. Time-fixed effects are included but not reported.
Productivity is obtained using the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin 2003. For further variable
descriptions, see the Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant
at 10% level.
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Table A.8: Results per Banking Group
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
All Large Com’cl Savings Coop’s All Large Com’cl Savings Coop’s
Productivity and selection
Correction term 0.567*** 1.178*** 2.478*** 3.634*** 6.071***
(0.037) (0.072) (0.098) (0.107) (0.103)
Productivity 0.000*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.011*** -0.006*** 0.101*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Size 0.436*** 0.390*** 0.515*** 0.253*** 0.296*** 0.526*** 0.626*** 1.483*** 0.710*** 1.309***
(0.003) (0.032) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.044) (0.040) (0.020) (0.020)
Bank-specific variables
Cost-income ratio 0.007*** 0.050*** 0.008*** -0.007*** 0.009*** -0.056*** 0.014** -0.034*** -0.050*** 0.021***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Return on equity 0.002*** -0,001 0.002*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.002** -0.014*** 0 0,003 0.022***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Capitalization -0.019*** 0.103*** -0.010*** -0.034*** -0.023*** 0.021*** -0.128** 0,002 -0.183*** -0.060***
(0.001) (0.037) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.058) (0.005) (0.020) (0.010)
Hidden reserves -0.009*** -0,243 0,005 -0.010* 0.020*** -0.235*** -0,173 0.316*** 0.116*** 0,017
(0.003) (0.172) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.253) (0.049) (0.015) (0.015)
Non-performing loans 0,004 0,103 -0.013*** 0.055*** 0.074*** -0.081*** 0,086 -0.137*** -0,04 0.324***
(0.003) (0.095) (0.004) (0.019) (0.008) (0.012) (0.145) (0.015) (0.053) (0.024)
Loan-loss provisions 0 0.047** 0.001*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.013*** -0.055* 0.014*** 0,008 -0.073***
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.009) (0.004)
Country-specific variables
GDP 0.198*** -0.131*** 0.153*** 0.328*** 0.139*** -1.010*** -0.308*** 0,012 0,022 -1.019***
(0.005) (0.048) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.021) (0.073) (0.062) (0.039) (0.027)
GDP per capita 0.134*** 0.125* 0.135*** 0.295*** 0.045*** 0.659*** 1.477*** 0.544*** 2.067*** 1.162***
(0.009) (0.075) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.044) (0.115) (0.113) (0.074) (0.061)
German FDI 0.288*** 0.402*** 0.175*** 0.234*** 0.357*** 0.918*** 0.782*** 0.749*** 1.063*** 2.475***
(0.004) (0.034) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.051) (0.045) (0.028) (0.030)
Growth correlations 0.128*** 0,008 -0.153*** -0.080*** 0.313*** -0,025 -0,064 -0.273** -0.641*** 1.527***
(0.010) (0.086) (0.031) (0.018) (0.014) (0.039) (0.127) (0.110) (0.060) (0.056)
Growth volatility -0.074*** -0,002 -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.100*** 0.130*** 0,009 0.067** 0.051*** -0.180***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) (0.032) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
Distance -0.343*** -0,056 -0.300*** -0.457*** -0.298*** 0.388*** -0.355*** -0.695*** -0.573*** -0.379***
(0.004) (0.041) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.059) (0.051) (0.036) (0.027)
Concentration 0.157*** 0,199 0,109 0.380*** 0.100*** -3.917*** -2.122*** -2.573*** -2.725*** -3.663***
(0.021) (0.180) (0.068) (0.041) (0.028) (0.083) (0.276) (0.234) (0.137) (0.107)
Activity restrictions -0.088*** 0.046*** -0.040*** -0.112*** -0.088*** 0.024*** 0.076*** -0.078*** -0.163*** -0.317***
(0.002) (0.017) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.026) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010)
Capital restrictions -0.111*** 0,004 -0,011 -0.113*** -0.129*** 0.036*** 0.067** 0,033 -0.267*** -0.368***
(0.002) (0.019) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.029) (0.023) (0.013) (0.012)
Institutional quality 0,01 0.218* 0,066 -0.236*** 0.128*** -0.224*** -0.906*** -0.758*** -0.790*** 0.544***
(0.014) (0.114) (0.043) (0.026) (0.019) (0.057) (0.174) (0.156) (0.092) (0.072)
Intercepts and fixed effects
East German banks -0.351*** -0.395*** -0.163*** -0,005 -0.245*** 0.414*** -1.701*** 0.601*** 0.871*** -0.226***
(0.011) (0.098) (0.050) (0.024) (0.017) (0.036) (0.147) (0.169) (0.067) (0.052)
Euro Area -0.496*** -0.188* -0,027 -0.420*** -0.621*** 2.231*** 0.624*** 0.640*** 1.574*** 0.345***
(0.009) (0.098) (0.032) (0.019) (0.012) (0.036) (0.136) (0.105) (0.059) (0.058)
Offshore destination -0.153*** 0.576*** 0.149*** 0.072** -0.412*** -0.718*** 0.883*** -0,025 0.253* -3.298***
(0.019) (0.143) (0.055) (0.034) (0.029) (0.091) (0.219) (0.216) (0.141) (0.140)
Developing country -0.389*** 0,137 -0.222*** -0.734*** -0.254*** -1.071*** -0,254 -0,194 -4.291*** -2.575***
(0.019) (0.155) (0.059) (0.036) (0.027) (0.094) (0.235) (0.243) (0.159) (0.131)
Financial center 0.327*** 0.703*** 0.257*** 0.234*** 0.379*** 1.155*** 1.505*** 1.428*** 1.747*** 0.577***
(0.016) (0.149) (0.053) (0.036) (0.020) (0.041) (0.221) (0.145) (0.070) (0.049)
Constant 10.581*** -3.113** -7.036*** -23.471*** -23.504***
(0.559) (1.549) (1.485) (1.120) (0.988)
Cut-off 1 8.640*** 5.351*** 7.288*** 9.619*** 8.223***
(0.118) (1.032) (0.377) (0.231) (0.157)
Cut-off 2 12.552*** 9.313*** 10.337*** 14.642*** 12.945***
(0.121) (1.047) (0.381) (0.253) (0.174)
Cut-off 3 13.103*** 10.247*** 10.867*** 14.812***
(0.123) (1.048) (0.383) (0.262)
Observations 343,770 3,185 24,080 83,300 233,205 94,329 2,839 9,131 28,874 53,471
R² 0.412 0.375 0.326 0.407 0.43 0.29 0.656 0.315 0.251 0.356
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Notes: Large banks represent the largest commercial banks, Landesbanken, and central cooperatives.
Commercial banks are privately owned banks; savings and cooperative banks are regionally operating
small banks, owned either mutually or by (regional) governments. The selection equation (Extensive
Margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model and includes unreported dummies for banking groups as
exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the mode of foreign market entry. The primary equation
(Intensive Margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the log volume of international
assets. Time-fixed effects are included but not reported. The sample spans the period 2002 to 2006.
Productivity is obtained with the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin 2003. For further variable
descriptions, see the Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant
at 10% level.
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Table A.9: Results Using Alternative Productivity Measures
Levinsohn-Petrin productivity measure Cost efficiency Labor productivity
Extensive margin Intensive margin Extensive margin Intensive margin Extensive margin Intensive margin
Productivity and selection
Correction term 0.4414*** -0.1062** 0.3302***
(0.0378) (0.0430) (0.0421)
Productivity 0.0002** 0.0207*** 0.3034*** 0.7807*** 0.0225 -7.2568***
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0371) (0.1167) (0.0359) (0.1273)
Size 0.4216*** 0.6491*** 0.4110*** 0.6352*** 0.4279*** 0.5484***
(0.0029) (0.0113) (0.0035) (0.0132) (0.0033) (0.0129)
Bank-specific variables
Return on equity 0.0016*** -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0111*** 0.0019*** -0.0016*
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0008)
Capitalization -0.0143*** -0.0197*** -0.0189*** -0.0606*** -0.0132*** 0.0394***
(0.0012) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0058) (0.0013) (0.0042)
Hidden reserves -0.0051 -0.2489*** -0.0050 -0.3629*** -0.0012 -0.3346***
(0.0032) (0.0098) (0.0039) (0.0118) (0.0036) (0.0107)
Non-performing loans 0.0081** -0.1587*** 0.0276*** -0.3147*** 0.0140*** -0.0639***
(0.0033) (0.0125) (0.0063) (0.0207) (0.0035) (0.0138)
Loan-loss provisions -0.0002 0.0146*** -0.0030*** 0.0145*** -0.0004 0.0057***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0012)
Country-specific variables
GDP 0.1978*** -1.0262*** 0.1992*** -1.2180*** 0.1968*** -1.1101***
(0.0054) (0.0215) (0.0066) (0.0254) (0.0063) (0.0239)
GDP per capita 0.1344*** 0.6599*** 0.2041*** 0.6751*** 0.1920*** 0.7154***
(0.0094) (0.0443) (0.0113) (0.0543) (0.0107) (0.0506)
German FDI 0.2875*** 0.8964*** 0.2870*** 0.8508*** 0.2792*** 0.8988***
(0.0042) (0.0167) (0.0050) (0.0196) (0.0047) (0.0185)
Growth correlations 0.1278*** -0.0450 0.1100*** 0.2768*** 0.1000*** 0.2913***
(0.0099) (0.0392) (0.0115) (0.0458) (0.0109) (0.0432)
Growth volatility -0.0739*** 0.1423*** -0.0664*** 0.2220*** -0.0626*** 0.1955***
(0.0026) (0.0123) (0.0033) (0.0151) (0.0031) (0.0141)
Distance -0.3420*** 0.4205*** -0.3457*** 0.6853*** -0.3408*** 0.5406***
(0.0043) (0.0174) (0.0051) (0.0206) (0.0048) (0.0196)
Concentration 0.1566*** -3.9640*** 0.0452* -4.5045*** 0.0545** -4.3979***
(0.0211) (0.0834) (0.0247) (0.0969) (0.0234) (0.0911)
Activity restrictions -0.0875*** 0.0333*** -0.0960*** 0.0610*** -0.0914*** 0.0266***
(0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0023) (0.0084) (0.0022) (0.0080)
Capital restrictions -0.1106*** 0.0464*** -0.0990*** 0.1233*** -0.0944*** 0.0947***
(0.0021) (0.0079) (0.0025) (0.0093) (0.0023) (0.0088)
Institutional quality 0.0102 -0.2446*** -0.0818*** -0.4462*** -0.0671*** -0.5125***
(0.0142) (0.0571) (0.0167) (0.0676) (0.0158) (0.0636)
Intercepts and fixed effects
East German banks -0.3106*** 0.2396*** -0.2783*** 0.3859*** -0.3078*** 0.5648***
(0.0106) (0.0358) (0.0133) (0.0442) (0.0121) (0.0407)
Euro Area -0.4949*** 2.2960*** -0.5000*** 2.3275*** -0.4737*** 2.1158***
(0.0095) (0.0363) (0.0113) (0.0436) (0.0107) (0.0410)
Offshore destination -0.1537*** -0.6344*** -0.0593*** -0.6569*** -0.0683*** -0.7440***
(0.0192) (0.0922) (0.0226) (0.1101) (0.0215) (0.1031)
Developing country -0.3887*** -1.0710*** -0.4442*** -0.7433*** -0.4212*** -0.8182***
(0.0194) (0.0953) (0.0232) (0.1164) (0.0220) (0.1088)
Financial center 0.3262*** 1.1933*** 0.4053*** 1.2738*** 0.3587*** 1.2286***
(0.0158) (0.0419) (0.0196) (0.0503) (0.0180) (0.0475)
Cut-off 1 8.4372*** 8.8488*** 8.6003***
(0.1181) (0.1454) (0.1353)
Cut-off 2 12.3410*** 12.8481*** 12.5114***
(0.1209) (0.1488) (0.1384)
Cut-off 3 12.8838*** 13.4032*** 13.0645***
(0.1231) (0.1512) (0.1409)
Constant 8.4291*** 13.0875*** 11.8497***
(0.5622) (0.6721) (0.6174)
Observations 343,770 94,329 239,820 68,702 268,975 74,954
R² 0.2741 0.2494 0.2709
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Notes: Levinsohn-Petrin is the same productivity used in the remaining Tables. Cost efficiency is an
estimate of systematic deviations from optimal (latent) cost frontiers as in Levinsohn and Petrin 2003.
Labor productivity is total assets scaled by total employment. For details, see Section 2.2.3 of the main
text. The selection equation (Extensive Margin) is estimated as an ordered probit model and includes
unreported dummies for banking groups as exclusion restrictions. The dependent variable is the mode of
foreign market entry. The primary equation (Intensive Margin) is estimated with OLS. The dependent
variable is the log volume of international assets. Time-fixed effects are included but not reported. The
sample spans the period 2002 to 2006. Productivity is obtained with the method proposed by Levinsohn
and Petrin 2003. For further variable descriptions, see the Data Appendix. ***Significant at 1% level.
**Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level.
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Figure A.1: Volumes of Investment: Total Volume
Notes: Total volume is in EUR millions and indicates the total international assets of all banks in a
specific Mode, aggregated across countries. Mode 1 (International assets), Mode 2a (Foreign branches),
and Mode 2b (Branches and subsidiaries).
Figure A.2: Volumes of Investment: Mean Volume
Notes: Mean volume is in EUR millions and gives the mean international assets of banks. Mode 1
(International assets), Mode 2a (Foreign branches), and Mode 2b (Branches and subsidiaries), aggregated
across countries.

3Do banks benefit from
internationalization?
Revisiting the market power-risk
nexus1
The ongoing turmoil in the international financial system calls the potential benefits of
bank globalization into question (see Global Committee on the Global Financial System,
2011). Concerns include that large, internationally active banks may enjoy too much
market power and that bank internationalization may increase bank risk. Many studies
analyze the effects of foreign banks in destination economies2 or performance differences
between domestic and foreign banks abroad3. But evidence regarding the influence of
bank internationalization on market power and risk in the home country is virtually
absent from the literature. We close this gap and analyze the implications of bank in-
ternationalization on the domestic market power-risk nexus. We use detailed bank-level
1This chapter draws on joint work with Claudia M. Buch and Michael Koetter. It relies on an updated
version of Buch et al. (2010) and is forthcoming in the Review of Finance (2012, Copyright by Oxford
University Press). Section 3.5 details on my contribution to these papers.
2For example, Mian (2006) and Detragiache et al. (2008) show that credit supply declines after the
entry of foreign banks in host countries. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) report on the basis of within-host
country differences among credit relationships that access to credit is not different between domestic and
foreign banks. Survey-based evidence by Popov and Udell (2012), in turn, indicates that international
banks hit by the crisis contracted loan supply. These studies do not elaborate on the effects of foreign
activities on banks in the home country.
3See Claessens and van Horen (2012) for recent evidence and an overview of the literature.
56 3. DO BANKS BENEFIT FROM INTERNATIONALIZATION?
data on financial accounts and international exposures of all German banks provided by
the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Buch et al., 2011a). The data allow us to identify the
number of countries where banks are active (the extensive margin), the share of foreign
relative to total assets (the intensive margin), and the different modes of entry into for-
eign markets (cross-border asset holdings versus foreign branches). A key contribution
of this paper is the ability to differentiate between cross-border activities and operating
branches abroad.4 Based on prudential financial accounts data, we estimate mark-ups as
the (scaled) difference between average revenues and marginal cost, the Lerner index. It
is a bank-specific measure of market power (see Koetter et al. (2010)). To find a measure
of bank risk, we use distress events as collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Dam
and Koetter (2012)). We apply a system estimator that accounts for the simultaneous
determination of market power and risk conditional on bank internationalization.
This paper contributes to three strands of previous literature. First, several papers
focus on the determinants of cross-border expansion by banks (see Berger et al. (2003);
Buch and Lipponer (2007); De Haas and Van Horen (2011); Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005)).
These studies find that regulatory and cultural barriers limit the international expansion
of banks, which are overcome more easily by larger and more profitable banks. We
account for this bank heterogeneity but ask the reverse question: Given that banks are
active abroad, how does this foreign presence influence their market power-risk tradeoff?
Especially banks with sufficient margins and/or more appetite for risk might decide to
expand internationally. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we adapt the method
of Frankel and Romer (1999). These concerns arise from possibly existing correlations
among foreign activities, mark-ups, and risk among all banks in a large, developed banking
system.5
Second, whereas a plethora of studies analyze the determinants of bank risk, these
studies usually ignore the role of bank internationalization.6 Amihud et al. (2002) examine
the risk effects of cross-border bank mergers and report that, on average, cross-border
4Usually, banks with a majority stake in a host country bank are considered international, see e.g.
Detragiache et al. (2008). But cross-border lending and foreign presences are at least as important a
channel for international banking.
5They use the geographic component of international trade as an instrument for actual trade. We
adapt their method to a panel context and exploit the fact that foreign GDP is a time-varying variable,
which is exogenous to the individual bank.
6See, for example, De Nicolo (2000), Gonzalez (2005), and Beltratti and Stulz (2011).
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bank mergers do not change the risk of acquiring banks. Meon and Weill (2005) study
the impact of cross-border mergers in Europe on banks’ exposures to macroeconomic risks.
They find potential gains in risk diversification from cross-border mergers. Ongena et al.
(2011) show that loose home-country regulation and supervision are associated with more
risk taking by internationally active banks. We extend these studies because we analyze
all modes of entry into foreign markets, not just mergers and acquisitions. Besides, we
adjust foreign exposures for GDP growth and stock market return correlation between
destination countries and the home market, Germany.
Third, the market power-risk nexus for banks has also been extensively studied. Many
cross-country studies report a negative relationship between market power and bank risk
(see, e.g. Beck, 2008; Schaeck et al., 2009). This result is in line with the theories of
Allen and Gale (2004) and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) who argue that less in-
tense competition increases banks’ margins and buffers against loan losses. Alternatively,
Boyd and De Nicolo` (2005) show that banks with more market power may inflict exces-
sively high funding costs on corporate customers, ultimately transcending into worsening
default rates, and subsequently bank instability. For a sample of 60 developing countries,
Ariss (2010) confirms a negative relationship between market power and bank stability.
Aside from the general neglect of international bank activities, the failure of virtually all
empirical studies to account for the simultaneous relationship between banks’ mark-ups
and risk may partly explain the controversial empirical evidence. Similar to Degryse and
Ongena (2001) we therefore take this simultaneity between (continuous) Lerner mark-ups
and (discrete) distress events explicitly into account and specify a system of two equations.
The main results of this paper are threefold.
First, after accounting for the joint determination of market power and risk and after
including banks’ international activities, we find a negative relationship between market
power and risk. This finding aligns with the majority of the empirical market power-risk
nexus literature. Second, we find that larger international exposures in terms of volume
(intensive margin) imply higher market power at home as suggested by Lerner indices.
Our key contribution to distinguish between different foreign market entry modes now
takes center stage: The operations of foreign branches rather than mere cross-border
transactions drive the positive effect of higher foreign volumes on domestic market power.
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This result could indicate that the gains from a larger customer pool on core markets
enhance the ability of banks to generate private information that can also be beneficial in
home markets to generate mark-ups (see Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). We further find
that activities in more foreign markets (extensive margin) reduce domestic market power
which is also driven by the activities of branches. Apparently, only some banks can reap
the profits from internationalization, whereas the costs of monitoring a large portfolio
outweigh diversification benefits for others.
Third, empirical evidence about how internationalization shapes risk is rather weak.
We do only find significant effects when considering the foreign business of branches. In
this light, maintaining a network of branches in many countries (extensive margin) lowers
the risk of the domestic parent bank. However, a higher volume of foreign operations
through branches (intensive margin) goes along with more risks for the domestic parent
bank.
In Section 3.1 we develop theoretical hypotheses regarding the relationship between
bank internationalization and the market power-risk nexus. In Section 3.3 we present the
data and descriptive statistics. The empirical model is described in Section 3.3, followed
by regression results in Section 3.4 and conclusions in Section 3.5.
3.1 Theoretical Hypothesis
The core research question is whether international activities affect the market power and
risk of banks. We develop hypotheses based on the banking literature that deals with the
determinants of global banking, portfolio effects, and the market power-risk nexus.
From a theoretical point of view, the relationship between market power and bank
risk is ambiguous. It might be negative for two reasons (see Allen and Gale, 2004). First,
because more concentrated banking systems reduce incentives of bankers to lend recklessly.
Second, because supervision by regulators might be more effective in more concentrated
systems. Hauswald and Marquez (2006) further show that increasing competitive pressure,
for instance due to foreign contestants, may reduce the customer pool of the average bank,
and thus a domestic bank’s ability to generate private information. Larger information
asymmetries can then increase average credit risk. Alternatively, market power may
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increase risk taking if banks can roll over loan risk by charging higher interest rates to
customers (see Boyd and De Nicolo`, 2005). If borrowers endogenously choose the risk
of their project, an increase in lending rates increases risk due to an adverse selection
effect. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) show that this risk shifting effect is due to
the assumption that loan default rates are perfectly correlated. They introduce imperfect
correlation of loan default rates and show that there is an additional margin effect: More
competition lowers (expected) loan rates and thus reduces buffers against loan losses.
Banks become riskier. The net effect is ambiguous, and we will thus explore which effect
dominates in the German data.
H1: The relationship between bank market power and risk is ambiguous.
We measure market power with bank-specific Lerner indices, which equal the difference
between average revenues and marginal costs, scaled by average revenues.7 Internation-
alization may affect bank market power through costs, revenues, or both. In contrast to
literature on multinational corporations, a generally accepted model of the international
bank does not exists (see Goldberg, 2004). However, existing literature implicitly indi-
cates how internationalization should affect the two components of Lerner indices, average
revenues and marginal cost.
Regarding the revenue channel, internationalization should increase mark-ups because
banks have more opportunities to generate private information that can also be exploited
in the domestic market. Ball and Tschoegl (1982) and Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) have
been among the first to show that banks follow their corporate customers abroad. Private
information about foreign markets that is acquired through these relationships is valuable
because it may facilitate the venturing abroad of the very bank’s other domestic cus-
tomers. Such information can therefore provide banks with a competitive advantage due
to international activities.8 This aspect could be particularly relevant in Germany, where
many mid-sized firms are internationally active and the banking market is characterized
7We prefer Lerner mark-ups over, for example, bank return measures because we are primarily inter-
ested in analyzing the effect of bank internationalization on the market power-risk nexus. Furthermore,
accounting-based return measures neglect random noise (see Bauer et al., 1998) and too few German
banks are listed to permit the use of market-based return measures to assess competition in the entire
banking industry. Given the ongoing debate in the literature on how to measure competition and market
power in banking (Delis and Kouretas, 2011), we consider below also simple market shares as well as
Boone (2008) indicators as alternatives to the Lerner index.
8See Degryse and Ongena, 2005 for a discussion of the role of distance in banking
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by many small and regionally focused banks. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
German “Sparkassen” perceive their limited presence on foreign markets to be a disad-
vantage compared to larger commercial banks. Likewise, Brickley et al. (2011) show that
small community banks in the U.S. prefer so-called banker’s banks over large, national
financial institutions to act as correspondent banks to avoid sharing private information
on local business with these larger potential competitors.9 Banker’s banks are thus a
specific form of direct investment by community banks to conduct out-of-state business
in order to preserve an informational, i.e. competitive advantage inherent to their local
business relationships. Overall, we expect that foreign activities are positively related
with higher average revenues due to superior abilities to generate private information as
well as a broader scope of potential customers.
The second channel through which foreign bank activities can affect market power
relies on marginal costs. In the banking literature, Hauswald and Marquez (2006) empha-
size that new contestants reduce the average number of customers per bank. This decline
erodes the ability to properly assess credit applicants because the pool of private infor-
mation sources contracts. Reduced information generation capability can be countered
by a more intensive use of information and communication technology, which increases
the screening cost of the bank. International activities provide the bank with access to
additional information sources, for instance by means of a larger customer base, but also
by means of the mere addition of country expertise. Ceteris paribus, such banks should
have lower cost to generate private information and thus exhibit larger mark-ups. With
reference to the international trade literature, differences in marginal costs across firms
reflect productivity differences which in turn are often assumed to be exogenous. However,
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) show that small Canadian export starters invest in technology
to raise their productivity sufficiently enough as to compete in foreign markets. Interna-
tional trade, yet, generates learning effects, which in turn leads to endogenous technology
improvements that reduce marginal cost. In this vein, international banks might improve
their productivity, reduce their marginal costs, and thus improve their mark-ups. Overall,
we expect both the information generation effect and the productivity effect of interna-
tional activities to reduce the marginal costs. The market power of banks should therefore
9Banker’s banks are cooperatives that are owned by community banks. They provide correspondent
banking services, such as loan participation, check clearing, but also international services.
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improve due to higher revenues and reduced marginal costs.
H2: The expected impact of internationalization on market power at
home is positive.
Modeling banks as portfolio managers that optimize their expected utility as a pos-
itive function of expected profits and a negative function of expected portfolio risk, has
a relatively long tradition in the banking literature (see Rochet, 2008). Given the close
relationship between returns and mark-ups to measure market power, this literature pro-
vides guidance regarding the effects of international activities on risk. The international
diversification of exposures may reduce bank risk (see, e.g., Berger 2000) if the correla-
tion between domestic and foreign exposure returns is sufficiently low or even negative.
Therefore, we control for both correlations: first for the correlation between destination
country output and equity returns and second for correlation between German output
and equity returns.10
Two effects might counterbalance this potential diversification effect. First, banks
have incentives to shift risk to countries where the regulatory safety net and its associated
implicit and explicit guarantees are underpriced (see John et al., 1991, 2000). Second,
an internationally active bank may face severe monitoring problems related to the loan
customer base or the operating cost structure of managing numerous large international
exposures. Taken together, the joint effect might ultimately increase the risk of the bank
(Winton, 1999). If monitoring and information costs are high, bank risk might increase,
in particular when banks operate on geographically distant markets.
To capture diversification effects, we use information on the number of countries in
which banks are active (the extensive margin). The expected impact on risk is negative.
The effect of the share of foreign activities in total assets (the intensive margin) on bank
risk is ambiguous. We do also explore the extent to which it depends on the correlation
of destination markets with the German market and geographical distance, with both
presumably increasing risk.
H3: A greater degree of diversification of foreign assets lowers bank risk.
The impact of a higher volume of foreign assets is ambiguous.
10We consider output and equity correlations for lack of preferable data on the returns on foreign
financial exposures.
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3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To test these three hypotheses on the relationship between bank internationalization,
market power, and risk, we use several proprietary bank-level datasets provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank. The detailed database on banks’ international assets is an impor-
tant novelty of this paper11. This so-called “External Position Report” provides com-
prehensive information on international balance-sheet assets of German banks and their
foreign branches month-by-month12, and country-by-country. Foreign assets comprise
loans to banks and non-banks, stocks, and bonds but exclude off-balance sheet items
except irrevocable credit commitments. The sample period ranges from 2003 to 2006.
Reporting thresholds on international positions were abolished in 2002. We focus on the
pre-crisis period to exclude the effect of government interventions on international bank
activities. Instead, we focus on bank behavior for a period which is not affected by such
interventions.
We complement the “External Position Report” with information from prudential fi-
nancial accounts. Each bank with a German banking license has to submit these data
to the supervisory authority. These datasets refer to unconsolidated, individual banks.
Financial statements include the assets of foreign branches, but not subsidiaries. To mea-
sure internationalization, market power, and risk at the same level, we therefore have to
disregard international exposures held through subsidiaries because we lack the necessary
data to estimate market power and risk for the latter. This approach ensures that we
assess the domestic market power-risk nexus conditional on the international exposures
held by each German bank that constitutes a legal entity. These legal entities are also the
subject of domestic prudential supervision, antitrust regulation, deposit insurance, and
the like.13 Details on the definitions and sources of variables are in Appendix B.2.
11For previous research using these data, see Buch et al. (2011a,b) or Duewel et al. (2011).
12In this paper, we draw on annual data.
13Note that subsidiaries are subject to host country control, e.g. regarding capital requirements.
Clearly, the recent experience of various German banks, especially internationally active Landesbanken
such as Sachsen LB, vividly illustrates that excessive risk raking abroad through subsidiaries can ulti-
mately lead to the failure of the entire bank holding company. We therefore consider foreign activities
through subsidiaries as a robustness test. Results for this pre-crisis sample mimic the findings reported
below for foreign branches. But clearly, further research dissecting more explicitly the implications of
internal capital markets, e.g. along the lines of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), is warranted. Given
the data limitations regarding subsidiaries, but also unknown bank holding company structures, such an
approach is outside the scope of this paper
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3.2.1 Measuring Bank Internationalization
We obtain data on cross-border assets held by individual banks and foreign assets held by
their respective foreign branches from the “External Position Report”. The vast majority
of banks reports international assets in at least one foreign country. On average, only 28
out of a total of 2,235 banks that were active in Germany during the sample period are
purely domestic.14 Maintaining a network of foreign branches reveals as cost-intensive.
Only 27 banks choose branches as foreign market entry mode.15 These banks might be
considered as the truly global banks.
We compute two measures of internationalization at the bank level. First, we compute
the extensive margin as the number of countries where a bank holds cross-border assets
or operates a foreign branch. If a bank runs several branches in a specific host country,
we include this as one observation per bank and country. The difference in the extensive
margin between banks with and without foreign branches is substantial. The average bank
holds foreign assets in approximately 14 countries but hardly any foreign branches (0.087,
Column 1, Table B.1). Banks with foreign branches, in contrast, hold foreign assets
in about 42 countries and operate foreign branches in approximately four countries on
average. In this small group of truly international banks, the largest ones have exposures
to all 71 countries sampled, and they operate branches in as many as 32 countries (Column
8, Table B.1).
The second measure of bank internationalization is the volume of foreign activities
relative to total assets, the intensive margin. We aggregate all foreign assets of bank i in
destination country j. We also separate the cross-border assets of the domestic headquar-
ters from those held through foreign branches. Note the difference between the destination
and host country perspectives that applies to foreign branches. Regarding the extensive
margin, we consider the number of host countries where banks operate foreign branches,
say Turkey. In contrast, we aggregate the intensive margin, i.e. financial assets, across
destination countries to which a foreign branch ultimately lends. The hypothetical Turk-
ish branch may lend primarily to host country counterparties, but also to third-country
borrowers, say Greece. Hence, the risk of these foreign exposures would be poorly reflected
14See Buch et al. (2011a) for details.
1537 banks run subsidiaries and/or branches.
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by the host country alone. Considering the host country for the intensive margin cap-
tures a bank’s abilities to acquire host country expertise whereas the destination country
perspective captures the actual geographical diversification of foreign exposures. Also,
this handling accounts for the effect that branches in financial centers primarily serve as
a lending platform to third-party destination countries. Column 1 of Table B.1 shows
that, on average, German banks hold about 4.4% of their total assets abroad through one
of these channels. The foreign asset share of banks with foreign branches in isolation is
much higher, around 34.7%.
Extensive and intensive margins do neither account directly for the co-movement be-
tween destination countries and the German market nor do different distances to Germany.
Both aspects potentially affect market power and risk though. Therefore, we first spec-
ify the average correlation between foreign equity markets and real output between the
destination country and Germany as well as the geographical distance between both. If,
for instance, a given bank is exposed to 10 foreign countries, we include the average of
the correlations and distance between these markets and the German markets as an addi-
tional covariate. Formally, this measure is given by
1
Ni
ΣNij=1δj where Ni is the number of
(host) countries in which bank i is active (the extensive margin), and δj is the correlation
between market j and the German market or the bilateral distance. Because we do not
have the specific returns on each market for each bank, we proxy returns by stock market
returns and GDP growth.
Second, we weight foreign exposures (the intensive margin) by correlations as well as
geographic distance. We compute for each bank
1
Ai
ΣNij=1FAijδj and specify correlation-
or distance-weighted intensive margins as a second covariate.
3.2.2 Measuring Market Power
Our preferred measure of bank market power is the Lerner index, i.e. the difference
between average revenues and marginal cost, scaled by average revenues. Two clear
advantages over other measures of market power are that the Lerner index nests different
models of competition and that it yields a measure at the level of the individual bank
(see Degryse et al. (2009)). A higher Lerner index indicates a lower degree of competition
(a higher degree of market power). We compute the Lerner index from stochastic cost
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and profit frontier analysis to obtain competition measures net of operational slack (see
Koetter et al. (2010)). Marginal costs are the total derivative of estimated operating cost
frontiers with respect to four outputs (interbank loans, customer loans, securities, and
off-balance sheet items). We estimate average revenues from a stochastic profit frontier.
To account for the three-tier banking structure in Germany banks and the fact that
banks operate under different technology regimes, we estimate both frontiers as latent
classes shown by Koetter and Poghosyan (2009).16 Average revenues and marginal costs
comprise revenues and costs associated with domestic, cross-border, and foreign branch
asset holdings. The Lerner index has the advantage that it can be computed for each
individual bank and for each year, and that it provides a measure of market power which
encompasses revenue and cost aspects. Bank competition measures are controversially
discussed (see Carbo et al. (2009)). Boone (2008) suggests as an alternative to directly
measure how (cost) inefficiency, as reflected by differences in marginal cost, affects bank
profitability. We therefore estimate how profits (pii) change in response to bank’s marginal
costs (ci ) (see also Degryse et al. (2009): 36-37): ln (pii) = α − βln (ci). The coefficient
β is the so-called Boone-indicator of market power, it gives the profit elasticity. Larger β
hint at more intense competition and hence less market power. Therefore, β is negative
in light of a market power interpretation. As noted by Delis (2012) lower market power
is reflected by larger magnitudes of the Boone indicator. We estimate Boone indicators
for each bank using bank-specific data that are, in contrast to the international exposure
data, available from 1994 until 2010.
Summary statistics for the bank-level variables are provided in Table B.2. Mean Lerner
indices of 23 basis points are in line with results reported by De Guevara and Maudos
(2007) for a sample of European banks and Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) for German
banks. The mean Lerner index is smaller for banks with foreign branches (15 basis points),
which may result from the greater degree of competitive pressure these banks are exposed
to on international markets.
16See Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) for a more detailed discussion. The German banking system is
characterized by a three-tier structure of savings, cooperative, and (private) commercial banks. These
banks differ with regard to their ownership structures, their ability to expand regionally, and their core
business model. A latent class model permits production parameters to vary and hence, different scale
economies and marginal cost properties for different groups of banks such as large commercial and central
savings banks versus small regional banks.
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3.2.3 Measuring Bank Risk
To measure bank risk, previous literature often uses so-called z-scores, non-performing
loans, or the volatility of bank-level reserves, profits, or non-performing loans (see e.g.
Beck, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Most of these measures capture important aspects
of bank risk, but not necessarily the risk that the entire financial institution is distressed
and ceases to exist. The German regulator defines distress as “a situation in which
an institutions existence will be endangered without support measures” (Bundesbank,
2007: 75). Support measures are either exits through restructuring mergers ordered by
the Federal Supervision Authorities (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht –
BaFin) or capital injections by bank-pillar specific insurance schemes (Dam and Koetter,
2012). The Bundesbank records distress events, which thus reveal when the regulator
deems the ultimate risk faced by a bank as too high, namely, to fail. Our preferred
measure of risk is therefore bank distress. Table B.2 shows that the distress frequency is
higher for banks that operate foreign branches (7%) as compared to the full sample (4%).
Lerner indices and the likelihood of distress are estimated using covariates that are lagged
by one year to avoid simultaneity by construction. We follow the bank failure literature
to select the covariates shown in Table B.2 to explain the occurrence of bank distress
(see, e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 1995). Measuring bank risk as the official declaration
of distress by the regulator is appealing. Yet, larger banks have not experienced distress
during the sample the period. To obtain a measure of risk for all banks, we follow Laeven
and Levine (2009) and compute for each bank a z-score as z =
E/A+RoA
σRoA
where E/A is the
capital-asset-ratio, RoA denotes return on assets, and σRoA denotes the standard deviation
of RoA, which is calculated using a rolling window of five years. Z-scores measure the
extent to which bank equity is sufficient to cover losses. Higher z-scores indicate less risky
banks.
3.3 Empirical Model
When choosing their business model, banks implicitly choose also their degree of market
power as well as the risk structure of their activities. This is a simultaneous choice.
We thus need to estimate the relationship between market power and risk jointly when
3.3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 67
analyzing the impact of internationalization on the market power-risk nexus. Contrary
to previous banking studies that specify simultaneous risk and return equation models
based on continuous variables (see e.g. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997)), the distress indicator
to measure risk in this study is binary. Therefore, we employ an instrumental-variables
procedure suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and described in Wooldridge (2002) for
systems with an endogenous binary variable.17
The dependent variable in the market-power equation is the Lerner index LIit =
LI∗it , a fully observed continuous variable. Because the probability of distress is not
observable, we proxy it by the binary indicator of an observable distress event, such that
PDit = I (PD
∗
it > 0) . As a first step, we estimate reduced-form Equations 3.1 and 3.2
to generate instruments for market power (Lerner index = LI) and risk (probability of
distress = PD) :
LIit = Π
′
1X it−1 + v1,it (3.1)
PDit = Π
′
2X it−1 + v2,it (3.2)
where i is a bank-index and t denotes time. We lag the explanatory variables by one
period to avoid simultaneity (see X it−1). The market-power Equation 3.1 is estimated
using OLS and yields the (K x 1)-vector of parameter coefficients Πˆ′1. The risk equation
3.2 is estimated using a probit model to obtain the (K x 1)-vector of parameter coefficients
Πˆ′2. Equation 3.1 yields residuals as the difference between observed and fitted market
power, vˆ1,it = LIit− LˆI it = LIit− Πˆ′1X it−1. Next, we estimate the structural equations of
interest:
LIit = γ1 ˆPD
∗
it + β
′
1X1,it−1 + ε1,it (3.3)
PD∗it = γ2LIit + β
′
2X2,it−1 + θvˆ1,it + ε2,it (3.4)
where X1,it−1 and X2,it−1 are the exogenous explanatory variables affecting market power
and risk, including measures of internationalization. We also specify time-, region-, and
banking group-fixed effects. The main qualitative results remain unchanged when we
17See also Degryse and Ongena (2001) who use this approach to analyze the relation between the return
on investment of banks and the number of creditor relationships.
68 3. DO BANKS BENEFIT FROM INTERNATIONALIZATION?
control for regional macroeconomic developments such as the regional insolvency rate
or GDP growth. Equations 3.3 and 3.4 are estimated with OLS and a probit model,
respectively. We bootstrap the standard errors because equations 3.3 and 3.4 include
generated regressors.
The simultaneity between banks’ choices of market power and risk is captured in the
following way. In the market-power equation 3.3, we insert fitted values from the probit
estimation of the risk equation 3.2. In the risk equation, we insert the residuals from the
continuous reduced-form equation vˆit and the true continuous variable LIit, i.e. the Lerner
index. Rivers and Vuong (1988) recommend this procedure because the probit estimation
relies on non-linear estimation techniques. Also, we can explicitly test for exogeneity in
the binary equation (see Winkelmann et al., 2006), and a z-test of H0 : θ = 0 indicates
whether the true Lerner index LIit is exogenous to the probability of distress.
18
3.4 Empirical Results
Table B.3 provides results of OLS regressions using the Lerner index as dependent variable
and Table B.4 provides results of probit models with the distress indicator as dependent
variable. Subsequent tables account for the potential endogeneity of the internationaliza-
tion variable (Tables B.5 and B.6) and portfolio effects when accounting for the correlation
of output and equity as well as the distance between destination and home markets (Tables
B.7 and B.8).
3.4.1 Market Power-Risk Nexus
Columns (1), (2), and (4) of Tables B.3 and B.4 show system estimation results. The two
cross terms (indicated by “predicted”) are significant and negative. Our Hypothesis 1 (H1)
states that the relationship between market power and risk is ambiguous. Our results
support theoretical models by Allen and Gale (2004) or Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2010), which show that banks with more market power are less risky. Column (3) shows
results using bank-specific, but time-invariant Boone indicators to measure market power.
18Implementing fitted values from the market power equation 3.1 into the structural equation 3.4
instead of the combination of residuals and the true Lerner index would imply to estimate a probit model
with an unknown scaling factor. This would not allow for valid inference.
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We do not find evidence of a significant relationship between the average sensitivity of
profits with respect to marginal cost, i.e. the Boone indicator and risk. A possible
problem is that the estimation of the Boone indicator is confined to time series estimation
for each individual bank that is based at most on 16 periods. Given this serious limitation,
we continue henceforth with Lerner indices as measures of market power. In addition,
market power residuals are insignificant in the risk equation. Hence the null hypothesis
that market power is exogenous to risk cannot be rejected.19
The overall fit of the model is quite good with an adjusted R² of about 0.37 for the
market power equation when using the Lerner index and a pseudo-R2 of 0.29 for the
risk equation. All results reported below are based on regressions including the full set of
control variables. In unreported regressions, we have excluded individual explanatory vari-
ables one-by-one to check whether some of our results might be driven by multicollinearity.
This is not the case.
3.4.2 Internationalization and Market Power
Our Hypothesis 2 (H2) conjectures that internationally more active banks enjoy more
market power in their home markets. Consider first the intensive margin measured by
the foreign to domestic asset share in percent. Column (2) in Table B.3 shows that a
higher total share of foreign assets – either through cross-border activities or through
foreign branches – has a positive impact on market power, which is in line with (H2).
Column (3) shows that this result also holds when specifying the Boone indicator, where
a negative sign indicates that a larger intensive margin increases a bank’s market power.
Increasing the foreign asset share by one percent increases Lerner indices by eight ba-
sis points, potentially reflecting the ability of internationally active banks to accompany
their customers on foreign markets and to lower informational asymmetries through local
knowledge. Given an average Lerner index of 23 basis points, this increase is economically
substantial and accounts for slightly less than a standard deviation (see Table B.2). At
the same time, a one-percent increase in the foreign asset share would be substantial for
the average bank, which holds only around 4.4% of its assets abroad (see Table B.1).
19We also specified the components of the Lerner index, average revenues and marginal cost, separately
as well as plain market shares of banks in terms of total assets. Like the Boone indicator, these measures
are insignificant.
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However, the mode of foreign market entry is crucial. A key contribution of this paper is
the ability to differentiate cross-border activities from operating branches abroad. There-
fore, we distinguish the intensive margin via cross-border and foreign branch activities in
column (4). The result shows that the positive effect of internationalization is driven by
maintaining branches, which usually specialize in foreign retail banking. The predicted
increase in Lerner indices by 28 basis points for an increasing foreign asset share held
through branches amounts to an improvement in market power on the order of one and a
half standard deviations (Table B.2). This substantial positive impact on market power
is line with the earlier conjecture that engaging in local lending relationships bears infor-
mation acquisition advantages. Cross-border activities alone, in contrast, do not have a
significant impact on market power.
Regarding the extensive margin, a larger number of countries reduces market power
at home. According to the baseline result, adding an exposure to one additional country
reduces Lerner indices by six basis points, i.e. half a standard deviation (Table B.1). This
general result holds irrespective of whether we measure market power by Lerner indices
(column 2) or Boone indicators (column 3). At first sight, this negative relationship is
at odds with H2. But the result in column (4) corroborates that the negative effect is
driven by an increase in the extensive margin in terms of opening foreign branches. This
finding is consistent with international economic literature stressing that foreign expan-
sions, especially through foreign direct investment such as branches, is costly, squeezes
profit margins, and can thus only be afforded by the largest, most productive banks (Buch
et al., 2011a). Not to our surprise, an increase in country exposure by means of branches
reduces the average bank’s margin. In addition, detrimental markup effects may arise
when banks attempt to manage a too far-flung empire that is increasingly complex to
control. In unreported regressions, we therefore checked if threshold effects matter. It
turns out that increasing international activities beyond a certain number of countries (10
for cross-border assets, five for countries with foreign branches) indeed drive this negative
result.
For the control variables, we mostly obtain significant and expected results. Higher
fee income shares increase market power. Potentially, banks can retain market power by
substituting traditional interest income with fee income (DeYoung and Roland, 2001).
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Larger banks might be able to charge high mark-ups because of their dominant role in
output markets, but they may also enjoy market power arising from economies of scale
in funding markets. We include a discrete variable to indicate the size quintile of banks’
total assets (from 1 to 5).20 Results show a negative relationship between size and market
power, reflecting the fact that smaller banks enjoy market power in regional and niche
markets. We measure the degree of specialization of banks’ activities using Hirschman-
Herfindahl indices computed across four asset categories. More specialized banks exhibit
larger market power in our sample. Regional concentration (the number of branches in
each region and the number of new acquisitions) enhances market power as well.
3.4.3 Internationalization and Risk
Hypothesis 3 (H3) states that internationally better-diversified banks (via the extensive
margin) should exhibit less risk whereas the effect of higher exposures (via the intensive
margin) remains ambiguous. Table B.4 shows the determinants of distress. The key result
is that more international banks, in general, are not more risky than domestically active
banks. Irrespective of whether we consider foreign asset shares held directly across borders
and branches jointly (column 2) or if we measure market power with Boone indicators
(column 3) both internationalization measures are insignificant. An important difference
emerges though when distinguishing the two modes of entry in column (4). We do not find
evidence for a significant impact of cross-border activities. However, banks that operate
branches in many foreign countries exhibit lower risk. Entering an additional country via
branches reduces the mean distress probability of 7% (Table 2) by 4.7 basis points. This
result supports the diversification hypothesis. Having a larger volume of foreign assets
held through branches (intensive margin), in contrast, increases rather than decreases
risk. Taken together, these results suggests that it is indeed the diversification effect that
matters, rather than the volume of foreign activities per se. These results are broadly in
line with H2 that the degree of diversification rather than the scale of foreign activities
matters for bank risk.
In addition to the internationalization variables, we include a standard vector of control
variables to explain distress events with so-called “CAMEL covariates” that capture vari-
20Results are qualitatively identical if we use log size instead.
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ous aspects of bank-specific risks (capitalization, asset quality, managerial skill, earnings,
and liquidity) (see Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). We expect more profitable, better
capitalized, and banks with a less risky asset portfolio to be less likely to experience a
distress event. The signs for the control variables are in line with these expectations and
with previous literature (see Dam and Koetter, 2012). Banks with a lower level of hidden
reserves and with a lower return on equity are more likely to experience a distress event
(see Berger, 1995). In line with e.g. Wheelock and Wilson (1995), higher cost efficiency
lowers bank risk. Higher profit efficiency, in turn, has no significant impact on risk. This
result corroborates the well-known negative correlation between cost and profit efficiency
measures (Bauer et al., 1998). It confirms that both concepts measure different types of
optimal behavior of bank managers: the realization of optimal profits seems to involve
inevitably higher risk while economizing on costs does not. The core capital ratio, the
share of non-performing loans, and the cost-to income ratio have no significant impact
3.4.4 Endogeneity of Foreign Assets
The empirical model that we have used so far accounts for the simultaneous determination
of market power and risk. But it may not sufficiently address the potential endogeneity of
internationalization variables. Endogeneity may arise if banks engaged in risky domestic
activities decide to venture abroad in order to offset high domestic risk. In such a case,
this bank self-selects into international activities if this rewards them with greater market
power at home.
We address the endogeneity concern of foreign assets in three ways: by adopting a
proxy for the exogenous component of banks’ foreign assets; by using the lagged foreign
assets share; and by focusing on banks which have changed their presence abroad. Turning
to the first measure, we adopt a methodology from the literature studying the link be-
tween trade openness and growth at the country-level. Frankel and Romer (1999) propose
to measure the causal impact of trade on growth by employing geographic variables as a
(exogenous) instruments for foreign trade. Their method is based on a two-step estimation
model. In a first step, a bilateral openness equation is specified. Predicted bilateral open-
ness measures from this equation are then aggregated to obtain a measure of aggregate
openness which is only related to a set of exogenous variables. In a second step, predicted
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openness is used as an instrument in a regression explaining the impact of openness on
GDP per capita. This method does not fully suit our panel context because geographic
variables used to extract the exogenous component of trade are time-invariant. We thus
need a time-varying exogenous explanatory variable for the first-stage regression. In our
setup, essentially all foreign macroeconomic variables can be considered exogenous from
the individual bank’s perspective. Details on the estimation of the exogenous component
of foreign assets are given in Appendix B.1.
For the predicted foreign asset share to be a good instrument, it should sufficiently
correlate with the actual foreign asset share, which is the case. The correlation between
the predicted and the actual foreign asset share at the bank-level (i.e. aggregated across
all countries) is 0.58. To eliminate the country dimension in the data, we aggregate foreign
asset shares across countries.
Results are reported in Column (2) of Tables B.5 and B.6. They are qualitatively
unchanged from those using the actual volume of foreign assets: expansions along the
intensive margin increase market power, yet, these expansions have no impact on risk.
Risk has a negative impact on market power, and the remaining control variables retain
their signs and significance. The second way to account for the endogeneity of openness
is to make use of the fact that current market power and risk are unlikely to have affected
internationalization decisions taken in the past. Hence, we use the foreign assets share
lagged by two periods as a right-hand side variable. Results in Column (3) of Tables
B.5 and B.6 are very similar to those using the actual or the predicted share of foreign
assets. Third, we account for the fact that lagged foreign assets may be persistent. We use
information on changes in foreign activities. Exit (number) and Entry (number) are count
variables of those countries from which a bank withdrew or into which a bank entered two
years before. Results in Columns (4) of Tables B.5 and B.6 show that past exits have a
positive impact on market power, consistent with our previous finding that maintaining
a foreign presence reduces market power. Past entries, in turn, have no effect although
it must be noted that the lag structure of changes in international presence limits the
sample considerably and thus might bear only limited information as such.
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3.4.5 Portfolio Effects
Aside from endogenous foreign activity, the neglect of geographical portfolio effects may
be crucial, in particular when considering the relationship of intensive and extensive
margins with risk. Tables B.7 and B.8 give three robustness checks while considering
three weighting schemes of portfolio decompositions.
We account for the fact that the mere count of the number of foreign countries (the
extensive margin) or the volume of activities (the intensive margin) do not adequately
capture portfolio diversification effects that should matter for the internationalization of
banks. To this end, we construct additional explanatory variables that weight foreign
activities with the correlation of stock market returns or the correlation of GDP growth
of the respective destination country with that in Germany. Alternatively, we weight
foreign activities with the distance between destination countries and Germany. None of
these additional variables is significant. At the same time, the result that being active in
a larger number of countries has a negative impact on market power remains intact and
so does the result that internationalization as such has no significant impact on banks
risk. Only the positive impact of internationalization on the market power of banks turns
insignificant when including foreign activities weighted by distance or GDP growth.
3.4.6 Further Robustness
We conduct a number of additional tests. Results are not reported in the interest of space
but available upon request. First, we divided the sample into weak and severe distress
events. In addition to the 240 severe distress events that we consider here, restructur-
ing mergers ordered by the BaFin (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) or
capital injections by insurance schemes, there have been 26 weaker distress events, such
as mandatory announcements by individual banks to the supervisory authority or official
warnings by the BaFin. As a robustness check, we therefore split the sample into weak and
severe distress events when estimating the system of equations. Results are qualitatively
identical compared to the reported ones, in particular as regards the mutual negative im-
pact of market power on risk. Again, there is no significant impact of internationalization
on risk.
Second, we used the z-score described in Section 3.2.3 as an alternative risk mea-
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sure. This alternative risk measure confirms the negative correlation between risk and
market power, but the impact of predicted Lerner indices on the z-score are sometimes
insignificant. The impact of internationalization on market power is mostly replicated. As
before, internationalization has no significant impact on risk. Results for the remaining
explanatory variables do not change.
Third, we split the sample by size and banking groups. Sub-samples for five size
categories reveal differences across banks. For all but the mid-sized banks, a higher
volume of cross-border assets has a positive effect. The impact of expansions along the
extensive margin on market power at home varies across banks of different size. For the
smallest 40% of the banks, internationalization has an insignificant (negative) effect. For
the mid-sized and large banks, internationalization has a positive effect. The negative
and significant impact for the full sample is driven by the “upper-middle” sized banks in
the fourth size quintile. One interpretation of this non-linear effect is that these banks
are too large to gain a competitive edge from foreign expansions as the mid-sized banks
do, but that they are too small to reap the true scale economies as the very large banks
do.
Finally, we estimate the baseline model for the different banking groups in Germany
separately. Traditionally, German banks differ in their degree of internationalization
because of different business models. Large commercial banks have a long history in
foreign markets whereas savings and cooperative banks are domestically oriented. We
split the sample by type of bank to account for these differences. The largest group of
banks are the cooperatives, followed by the savings banks, and the commercial banks.
The result that market power declines when banks are active in many countries (higher
extensive margin) is a feature of savings and cooperative banks, but not for commercial
banks. The positive effect of a large volume of activities (higher intensive margin), in
turn, is present in the sub-samples of commercial and savings but not of cooperative
banks. Hence, in terms of market power, commercial banks unequivocally gain from
globalization while cooperative banks lose. In terms of risk effects of internationalization,
we do not find significant effects for commercial and savings banks, corroborating the
results obtained for the full sample.
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3.5 Conclusions
We use a simultaneous two-equation model to analyze how internationalization affects
the relationship between market power and risk in the domestic German banking mar-
ket between 2003 and 2006. Based on detailed data of the Bundesbank, we estimate
bank-specific market power, observe official distress events to measure individual risk and
distinguish between two foreign entry modes: cross-border asset holdings and operating
branches abroad. We test three hypotheses that link bank internationalization (measured
by extensive and intensive margins), their market power (proxied by Lerner indices) and
risk (captured by distress events).
First, we hypothesize that the relationship between market power and risk is a priori
ambiguous on theoretical grounds. After accounting for the simultaneous determination
of market power and risk, and conditioning on international activities, we find a negative
correlation between market power and risk. This result is robust to the inclusion of size
as a separate covariate. Indeed, when we control for other bank-specific characteristics,
we find that banks see their market power decline when growing in size. Our result
on the negative relationship between market power and risk suits theoretical models that
emphasize the importance of market power to build up profitability buffers against shocks.
Second, we hypothesize that banks with international activities enjoy more market
power in domestic markets because of larger average revenues and lower marginal costs.
Larger average revenues might ensue from offering banking services to more markets or
the ability to follow domestic customers abroad. Lower marginal costs might reflect a
wider range of expertise in generating private information from larger, geographically
diversified customer pools and productivity gains. We distinguish between two measures
of international activity, the intensive and the extensive margin.
The intensive margin equals the share of foreign assets relative to total assets. We find that
the intensive margin has a significantly positive effect on Lerner mark-ups. This result
remains intact (i) when measuring bank competition with Boone indicators, (ii) when
accounting for endogenous foreign market entry using lagged exposures and the exogenous
component of foreign exposures (see Frankel and Romer, 1999), and (iii) when accounting
for the correlation of equity returns between destination countries and Germany. The
intensive margin becomes insignificant though when considering historical entry and exit
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behavior to control for endogenous exposures and when using real output correlations and
distances instead of equity returns to weigh foreign exposures. We do not find evidence
for a significant relationship between foreign asset shares and Lerner index components,
neither for average revenues, nor for marginal costs, nor for simpler measures of market
power such as domestic market shares. A key contribution of this paper is the ability
to differentiate cross-border activities from operating branches abroad. In this light, we
find that the significant relationship between the intensive margin and the Lerner index
is driven by exposures arising from foreign branches rather than cross-border activities.
Accounting for this usually omitted channel of international bank activity in the literature
is thus important. Sample splits by banking group show that commercial and savings
banks exhibit higher Lerner markups in response to a higher intensive margin while
cooperative banks exhibit lower market power.
The extensive margin reflects the number of destination countries in which a banks reports
any operations. Across various specifications to control for alternative measures of market
power, endogenous entry, and destination country correlation with Germany, we find a
negative relationship between market power and the extensive margin. This result is
also driven by exposures arising from foreign branches rather than cross-border activities.
Managing a too far-flung, complex empire may become increasingly difficult and only the
largest, most productive banks are able to reap the profits at home from costly acquired
additional information abroad.
Third, we hypothesize that the relationship between the extensive margin and bank
risk is negative, whereas it is ambiguous regarding the intensive margin. Empirical evi-
dence on the impact of extensive and intensive margins on risk is rather weak. Again, a key
contribution is our ability to differentiate cross-border activities from operating branches
abroad. For the entire sample of banks, a higher extensive margin reduces risk via foreign
branches but not cross-border activity. We do also find a positive effect of higher business
volumes of foreign branches on risk, but not of cross-border transactions. Diversification
benefits thus seem unlikely to materialize for small, unsophisticated banks and to be over-
compensated by the costs of maintaining too large international branch networks. This
result underpins the importance to distinguish the channels of internationalization, cross-
border versus foreign branch activity. Generally speaking, the relationship between bank
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internationalization and risk is weak and often turns insignificant when accounting for
alternative market power measures, endogenous entry, and correlation between Germany
and destination countries.
Overall, the results suggest that the potential benefits from internationalization in
terms of a better risk-return tradeoff are rather elusive. Increasing bank internationaliza-
tion by means of intensifying existing country exposures (the intensive margin) increases
banks’ mark-ups, which in turn reduces risk. However, a bank raising the volume of for-
eign branch operations also increases its risk. Internationalization by means of servicing
more countries (extensive margin) reduces mark-ups as well as risk if the bank enters
these markets by operating branches.
Understanding the market power-risk tradeoff for internationally active banks is of
key importance for policymakers. Given the global financial crisis, the benefits of inter-
national banking in terms of enhanced mark-ups which stabilize the banking system seem
to outweigh the relatively weak impact of bank internationalization on bank risk that
prevails in this sample. The potentially detrimental effects on risk through networks of
foreign branches point out that international integration not only brings about diversifica-
tion benefits but also does it expose these banks to risks that might be systemically most
relevant. Designing appropriate policy tools requires further insights into the relationships
between all modes of bank internationalization and bank risk .
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Contribution
Similar to the first paper, I actively participated in all stages of developing this paper,
from contributing ideas, data preparation to interpreting results and ultimately writing
and revising the text. In what follows I consider three examples of my contribution in
more detail by.
Section 3.3 presents our empirical model. Besides concerns about the simultaneity of
risk and market power, we have to tackle the problem of possible endogeneity related to our
measures of internationalization. Our setup of one binary and one continuous endogenous
variable requires a complex estimator because probit models rely on non-linear estimation
methods. Any implemented STATA program was not able to test for the exogeneity in
the binary equation which lead me to consider and implement the approach of Rivers and
Vuong (1988). They suggest jointly inserting fitted residuals from the first stage and the
true Lerner index into the risk equation on the second stage.
Besides, I was involved in tailoring the Frankel-Romer approach to our specific context.
Their method draws on a two-step estimation model to account for the endogeneity of
internationalization. Our panel dataset, yet, does not suit their setup. For this reason,
we had to find time-varying exogenous covariates to enter the first stage. Appendix B.1
elaborates on how to adjust the suggestions of Frankel and Romer (1999) to our specific
context of more dimensions in the data setup.
Third, I contributed to the construction of adequate weighting schemes of foreign
exposures. The aim was to enrich an explanatory variable of internationalization by the
degree of foreign and domestic correlation of macroeconomic factors. We use the portfolio
of foreign country exposures respectively along the intensive and I margin and construct
weights for each country. With respect to these weights, we include correlations between
foreign and German stock market returns or GDP growth. Taking the inverse of these
correlations, we weight down exposures with high correlations. Besides, we developed a
weighting scheme by distances.
In brief, my core contributions relate to the empirical aspects of the paper, ranging
from developing the appropriate estimation techniques to constructing adequate instru-
ments and weighting schemes. However, I was also involved in all general tasks.

Appendix B
Do banks benefit from
internationalization?
B.1 Technical Appendix:
Exogeneity of Foreign Assets
This appendix describes how we estimate the exogenous component of foreign assets
based on the methodology proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999). Our modified first
stage Frankel-Romer regression looks as follows:
FAijt = a0 + ai,1Distj + ai,2GDP
∗
jt + εijt (B.1)
where FAijt is the share of foreign assets across modes relative to total assets of bank
i held in country j in year t, Distj is the geographic distance between Germany and
country j, GDP ∗jt is foreign GDP which is exogenous to the individual bank i, and εijt is
an error term which captures the bank-specific determinants of foreign assets. We estimate
Equation B.1 bank-by-bank using OLS to obtain bank-specific regression coefficients.
The predicted values from this equation are used to obtain a bank-specific instrument
of bilateral openness. Re-writing B.1 in matrix form FAijt = a
′
iΘjt+εijt where a
′
i is the
vector of coefficients and Θjt is the vector of right-hand-side variables, bank i ’s overall
predicted foreign assets are given by ˆFAijt = aˆ′iΘjt.
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B.2 Data Appendix
All bank data are obtained from unconsolidated balance sheets, profit and loss accounts,
and audit reports reported annually by all banks to the Deutsche Bundesbank. We use
unconsolidated financial statements of unitary banks. These statements contain infor-
mation on domestic banks, including their foreign branches. Variables used for, both the
productivity estimation and the CAMEL vector are corrected for outliers by truncating at
the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. Level variables are deflated with the consumer
price index. Descriptive statistics of all variables are given in Table B.1.
Bank-level variables
Acquisitions The number of acquisitions per regional agglomeration area.
Assets Gross total assets. An indicator variable based on the size distribution of total
assets per year ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high).
Banking Group An indicator variable ranging from 1 to 4 for large banks, regional
commercial, regional savings, and cooperative banks. “Large” banks comprise the
head institutions of the savings (Landesbanken) and cooperative bank sector as well
as the largest commercial banks. “Commercial banks” are privately owned, but not
necessarily publicly listed banks. “Savings banks” are (local) government owned
regional banks. “Cooperative banks” are mutually owned regional banks.
Branches The number of domestic branches per bank relative to total assets.
Capitalization Core capital in percent of gross total assets.
Cost efficiency Cost efficiency obtained from a latent stochastic cost frontier analysis
with two technology regimes.
Cost-income ratio Personnel expenditure in percent of total administrative cost.
Customer loans Loans to corporate customers and individuals.
Equity Gross total equity in EUR millions.
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Herfindahl index (output categories) Diversification indicator across four output cat-
egories of banks, interbank loans, customer loans, bonds and stocks, and notional
values of granted guarantees and credit commitments, calculated as the sum of
squared shares of each product category.
Interbank loans Loans to banks and other depository institutions.
Loan-loss-provisions Stock of loan-loss provisions in percent of gross total loans.
Non-performing loans Loans with latent risks according to central bank auditors in
percent of total audited loans.
Off-balance sheet items Granted credit guarantees and commitments.
Physical capital Fixed assets including IT-capital stock in EUR millions.
Profit efficiency Profit efficiency obtained from a latent stochastic profit frontier anal-
ysis with two technology regimes.
Publicly incorporated banks Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is publicly in-
corporated, either as joint stock or public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft (AG);
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA); Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung
(GmbH )).
Reserves Hidden reserves according to §340f of the German commercial code in percent
of gross total assets.
Return on equity (ROE) Operating result including net interest, fee, commission and
trading income in percent of equity capital.
Securities Bonds and stocks.
Share of fee income Provision and fee income relative to total operating gross revenues.
Data on Bank Risk
To measure the soundness of the German banking sector, we use confidential information
from the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank for individual banks at an annual
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frequency. These data allow for a distinction between different distress categories that
differ in terms of severity of distress observed:
Weak distress events Mandatory announcements by individual banks to the supervi-
sory authority (Distress Category I) and official warnings by the Bundesanstalt fu¨r
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) (Distress Category II),
Severe distress events Direct interventions into the ongoing business of a bank by the
BaFin (Distress Category III), and all events that reflect the disappearance of a
bank from active business operations such as closure of a bank or restructuring
mergers (Distress Category IV).
External Position Report
Data on the international assets of German banks are taken from the “External Position
Report” of the Deutsche Bundesbank. They are confidential and can be used on the
premises of the Bundesbank only.
International assets Loans and advances to banks, companies, governments, bonds
and notes, foreign shares and other equity, participation abroad, denominated or
converted into Euro. Irrevocable credit commitments are included but other off-
balance sheet items are not. For a more detailed description of this data base see
Fiorentino et al. (2010).
Branches and subsidiaries Foreign affiliates of German parent banks. Branches do
not have an independent legal status, whereas subsidiaries do. We attribute assets
held by affiliates to the country in which they are located.
List of countries United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, In-
donesia, Ireland, Israel, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Cayman Islands, Lithua-
nia, Luxemburg, Latvia, Morocco, Malta, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Swe-
den, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovakia, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, South Africa.
B.3. TABLES AND FIGURES 85
B.3 Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics: Internationalization
Full Sample Banks with branches
(7118 bank-year observations) (138 bank-year observations)
mean sd p1 p99 mean sd p1 p99
I. Number of countries (extensive margin)
Cross-border plus branches 13.58 9.425 1 54 41.57 21.03 0 71
Cross-border 13.61 9.455 2 54 42.72 20.06 7 71
Branches 0.087 1.084 0 1 4.475 6.389 1 32
II. Foreign assets / total assets (intensive margin)
Cross-border plus branches 0.044 0.076 0 0.434 0.347 0.231 0.009 0.828
Cross-border 0.042 0.066 0 0.322 0.241 0.185 0.005 0.958
Branches 0.002 0.026 0 0.076 0.120 0.143 0.000 0.640
Total assets 2,090 11,400 28 36,600 55,000 56,800 198 133,000
Notes: This table gives the descriptive statistics for the extensive and the intensive margin of banks’
foreign activities. The extensive margin reported in Panel I is a count variable measuring the number of
destination countries in which banks hold foreign assets and the number of foreign branches of a bank.
The intensive margin reported in Panel II gives the foreign assets relative to the total assets of a bank.
We distinguish the assets held in the cross-border mode and through foreign branches. We report each
of these measures for all banks included in the sample as well as for the banks with foreign branches
separately.
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics: Regression Variables
Full Sample Banks with branches
(7118 bank-year observations) (138 bank-year observations)
mean sd p1 p99 mean sd p1 p99
Market Power
Lerner index 22.67 11.69 -9.174 51.56 14.91 20.91 -32.61 57.47
Boone indicator -0.89 4.41 -4.60 2.11 -0.64 1.10 -3.33 2.10
Risk
Distress frequency 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Z-score -4.40 4.04 -17.65 0.92 -3.734 4.59 -23 1.268
Explanatory variables: Market Power
Fee income 12.30 5.41 2.30 33.44 12.11 11.58 1.49 57.80
Size quintile 3.06 1.39 1.00 5.00 4.75 0.69 2.00 5.00
Herfindahl (output
cateogories)
46.32 8.91 29.42 71.56 38.16 14.92 25.58 86.93
Publicly incorporated 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Branches 28.87 21.24 0.17 101.10 8.10 17.42 0.00 88.97
Acquisitions 1.93 2.48 0.00 12.00 4.86 4.40 0.00 14.00
Explanatory variables: Risk
Core capital ratio 5.64 2.19 2.59 11.20 4.75 3.77 1.18 17.97
Reserves 1.51 1.04 0.00 4.58 0.29 0.36 0.00 1.64
Customer loan share 58.86 12.90 21.95 83.60 44.03 20.44 10.74 95.94
Non-performing loans 8.75 7.01 0.30 32.86 8.05 12.82 0.22 66.56
Cost-income ratio 29.38 6.36 7.15 42.67 15.97 12.15 2.49 44.94
Return on equity 11.60 11.57 -23.29 34.42 9.63 17.83 -46.39 58.03
Cost efficiency 84.20 9.98 54.00 98.34 78.76 18.72 34.05 99.36
Profit efficiency 73.17 13.24 25.19 92.38 63.33 22.93 1.63 94.27
Portfolio effects: Extensive margin
Average growth correlation 1 0.163 0.273 0.891 0.447 0.154 0.261 0.836
Average stock market
correlation
1 0.132 0.345 0.929 0.492 0.158 0.214 0.875
Average distance 2555 929 617 4955 3934 1043 1095 5037
Portfolio Effects: Intensive margin
Weights = growth correlations 0.029 0.047 0 0.266 0.216 0.140 0.003 0.474
Weights = stock return
correlations
0.003 0.004 0 0.018 0.010 0.011 0 0.051
Distance weights 85 209 0 942 892 848 8 2786
Notes: This table gives the descriptive statistics for explanatory variables used in the regressions. The
total number of observations (bank-year) is 7,118. For detailed data definitions see the Appendix B.2.
The Lerner index is the mark-up between average revenues and marginal costs, scaled by average revenues.
Details are given in Section 3.2 of the main text.
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Table B.3: Baseline Regression Results: (a) Market Power
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Market Power as:
Lerner index Lerner index Boone
indicator
Lerner index
Predicted risks as
covariate
No. of destinations (all) -0.059** 0.070**
(0.025) (0.036)
Foreign asset share (all) 8.335** -17.487**
(3.420) (8.048)
No. of destinations
(cross-border)
-0.049
(0.031)
Foreign assets
(cross-border) / total
assets
4.367
(3.711)
No. of destinations
(branches)
-0.668**
(0.279)
Foreign assets (branches)
/ total assets
28.871***
(7.390)
Risk (predicted) -4.739*** -4.730*** -0.208 -4.729***
(0.198) (0.181) (0.193) (0.207)
Fee income 0.220*** 0.228*** -0.004 0.228***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.037) (0.046)
Size quintile -1.132*** -0.904*** -0.536*** -0.930***
(0.125) (0.147) (0.139) (0.146)
Herfindahl 0.097*** 0.103*** -0.085** 0.099***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.034) (0.018)
Publicly incorporated -6.039*** -6.151*** -1.390** -6.428***
(1.353) (1.245) (0.662) (1.413)
Branches 0.008 0.007 -0.012*** 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009)
Acquisitions 0.095* 0.078 0.001 0.089*
(0.055) (0.051) (0.023) (0.047)
Constant 16.183*** 15.925*** 4.169** 16.244***
(2.165) (2.178) (1.949) (2.427)
Observations 7118 7118 7081 7118
R² 0.373 0.376 0.097 0.378
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Table B.4: Baseline Regression Results: (b) Risk as Distress indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
Distress indicator
Market Power as
covariate:
Lerner index Lerner index Boone
indicator
Lerner index
No. of destinations (all) 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001 )
Foreign asset share 0.0050 0.0028
(0.0202) (0.0161)
No. of destinations
(cross-border)
0.0002
(0.0001)
Foreign assets
(cross-border) / total
assets
-0.0001
(0.0268)
No. of destinations
(branches)
-0.0047**
(0.0022)
Foreign assets (branches)
/ total assets
0.0876*
(0.0482)
Market power (predicted) -0.0013** -0.0010** -0.0001 -0.0009**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Market power residuals 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Core capital ratio 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Reserves -0.0123*** -0.0129*** -0.0160*** -0.0127***
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0015)
Customer loan share 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Non-performing loans 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cost-income ratio 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Return on equity -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0005*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cost efficiency -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0004*** -0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Profit efficiency 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 7,118 7,118 7,118 7,118
Pseudo R2 0.292 0.292 0.275 0.295
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Notes: Tables B.3 and B.4 give regression results from estimating the probability of distress and the
market power of banks (Lerner index) simultaneously, as described in Section 3.3. Estimations of the
Lerner index in Table B.3 use OLS, estimations of the probability of distress in Table B.4 use a probit
model. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Dummies for different banking groups, time,
and regional fixed effects are included but not reported. Internationalization is measured through the
number of countries in which a bank is present (extensive margin) and the share of foreign assets in
total assets (intensive margin). Table B.3 depicts coefficients with standard errors in brackets, Table
B.4 reports marginal effects with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%,
10%-level drawing on bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table B.5: Endogeneity of Foreign Status: (a) Market power (Lerner index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Frankel-Romer Two year lag Lagged number
of entries and
exits
No. of countries, t-1 -0.059**
(0.023)
Foreign assets / total
assets t-1
8.335** -1.220
(3.864) (4.294)
No. of countries, t-2 -0.079*** -0.081***
(0.028) (0.024)
Foreign assets / total
assets t-2
8.611**
(3.840)
Entry (0/1) (t-2)
Exit (0/1) (t-2)
Entry (number) (t-2) -0.037
(0.097)
Exit (number) (t-2) 0.217***
(0.072)
Foreign / total assets
(Frankel/Romer)
5.980*
(3.073)
Risk (predicted) -4.730*** -4.951*** -4.944*** -5.139***
(0.183) (0.272) (0.289) (0.370)
Fee income 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.233*** 0.187***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.048) (0.050)
Size quintile -0.904*** -0.882*** -0.865*** -0.852***
(0.141) (0.197) (0.192) (0.193)
Herfindahl 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.115***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Publicly incorporated -6.151*** -5.252*** -5.309*** -4.517**
(1.323) (1.359) (1.547) (1.789)
Branches 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.046***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Acquisitions 0.078 0.075 0.068 -0.051
(0.052) (0.065) (0.075) (0.103)
Constant 15.925*** 14.897*** 14.789*** 10.580***
(1.994) (2.944) (2.296) (2.549)
Observations 7118 5219 5219 3018
R-squared 0.376 0.378 0.379 0.418
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Table B.6: Endogeneity of Foreign Status: (b) Risk as Distress indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Frankel-Romer Two year lag Lagged number
of entries and
exits
No. of countries, t-1 0.0001
(0.0001)
Foreign assets / total
assets t-1
0.0050 -0.0072
(0.0162) (0.0150)
No. of countries, t-2 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Foreign assets / total
assets t-2
0.0034
(0.0198)
Entry (0/1) (t-2)
Exit (0/1) (t-2)
Entry (number) (t-2) 0.0000
(0.0004)
Exit (number) (t-2) 0.0005
(0.0004)
Foreign / total assets
(Frankel/Romer)
0.0013
(0.0131)
Lerner (predicted) -0.0010** -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Lerner residuals 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Core capital ratio 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Reserves -0.0129*** -0.0093*** -0.0094*** -0.0080***
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0025)
Customer loan share 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Non-performing loans 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Cost-income ratio 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Return on equity -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Cost efficiency -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Profit efficiency 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 7118 5219 5219 3018
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Notes: Tables B.5 and B.6 gives regression results for simultaneously estimating the probability of distress
and the market power of banks (Lerner index) as described in Section 3.3 Estimations of the Lerner index
in Table B.5 use OLS, estimations of the probability of distress in Table B.6 use a probit model. All
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Dummies for different banking groups, time, and regional
fixed effects are included but not reported. Number of countries is the number of countries in which the
bank has cross-border activities or holds foreign branches. Foreign assets / total assets is the sum of cross-
border and branch assets. Entry (0/1) is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bank has increased
the number of foreign countries in which it is active, Exit (0/1) is a dummy variable which is equal to one
if a bank has lowered the number of countries. Exit (number) and Entry (number) are the corresponding
variables using the absolute value of the count of countries from which a bank has withdrawn or into
which a bank has newly expanded. Internationalization is measured through the number of countries
in which a bank is present (extensive margin) and the share of foreign assets in total assets (intensive
margin). Table B.5 depicts standardized coefficients in brackets, Table B.6 reports marginal effects and
standard errors on brackets. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level drawing on bootstrapped
standard errors.
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Table B.7: Including Portfolio Effects: (a) Market power (Lerner index)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of destination
countries (branches +
cross-border)
-0.059** -0.068** -0.083*** -0.052*
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027)
Foreign assets
(cross-border + branches)
/ total assets
8.335*** 8.448 10.831** 9.611
(2.948) (7.865) (4.883) (8.134)
Average growth
correlation
-1.266
(1.137)
Weighted foreign assets /
total assets (weights =
growth correlations)
-0.232
(12.229)
Average stock market
correlation
-2.302
(1.977)
Weighted foreign assets /
total assets (weights =
stock market correlations)
-64.448
(63.987)
Average distance -0.000
(0.000)
Weighted foreign assets /
total assets (weights =
distance weights)
-0.001
(0.003)
Risk (predicted) -4.730*** -4.738*** -4.745*** -4.754***
(0.180) (0.168) (0.181) (0.172)
Fee income 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.235*** 0.225***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040)
Size quintile -0.904*** -0.893*** -0.913*** -0.911***
(0.131) (0.156) (0.151) (0.147)
Herfindahl 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.103***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015)
Publicly incorporated -6.151*** -6.134*** -6.218*** -6.136***
(1.272) (1.384) (1.185) (1.197)
Branches 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Acquisitions 0.078 0.076 0.083* 0.076
(0.055) (0.066) (0.049) (0.049)
Constant 15.925*** 16.537*** 17.842*** 16.261***
(2.137) (2.211) (2.672) (2.348)
Observations 7,118 7,118 7,116 7,118
R² 0.376 0.377 0.377 0.377
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Table B.8: Including Portfolio Effects: (b) Risk as Distress indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of destination
countries (branches +
cross-border)
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Foreign assets
(cross-border + branches)
/ total assets
0.0050 0.0094 0.0227 0.0249
(0.0178) (0.0302) (0.0271) (0.0299)
Average growth
correlation
-0.0030
(0.0078)
Weighted foreign assets /
total assets (weights =
growth correlations)
-0.0079
(0.0432)
Average stock market
correlation
-0.0039
(0.0102)
Weighted foreign assets /
total assets (weights =
stock return correlations)
-0.5154
(0.4175)
Average distance -0.0000
(0.0000)
Weighted foreign assets /
total assets (distance
weights)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
Lerner (predicted) -0.0010 -0.0010* -0.0008 -0.0010*
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Lerner residuals 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Core capital ratio 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Reserves -0.0129*** -0.0129*** -0.0132*** -0.0128***
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Customer loan share 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0001** 0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Non-performing loans 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cost-income ratio 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0003*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Return on equity -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Cost efficiency -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Profit efficiency 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 7,118 7,118 7,116 7,118
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Notes: Tables B.7 and B.8 give regression results from simultaneously estimating the probability of
distress and the market power of banks (Lerner index) as described in Section 3.3. Estimations of the
Lerner index in Table B.7 use OLS, estimations of the probability of distress in Table B.8 use a probit
model. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Dummies for different banking groups, time,
and regional fixed effects are included but not reported. Internationalization is measured through the
number of countries in which a bank is present (extensive margin) and the share of foreign assets in
total assets (intensive margin). Table B.7 depicts coefficients and standard errors in brackets, Table
B.8 reports marginal effects and standard errors in brackets. Average growth correlations, average stock
market correlations, and average distances are averages for the countries in which a particular bank is
active in a particular year. Weighted foreign assets relative to total assets use GDP correlations, stock
market correlations, and distance weights, respectively. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level
drawing on bootstrapped standard errors.

4Risky Adjustments or Adjustments
to Risks: Decomposing Bank
Leverage1
The Lehman collapse of September 2008 marks the outset of the banking crisis and has
induced banks to substantially restructure their balance-sheets. Uncertainty paralyzed
the interbank market and lead to a fundamental change in bank funding conditions. This
paper sheds light on the dynamics of banks’ liabilities from a short- and long-run perspec-
tive. From a long-run perspective, it examines how banks reallocate various liabilities in
response to fundamental ruptures in their funding conditions. From a short-run perspec-
tive, it examines which liability components adjust for short-run deviations from long-run
liability ratios that, in turn, are induced by changes in financial market risks.
If banks exhibit constant liability ratios of for instance equity to total balance-sheet,
a decomposition of all liabilities and the total balance sheet should form a cointegrating
relationship. Hence, cointegration analysis can test whether banks target distinct liabil-
ity ratios and whether they achieve this aim when facing fundamental ruptures in their
funding conditions. My empirical approach reveals that cointegration can only be found
after accounting for structural breaks. Identifying these structural breaks proves to be
useful, as their estimates allow me to trace the channels that banks invoke to reallocate
their balance sheets when hit by these major changes in funding conditions. The equity
1This chapter greatly benefited from fruitful discussions with Mathias Hoffmann. I am grateful for
many ideas and comments.
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to total balance sheet ratio features the inverse of the leverage ratio, meaning that my
approach can trace the channels of leverage adjustments. To form hypotheses about the
optimal adjustments of banks to ruptures in their funding conditions or risks in financial
markets, I construct a tailored version of the workhorse banking model by Baltensperger
and Milde (1987).
My empirical analysis exploits comprehensive balance-sheet data of four distinct Ger-
man banking groups: large commercial banks, small commercial banks, public sector
banks and cooperative banks. The estimation sample draws on all globally operating
banks headquartered in Germany. I organize these banks by banking group to bring out
the heterogeneity in terms of business model, funding structure or ownership.
The Lehman collapse and the subsequent freeze of interbank markets suggests itself as a
major permanent break in the funding conditions of banks. One particular German bank-
ing group, public sector banks, have experienced another major event which has shaped
their funding structure and portfolio allocation. By a decision of the European Commis-
sion, public sector banks lost their guarantee schemes in July 2005 with a grandfathering
arrangement for liabilities incurred between 2001-2005 but maturing no later than 2015
(Brunner et al., 2004). Both the Lehman collapse and the withdrawal of guarantees enter
the long-run analysis as key breaks in the funding conditions of public sector banks.
To proxy exogenous financial market risks that trigger short-run deviations from long-run
ratios, I resort to the return difference between Moody’s “Baa-” and “AAA”-rated long-
run corporate bonds, denoted as the risk-spread. My objective is to approach the default
risk of borrowing agents and the aggregate uncertainty in financial markets. My short-
run empirical analysis shows which liabilities adjust and restore the long-run equilibrium
ratios as impulse response functions when facing a shock in the exogenous risk spread.
This paper proceeds in several steps. A brief review of the relevant literature follows
this outline. Section 4.2.1 describes the bank balance-sheet setup and offers the liability
decompositions into three core sets which form the backbone of my empirical analysis.
Section 4.2.2 derives the long-run cointegrated relationships. Turning to the empirical
part, Section 4.3.1 provides some stylized facts of the data and precedes the presentation
of my results: Section 4.3.1 relates to the long run, Section 4.3.3 to the short run. Finally,
Section 4.4 concludes.
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4.1 Literature Review
My paper builds on two strands of economic literature. The first strand relates balance-
sheet dynamics and key issues of the banking business such as liquidity, leverage and
lending to exogenous shocks. In a narrow sense, it elaborates on the so-called bank-
lending channel stating that characteristics of bank balance sheets shape their response
to monetary policy decisions (see for instance Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). The idea
that heterogeneity among banks governs the effectiveness of monetary policy as exoge-
nous shocks has sparked a sizable literature. My review presents only a choice. In a
seminal paper, Kashyap and Stein (2000) argue that monetary policy exercises a stronger
impact on those banks with less liquid balance sheets. Kishan and Opiela (2000) add that
smallest and least capitalized banks reveal as most responsive. Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2008) broaden the scope. They find that international operations shield banks from do-
mestic monetary policy as internal capital markets reinforce or weaken the propagation of
shocks. With the global banking crisis of 2008 the focus has shifted. Now the literature
explores how balance-sheet characteristics and key issues of the banking business shape
the response to financial market shocks. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that after
the Lehman collapse banks that had been more exposed to the short-run debt market
and credit-line drawdowns reduced their lending more sharply than did their competitors.
Puri et al. (2011) identify a significant reduction in the lending of those savings banks
that were linked to head institutions with a high exposure to the US subprime market.
The twofold role of foreign banks in the financial crisis is explored by Cetorelli and Gold-
berg (2012). They show that global banks transmit shocks by relating the parent banks’
funding needs to the balance-sheet contraction of foreign affiliates. Giannetti and Laeven
(2012) put forward that the collapse of the syndicated loan market is traceable to banks
re-balancing their portfolio in favor of domestic rather than foreign lending.
The second strand of literature deals with the methodology applied in this paper.
To distinguish long-run and short-run perspective, I refer to the consumption-wealth lit-
erature. By interpreting a balance-sheet as a budget constraint in present value form, I
motivate the link between balance-sheet constraints and cointegration analysis. Campbell
and Mankiw (1989) lay the cornerstone for this type of model and Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001) link them to financial market developments. Hoffmann (2006) allows for trend
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breaks and splits the cointegrating relationship with all components into three relation-
ships drawing on two variables.
As distinct from that, my empirical approach finds structural breaks in the long-run
liability ratios. Cointegration analysis allows me interpret structural breaks in terms
of balance-sheet reallocations. Thereby, I can identify the liability channels that banks
invoke to adjust their leverage in response to shocks. Indeed, i Silvestre and Sanso´ (2006)
provide the toolkit to test for cointegration given structural breaks in the cointegrating
vector.
My paper greatly benefits from these presented tools and applies them to balance-
sheet dynamics. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to interpret struc-
tural breaks in cointegrating relationships as channels of leverage adjustment. My paper
contributes twofold to the existing literature. First, I distinguish between short- and long-
run balance-sheet dynamics to identify long-run equilibrium ratios, structural breaks and
most responsive liabilities in the short run. Second, I use detailed balance-sheet data,
to examine the reallocation among liabilities and thus the liability channels to adjust
leverage.
4.2 Deriving the Empirical Approach
4.2.1 Decomposing Leverage
This section deals with changes in leverage and more general liability decompositions of
bank balance sheets. Figure C.1 sketches a stylized balance sheet with mutually exclusive
items in bold print. Its liability side broadly imitates an official form (“HV12” shown
in Appendix C.2) that the Bundesbank makes available for banks to report supervisory
data. Let capital letters denote balance-sheet items as indicated by banks in levels and
denominated in euro. The balance-sheet identity states that sources of internal and exter-
nal finance sum up to the balance sheet total (TBS ). EQUITY corresponds to subscribed
capital as a source of internal finance. The following items characterize sources of external
finance (EFIN ): BONDS capture issued securitized debt, DEBT features non-securitized
debt, such as deposits and borrowed funds while OTHER LIABILITIES serve as a resid-
ual catchall item. To shed light on the (de)leveraging process, my empirical analysis draws
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on three distinct decompositions of the liability side: set I, the baseline decomposes the
total balance sheet into EQUITY, BONDS, DEBT and OTHER LIABILITIES. Set II
adds a distinction between foreign and domestic debt, while set III separates bank from
non-bank debt.2
According to the balance-sheet identity, EQUITY, BONDS, DEBT and OTHER LI-
ABILITIES add up to the total balance sheet (TBS hereafter). Thus, leverage can be
expressed by liability components as:
Leverage = TBS/(EQUITY ) = TBS/TBS−EFIN = TBS/(TBS−DEBT−BONDS−OTHERLIABILITIES)
(4.1)
Hence, changes in leverage may ensue from non-offsetting changes in the components of
sets I to III.
4.2.2 Econometric Traces of Changes in Leverage
The aim of this section is to derive possibly cointegrating relationships between vari-
ous liability decompositions and the total balance sheet. My approach bears analogy to
Campbell and Mankiw (1989); Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) and Hoffmann (2005). To
build the bridge, one might interpret the balance-sheet identity as a budget constraint in
present value form. Be it for regulatory reasons, be it for the purpose of profit maximiza-
tion, the following chain of arguments strongly draws on the idea that banks exhibit a
constant equity to total balance sheet ratio, the inverse of the leverage ratio.
To simplify, I split the total balance sheet TBSt only into equity EQUITY t and external
finance EFINt as a composite of other liability items
3 to arrive at the following version
of the balance-sheet identity:
TBSt = EQUITY t + EFINt (4.2)
Based on the assumption that banks exhibit a constant long-run equity to total balance
sheet ratio, it is possible to approximate these long-run ratios. For this purpose, I take a
first-order Taylor expansion4 of the balance sheet-identity around the equity to total ratio
2Table C.1 gives the ultimate specifications in terms of potentially cointegrating relationships.
3This approach ignores any regulatory restrictions, as no risk-weights are involved when referring to
the total balance sheet. For this reason, my paper restricts leveraging and deleveraging only to the total
balance sheet and the liability decomposition while abstracting from the structure of the asset side.
4 A step-by-step log-linearization of the equity ratio is provided in Appendix C.1.
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expressed in logarithms (equityt − tbst) and around the external finance to total ratio
(efint − tbst). Letting lower case letters denote logarithms, Equation (4.3) suggests an
equilibrium long-run relationship between equity, external finance and the total balance
sheet tbs :
tbst = c6 + γequityt + (1− γ) efint (4.3)
γ denotes the long-run equilibrium share of equity to total balance sheet, whereas (1− γ)
gives the long-run share of external finance to the total balance sheet. If banks exhibit
constant equilibrium ratios, cointegration analysis serves as appropriate tool to examine
Equation (4.4) with εt as random deviation from the long-run ratios in period t:
tbst = c6 + γequityt + (1− γ) efint + εt (4.4)
Table C.1 broadens the scope again. It lists the corresponding equations while splitting
up debt into sub-components in line with Figure C.1 and the previously formed sets. By
analogy, δI2 denotes the long-run equilibrium share of bonds in the total balance sheet,
equivalently expressed as long-run bond to total balance sheet ratio.
In short, if banks exhibit constant ratios, liability decomposition sets should be cointe-
grated. In what follows, I will reverse this argument. Cointegration analysis provides
the tools to test whether banks do indeed exhibit constant ratios such as the equity to
total ratio. Put differently, finding cointegration among liability sets I to III would yield
strong evidence that banks target constant leverage ratios, the flip side of the equity to
total. However, in view of financial market turmoil and the subsequent banking crisis in
September 2008, the question arises whether banks were actually able to target constant
liability ratios.
As IMF (2011) puts forward, the Lehman collapse in September 2008 has left persistent
traces in the liability decomposition of banks. Indeed, structural breaks in the cointe-
gration term might stand for ruptures in long-run liability shares which invites me to
interpret them as structural breaks in leverage or its decomposition.
In this vein, changes in leverage are not restricted to explicit movements in either equity
or the total balance sheet tbs. The definition of leverage by Equation (4.1) suggests that
sudden changes in leverage might run through different channels represented by different
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liability reallocations. Sets I to III reflect these channels. Applying cointegration tests in
the presence of possible structural breaks to sets I to III can shed light on the channels that
banks use to adjust their leverage. My empirical approach exploits comprehensive balance-
sheet data to examine how banks re-organize their liability decomposition to tune their
leverage. Having found cointegrating relationships with structural breaks, I can apply
the tools of cointegration analysis. Vector error correction models and impulse response
functions can shed light on how distinct balance-sheet items restore the equilibrium.
4.3 Empirical Evidence
4.3.1 Datasets and Sample Construction
Two datasets collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank set the stage for my empirical anal-
ysis. Both datasets consist of individual mandatory reports submitted by all banks with
a German banking license. First, the “Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics” (“Monatliche
Bilanzstatistik”) dataset features comprehensive data on all balance-sheet items of Ger-
man banks.5 Second, the “External Position Report” (“Auslandsstatus”) as described by
Fiorentino et al. (2010) offers the corresponding data by country of foreign business. Both
datasets are rich in coverage and detail. After combining the External Position Report
with the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, I am able to use information on various classes
of assets and liabilities and to distinguish between securitized and non-securitized items
by maturities and even counterparty. To study leverage dynamics in light of banking
groups’ distinct characteristics, I construct aggregates for each of four individual banking
groups. Thereby, I aim to bring out the heterogeneity in terms of business model, funding
structure and ownership. Put differently, my empirical analysis draws on individual time
series estimations by banking group. 6
The dataset of my empirical analysis is constructed as follows. Starting from bank-
level data, I restrict the sample to banks headquartered in Germany which, however,
run foreign affiliates. My intention is to capture globally exposed banks with foreign
commercial presence. In a second step I keep only those banks with a consecutive data
5Appendix C.3 gives further details, Figure C.2 shows an official reporting form.
6Besides, for reasons of confidentiality, the Bundesbank does not allow to report results from individual
time series estimations by bank.
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record from January 2002 to April 2010 to avoid discrete jumps. Hence, banks entering or
exiting the German banking market drop out of the sample. In a third step, I aggregate
the data by banking group.
Substantial heterogeneity characterizes the population of German banks: institutional
setup, stake- or shareholders and the business model vary across banking groups. Banking
group 1 includes large commercial banks and has 3 members. Banking group 2 includes
small commercial banks and captures consecutive time series of 32 individual banks.
Banking group 3 includes public sector banks as a composite group of (large) savings
banks and their head institutions with 13 members in total. Finally, banking group 4
includes large cooperative banks and their head institutions, amounting to 10 member
banks in total. An observational unit in the empirical analysis could be characterized as
a representative synthetic composite bank: a large commercial bank, a small commercial
bank, a public sector bank or a cooperative bank .
Figure C.3 depicts the size of the included banks aggregated by banking group relative
to the sample at hand. As previously mentioned, I restrict the used dataset to complete
records which causes public sector banks to appear as the largest banking group in terms
of total balance sheet. Yet, Figure C.3 clearly shows that their share declines in the wake
of the Lehman failure, whereas the share of large commercial banks increases.
Figure C.4 gives an impression of how much my analysis captures relative to the entire
German bank population. On the left vertical axis, I plot the total balance sheet. The
blue line represents the entire German bank population, whereas the red line represents
my sample of internationally operating banks with permanent record. Turning to the
share captured, the green line refers to the vertical axis to the right presenting the share
of my sample aggregate relative to the aggregate of the entire population. Hence, my
sample captures between 30% in 2002 and more than 40% in 2010. Its growth ensues
unintentionally from the data.
Table C.2 presents some descriptive statistics. It relies on aggregated data across all
banking groups in levels and EUR billions. The underlying monthly sample ranges from
January 2002 to April 2010. Descriptive figures state that the domestic share in debt
exceeds by far the foreign share (set II), whereas the foreign share exhibits less volatility.
Bank debt outstrips non-bank debt (set III). Further, Table C.2 gives descriptive statistics
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of the risk-spread which enters the short-run analysis as weakly exogenous variable.
4.3.2 Long-Run Equilibrium Ratios and Structural Breaks
My paper examines leverage and the liability structure of balance sheets from a short
and long-run perspective. This section focuses on the long-run. If liability shares are con-
stant over time, liability decomposition sets as presented in Table C.1 will be cointegrated.
Major changes in the funding conditions of banks, however, cast constant liability ratios
into doubt. In econometric terms, I interpret major changes in these funding conditions as
structural breaks.This section considers financial market turmoil in September 2008 for all
banking groups and the withdrawal of guarantees in July 2005 for public sector banks as
possible structural breaks. For this reason, cointegration analysis can test whether banks
target constant ratios and whether they were able to do so when facing major changes in
their funding conditions.
The next section develops hypotheses about the impact of structural breaks. Then,
I briefly review the econometric tools to test for constant ratios and cointegration in the
presence of structural breaks. My empirical results follow while tracing the leveraging
and deleveraging of banks and the changes in their liability structure.
Hypotheses about Structural Breaks
To form hypotheses about how changes in funding conditions impact liability ratios, I build
on a workhorse banking model of Baltensperger and Milde (1987). Appendix C.2 tailors
the model of Baltensperger and Milde (1987) to my empirical setup. Baltensperger and
Milde (1987) argue that banks simultaneously optimize the asset and liability structure
of balance-sheets to maximize profits in competitive markets. The tradeoff between less
profitable cash holdings and interest-bearing assets shapes (i) the illiquidity risk. By
analogy, the tradeoff between deposit and equity finance shapes (ii) insolvency risk. In
this sense, banks form expectations about their liquidity needs and their aggregate return
to manage their illiquidity and insolvency risks. Objective costs arise to deal with both
risks. Indeed, illiquidity and insolvency risks ensue from how participants perceive and
think about risks on financial markets.
Figure C.5 motivates the inclusion of structural breaks into my analysis. It displays
the bank debt to total balance sheet ratio for cooperative banks while marking the outset
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of the financial crisis in September 2008. I will interpret the Lehman failure in September
2008 as a permanent shift in parameters of the Baltensperger model. One might think
about the interbank market freeze as a surge in restructuring costs η or a surge in the
penalty rate p on interbank markets. With respect to a bank’s customers, the Lehman
default might trigger a shift in the volatility of liquidity needs ∆σv and/or a shock to the
volatility of aggregate return ∆σr. The optimal elasticities (C.24) and (C.25) recommend
a reduction of external finance. For this reason, I hypothesize that banks substitute
external finance for equity in the wake of the Lehman failure.
With respect to public sector banks, I present a regulatory change as a possible second
structural break: In July 2005 the public owners’ maintenance obligation (“Anstaltslast”)
and guarantee obligation (“Gewa¨hrtra¨gerhaftung”) underwent major change (see for in-
stance Brunner et al., 2004; IMF, 2011). The guarantee obligation was transformed and
will cease to exist after a transition period in December 2015. Until then, the so-called
grandfathering clause states that liabilities which a public sector bank had incurred be-
tween July 2001 and July 2005 will be guaranteed, or “grandfathered”, if they mature no
later than December 2015.7 Liabilities incurred after July 2005 are not subject to an ex-
plicit public guarantee. Hence, this date marks a crucial change in the funding conditions
of public sector banks. Figure C.5 motivates the inclusion of two structural breaks for
public sector banks. It displays the bank debt to total balance sheet ratio for public sector
banks while marking both the withdrawal of guarantees in July 2005 and the outset of the
financial crisis in September 2008. In light of Baltensperger and Milde (1987), I interpret
the removal of guarantees as a surge in the costs of external finance t for public sector
banks. According to the optimal elasticities in C.22, I again hypothesize that they will
substitute external finance for equity.
Econometric Tools
My analysis applies time-series techniques separately to each individual banking group.
To test for constant liability ratios, I follow standard procedures to test for cointegration.
It starts with unit root tests of all individual time series and then proceeds to cointegration
tests of entire liability sets per banking group. Ambivalent results on the cointegration
7Liabilities incurred before July 2001 will be captured until final maturity.
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tests point out that banks do not exhibit constant liability ratios over the entire sample
period. Hence, finding no cointegration leads me to test for structural breaks in the
cointegrating relationships. This long-run consideration finishes with dynamic ordinary
least squares (DOLS) estimation of the long-run equilibrium ratios in the presence of
structural breaks. I interpret structural breaks as evidence of changes in liability ratios
induced by major ruptures in the funding conditions of banks.
Unit Root Tests To verify that all balance-sheet items in the liability sets of Ta-
ble C.1 have a unit root, I resort to Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF ) tests as well as
Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) tests. To give way to the cointegration anal-
ysis below, all variables in levels should be integrated of order one I(1). Lu¨tkepohl and
Kra¨tzig (2004) partly extend the definition of cointegration and allow for I(1) and I(0)
variables to form a cointegrating relationship as long as a linear combination thereof is
I(0). Consequently, even if it turns out that some liability items do not fulfill the I(1) re-
quirement, this should not harm the appropriateness of further cointegration and VECM
analysis.
For each banking group and balance-sheet item I run the ADF test on levels and first
differences as developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) and MacKinnon (2010). Figure C.7
plots the ADF test statistic of first differences against the test statistics of the times
series in levels. The existence of three outliers related to small commercial banks and
cooperative banks still allows to continue with cointegration and VECM analysis.
As opposed to the ADF test, the null hypothesis of the KPSS test as suggested
by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) states that a variable is stationary. Figure C.8 plots the
KPSS test statistic of the variable in first differences against the KPSS test statistic of
the variable in levels. Again, the extended definition of cointegration by Lu¨tkepohl and
Kra¨tzig (2004) mitigates concerns about outliers.
Standard Cointegration Analysis Cointegration analysis seeks to absorb long-
run phenomena into a cointegration vector. Recall that if both long-run liability ratios and
leverage are constant, liability sets should be cointegrated. Thus, cointegration analysis
can test whether banks target constant liability ratios and whether they are able to achieve
this aim when facing severe ruptures in their funding conditions. Table C.3 features three
different cointegration tests which are in turn applied to all sets for each banking group:
the Engle-Granger (EG) test, the KPSS test and Johansen’s trace statistic.
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Engle and Granger (1987) suggest this residual-based test featuring a null hypothesis
of non-cointegration, while critical values draw on MacKinnon (2010). The first panel of
Table C.3 suggests that baseline set I is cointegrated only for large commercial banks. Set
II involves a distinction between foreign and domestic debt and turns out to be cointe-
grated with respect to public sector and cooperative banks. Set III, while splitting debt
into bank and non-bank debt, only forms a cointegrating relationship for large commercial
banks. These mixed results gives rise to the inclusion of structural breaks.
Shin (1994) develops a residual-based test with a null hypothesis of cointegration
based on the previously discussed KPSS test. As already stated, these findings strongly
suggest the existence of structural breaks. The second panel of Table C.3 presents that
cointegration is rejected for public sector banks in set II as well as small commercial banks
in sets I and III. The Shin (1994) test and the Engle and Granger (1987) test come to the
same conclusion, if the Shin test cannot reject its null of cointegration and the EG test
rejects its null of non-cointegration. Inference based on some sets indeed point into the
same direction, the overall evidence is, however, mixed.
Johansen’s trace statistic Johansen (1995) relies on a likelihood ratio test with eigen-
values deriving from reduced regression techniques Lu¨tkepohl and Kra¨tzig (2004). For
each banking group and liability set, the third panel of Table C.3 gives the number of
cointegrating relationships. With respect to large commercial banks, results from the Jo-
hansen test align with the KPSS test but contrasts strongly with respect to cooperative
banks. For this reason, I conclude that contradictory results provided by three differ-
ent cointegration tests might ensue from possible structural breaks. From now on, the
analysis focuses on cointegration analysis dealing with a single cointegrating relationship
and potential structural breaks. This more closely suits the purpose of finding long-run
cointegrating relationships in the liability decompositions.
Structural breaks reflected by Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and Chow Tests This
study centers on whether banks exhibit constant liability ratios. If major changes in the
funding conditions constitute structural break in cointegrating relationships, I can inter-
pret these breaks as a change in the leverage ratios of banks. Previous results from conven-
tional cointegration analysis did not provide clear-cut evidence on possibly cointegrated
sets of liability decompositions. Yet, intuition suggests that liability decompositions as
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listed in Table C.1 share common stochastic trends. Structural breaks in the long-run
relationships might solve the puzzle. i Silvestre and Sanso´ (2006) have advanced a cointe-
gration test in the presence of structural breaks. Applied to my setup, their methodology
serves several purposes. First, it yields explicit estimates of long-run ratios and interac-
tion coefficients. Long-run ratios inform about differences in the liability structure across
banking groups. Interaction coefficients indicate structural breaks and split up changes
in leverage into distinct channels. Second, the Chow test informs about the overall signif-
icance of the structural break. Third, finding evidence of cointegration after accounting
for structural breaks allows me to analyze short-run dynamics by means of VECMs and
impulse response functions.
The Carrion Test Gregory and Hansen (1996a,b) develop a cointegration test
which allows for breaks in the intercept, the deterministic trend and coefficient estimates.
Their idea is to introduce the transition of a cointegrating equilibrium from one path to
another. Yet, Gregory and Hansen do not account for the endogeneity of the regressors.
i Silvestre and Sanso´ (2006) tackle this issue and extend their model to a multivariate
framework. Their suggested test statistic involves regression residuals from a first stage
DOLS estimation in which all coefficients are interacted with a break dummy. Equation
(4.5) projects their idea on the simplified liability decompositions. It expands Equation
(4.4) by leads and lags of first differences, a structural break dummy B and the interaction
terms:
tbst = c+ γ0equityt + (1− γ0) efint +B + γ1equityt ∗B + γ2efint ∗B (4.5)
+
1∑
k=−1
δk∆equityt+k +
1∑
k=−1
τk∆efint + ςt
Similar in spirit to Gregory and Hansen (1996a,b) the null hypothesis of i Silvestre and
Sanso´ (2006) states cointegration while explicitly allowing for the possibility of a structural
break in coefficient parameters. The consistent estimate of γˆ0 characterizes the long-run
equilibrium equity to total ratio over the entire period. The coefficient estimate of the
interaction term, γˆ1 states to which extent the regime shift has modified the equity to
total ratio. Hence, structural breaks in the cointegrating relationship can be interpreted
as changes in the liability ratios. A further split of the liability components allows me to
trace the channels of deleveraging more explicitly.
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Structural Breaks My analysis considers two structural breaks: the Lehman Col-
lapse as well as the termination of guarantees for public sector banks, the so-called grand-
fathering clause. Results in Tables C.4 to C.6 inform about the long-run ratios over
the entire sample period from January 2002 to April 2010 and further state in how far
structural breaks have left persistent traces on balance sheets. To illustrate the tables’
setup by help of the Lehman collapse and Equation (4.5), a structural break B is modeled
twofold: (i) a dummy variable labeled lehman assumes the value 0 and switches to 1 from
September 2008 onwards, (ii) this dummy variable is interacted with all liability items
of the respective set and carries the prefix iL ∗ throughout all tables. With respect to
public sector banks I introduce the removal of public guarantees in July 2005 as a second
structural break. The respective interaction terms carries the prefix iG ∗. These inter-
action terms iL ∗ and iG ∗indicate which long-run liability ratios change in response to
structural breaks. They identify the channels of leveraging and deleveraging given major
changes in the funding conditions of banks. Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimation allows to
apply standard t- and F-tests of the coefficient estimates (Murray, 2006). For this reason,
I use a Chow test to draw conclusions about the joint significance of all estimates related
to the structural break, namely the dummy variable as well as the interaction terms.
Results on Long-Run Ratios and Structural Breaks
Tables C.4 to C.6 present the results by banking group while distinguishing among the
baseline model (set I), the split into domestic and foreign debt (set II) and the split into
bank versus non-bank debt (set III). Columns two to five of all tables focus on the Lehman
collapse as structural break separated by banking group. Columns six and seven solely
feature public sector banks, with column six capturing the abolition of guarantees in
isolation (grandfa) and column seven jointly considering both structural breaks. To test
for cointegration in the presence of a structural break, carrion gives the test statistic of
the Carrion test. The Chow test indicates whether banks significantly reallocated their
balance-sheet in response to structural breaks.
Large Commercial Banks (bg1) As evidenced by the Carrion test in the second
column of Table C.4, the null hypothesis of cointegration cannot be rejected at the 5%
level of significance. Further, throughout all specifications in Tables C.4 to C.6 p-values
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of the Chow test tell about the joint significance of the Lehman interaction and dummy
variables. These results propose that a structural break shapes the liability structure of
large commercial banks.
Large commercial banks hold on average 76.5% of their liabilities as non-securitized
debt and 10.2% as bonds. Equity amounts to about 5% and other liabilities make up
almost 9% of the total.8 In the wake of the Lehman collapse, large commercial banks
have cut back on debt (-2.3%) and bond finance (-1.7%) but exhibit no significant effect
on equity. These stylized facts broadly align with the Baltensperger model and hint at a
significant deleveraging of large commercial banks.
A breakdown of debt into foreign and domestic debt (set II, Table C.5) and bank
versus non-bank debt (set III, Table C.6) disclosed the channels of deleveraging more pre-
cisely. Estimates of the interaction coefficients in set II suggest that the overall reduction
in debt ensues as a net effect. Indeed, an increase in domestic debt (3.3%) partly re-
verses a very pronounced drop in foreign debt (-7.1%) and bond finance. Generally, large
commercial banks almost equally split their debt finance between domestic and foreign
funding sources. Set III hints at a significant reduction of -2.9% in borrowing from other
banks. Prior to the Lehman failure, large commercial banks relied more on bank debt
(42.5%) than non-bank debt (34.4%). These findings allude to the prominent exposure of
large commercial banks to international bank markets. To conclude, the deleveraging of
large commercial banks mainly runs through a reduction in foreign debt, bank debt and
issued bonds.
Small Commercial Banks (bg2) Results on the Chow test stress that the Lehman
collapse has left persistent traces in the liability structure of small commercial banks
throughout all sets (Tables C.4 to C.6). According to the Carrion test in the third
column of Table C.4, cointegration given the structural break cannot even be rejected at
the 10% level of significance. Small commercial banks exhibit an average funding pattern
which is similar that to large commercial banks. Total liabilities can be decomposed into
on average 73.5% debt, 10.5% bond, 6% equity finance and 10% of other liabilities. Yet, in
comparison to large commercial banks, the adjustment in the wake of the Lehman collapse
8The share of average debt, equity and bond finance does not differ between set I and set II. Minor
deviations in set II ensue from the consolidation of foreign branches and subsidiaries with their parent
bank.
112 3. RISKY ADJUSTMENTS OR ADJUSTMENTS TO RISKS
runs in the opposite direction: small commercial banks have raised their overall debt by
almost 5.5% and reduced bond finance by -1.6%. Effects on equity and other liabilities
turn out to be insignificant. These results allude to a leveraging-up in response to financial
market turmoil. In fact, these measures are at odds with the optimal suggestions of the
Baltensperger model.
A glance at set II (Table C.5) while decomposing debt suggests that restructuring
operates through an almost equal increase in foreign (plus 4%) and domestic debt (4.9%).
Set II hints at the crucial role of domestic against foreign funding: 63.7% of the total is
domestic debt and foreign debt is about 11% on average. However, in view of discrepancies
due to the consolidation of parent banks with foreign affiliates, these estimates might be
questioned. Similar doubts related to set II emerge when considering that equity seems
to have increased by 4% in the wake of the Lehman failure.
Set III (Table C.6) can avoid these concerns about consolidation. During the pre-
Lehman period, small commercial banks relied more on non-bank funding (51.4%) than
on tabbing the interbank market (21.6%). This finding might explain why evidence on
set III does not hint at a significant deleveraging or leveraging after the Lehman collapse.
To sum up, limited evidence on leveraging in the wake of the Lehman failure probably
ensues from its limited exposure to international interbank markets.
Public Sector Banks: Savings Banks and their head institutions (bg3)
With respect to public sector banks, my analysis considers two potential structural breaks.
Besides the Lehman collapse, the abolition of public guarantees in July 2005 (the grand-
fathering effect) suggests itself as another structural break in the funding structure. The
fourth column of Table C.4 captures the Lehman effect in isolation, the six column only
relies on the grandfathering effect, whereas the last column captures both effects simul-
taneously. In terms of the Baltensperger model, one might interpret the grandfathering
clause as a surge in the cost of external finance such as bonds or different types of debt.
Optimal elasticity (C.22) suggests an decline in external finance in response to higher
costs.
Cointegration in the presence of the Lehman structural break (iL * related to lehman)
cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance. Results from the Chow test suggest
that public sector banks have significantly restructured their balance sheet in the wake
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of the Lehman collapse. Turning to the structural break of the grandfathering effect
(iG * related to grandfa), cointegration cannot either be rejected at the 10% with the
Chow test confirming the necessity to include this structural break. These findings lead
to three conclusions: First, cointegration is a common phenomenon with respect to the
liability structure when considering each break in isolation. Due to the fact that a linear
combination of cointegrated relationships must be cointegrated as well Lu¨tkepohl and
Kra¨tzig (2004), the short-run analysis draws on VECMs and thus runs in parallel to
the other banking groups. Second, the significance of isolated events as well as their joint
significance hints at the importance to rely on both events in the following analysis. Third,
differences in the estimated long-run shares of column four, five and seven undoubtedly
require the joint consideration of both breaks as an isolated view only yields biased long-
run estimates.
Set I (last column in Table C.4) depicts a 58.6% share of debt finance and 30.3% bond
finance. A glance at the changing average equity share confirms that the grandfathering
effect needs to be considered to avoid misleading conclusions. In this vein, public sector
banks report an average equity share of 3.8% while other liabilities account for 7.4%
on average. The grandfathering clause has triggered an increase (+2.7%) in debt, a
remarkable reduction in equity finance of more than -3% and a small drop in bond finance
(-1.2%). These findings suggest a considerable increase in leverage, albeit they do not align
with the optimal suggestions of the Baltensperger model. In the wake of the Lehman
failure, equity increases by more than 3.1% again, whereas bond finance falls by another
-1.8%. The change in debt finance reveals to be insignificant. On the whole, public sector
banks seem to deleverage in the post Lehman period which corresponds to the optimal
suggestions of the Baltensperger model.
Digging deeper into the debt decomposition, set II (Table C.5) suggests that domestic
debt accounts for 43.7% and foreign debt for only 16.8%. of all liabilities. It turns out
that the overall debt increase after the removal of guarantees is driven by an increase in
domestic debt (+1.9%), while foreign debt or bond finance seem to be unaffected. The
decline in equity which is not matched by a significant identical increase in debt suggest
a rise in leverage. Public sector banks significantly restructure their liabilities during the
post Lehman period. Foreign debt (-3.4%) and other liabilities (-1.9%) drop significantly
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with, however, no effect on equity. In sum, set II suggests a weak raise in leverage after
the abolition of guarantees but provides strong evidence of a deleveraging process running
through foreign debt after the Lehman collapse.
Set III (Table C.6) discriminates between bank and non-bank debt. On average, public
sector banks rely on almost 34% bank-debt finance, whereas a little more than 24.6% is
reported as debt vis-a`-vis non-banks. After the removal of guarantees, public sector banks
to increase their share of bank debt by almost 2% and reduce equity by -2.7%. Similar to
set II, these findings hint at a leveraging after the removal of guarantees. Once liquidity
dried up on international interbank markets in the wake of the Lehman collapse, public
sector banks substituted away from bank debt (-3.2%) and bond finance (-4.9%) without
any change in equity. For this reason, results of set III suggest a significant leveraging-up
in the pre- and a significant deleveraging in the post-Lehman era. The leveraging-up runs
through the (domestic) interbank market and a reduction in equity, while the deleveraging
runs particularly through a reduction in foreign and bank debt as well as a decline in bond
finance.
To draw a conclusion, both events, the grandfathering effect and the Lehman failure,
have remarkably impacted on the balance-sheet structure of public sector banks. A com-
parison of isolated and joint effects justifies my comprehensive setup and points out that
a restricted focus on either one event would have lead to highly distorted results. Pubic
sector banks have partly reversed several reallocations which had been induced by the
grandfathering clause after the Lehman collapse. Evidence is strong on a leveraging after
the removal of guarantees. Evidence on the deleveraging process in the post Lehman era
hints at a considerable contraction of foreign debt, bank debt and bond finance. To admit,
some of these changes and the retreat from foreign and interbank markets, are likely to
be shaped by government support measures as described by Buch et al. (2011a).
Cooperative Banks including their head institutions (bg4) Overall, empirical
tests put forward that the Lehman failure has impacted on the liability decomposition
of cooperative banks: The Chow test hints at the significance of the Lehman collapse
throughout all specifications. Further, cointegration in the presence of the Lehman break
cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level.
The liability composition of cooperative banks is largely dominated by debt, account-
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ing for more than 72% of the total balance sheet. As pointed out by Brunner et al. (2004),
deposits from other cooperative banks or their head institutions might explain this huge
figure. Bond finance with an average of 16%, equity finance (1.7% on average) and other
liabilities play a minor role. After the Lehman collapse in September 2008, cooperative
banks have significantly restructured their liabilities. Debt finance dropped by almost
-4%, whereas bond finance has increased by almost 6% and other liabilities by more than
2%. In terms of leverage, the baseline set I thus hints at a substitution of debt for bond
finance. The change in other liabilities is also significant, such that a clear statement
about leverage escapes this framework. Set II reveals that more than 58.6% of the total
balance sheet is domestic debt and only 15.2% is borrowed from abroad. In the wake of
the Lehman collapse, foreign debt fell by -4.3%. This suggests that the substitution effect
mainly runs from foreign debt to bond finance, with domestic debt almost remaining un-
touched. Set III (Table C.6) distinguishes between bank and non-bank debt. The share of
average bank debt lies at 53%, whereas non-bank debt accounts for 19% of all liabilities.
These figures suggest the highest level of funding by means of bank debt. Again, these
loans might also be issued domestically among cooperative banks or between cooperative
banks and their head institutions. Despite this side information, the reduction in debt
can clearly be traced back to a reduction in bank debt.
In sum, the Lehman collapse has triggered a major reallocation in the balance sheet
of cooperative banks. Bond finance has been substituted for interbank funding which is
partly attributable to a reduction in foreign and bank debt. Cooperative banks’ stance
on leverage seems to be almost unaffected.
Summary To conclude on the long run, cointegration analysis finds constant long-
run ratios only after structural breaks are taken into account. The estimates of interaction
coefficients with structural breaks indicate which liability ratios change in response to
ruptures in the funding conditions of banks. In this light, large commercial banks reduce
their leverage after the Lehman collapse mainly running through a decline in foreign, bank
and bond finance. Small commercial banks exhibit weak evidence of a slight increase in
leverage running through foreign and domestic debt. Public sector banks increase their
leverage after the withdrawal of guarantees, but reduce it in the wake of the Lehman
collapse running through foreign bank and bond debt. Cooperative banks take a neutral
116 3. RISKY ADJUSTMENTS OR ADJUSTMENTS TO RISKS
stance on leverage when facing changes in the funding conditions in international banking
markets.
4.3.3 Short-Run Dynamics
The aim of this paper is to analyze the adjustment patterns of bank liabilities from a
short- and long-run perspective. Now, short-run responses to exogenous financial market
developments take center stage. To build the bridge between bank liabilities, leverage and
risks in financial markets, I resort to a workhorse banking model of Baltensperger and
Milde (1987). To reflect how risks shape the short-run balance-sheet dynamics, I apply
VECMs and impulse response functions (IRFs) as econometric tools.
Hypothesis about how exogenous risk spread shaped the liability decomposi-
tion
This section develops hypothesis about banks’ optimal short-run reactions to changes
in financial market risks. It borrows again from Baltensperger and Milde (1987)9 with
banks simultaneously optimizing assets and liabilities to maximize profits in competitive
markets. Two tradeoffs exist which shape the illiquidity risk and the insolvency risk.
Again, banks form expectations and incur costs to manage their illiquidity and insolvency
risks. Both risks are rooted in banks’ perception and interpretation of financial market
developments. To proxy financial market risk, I use the risk spread, defined as return
difference between “Moodys Baa-” and “AAA”-rated long-run corporate bonds. Gatev
and Strahan (2006) use the risk spread to proxy default risk. An increase in the risk spread
requires a bank to be more sensitive towards heterogeneity among borrowing agents in the
market. From a cross-sectional point of view, more and more pronounced variation in the
customers’ needs of funds arises. I interpret this either as more variation in bank revenues,
or a bank’s own liquidity need or a combination of both. Following Baltensperger and
Milde (1987), both phenomena increase a bank’s expected liquidity protection and/or
solvency costs. Optimal measures to counter these developments and stay on the optimal
path are proposed by the elasticities in Appendix Section C.2: the total balance sheet
should contract according to optimal elasticities C.19 and C.20 while optimal structural
9Appendix section C.2 presents more details on the model.
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elasticities C.24 and C.25 recommend that equity should replace external finance.
To translate Baltensperger and Milde (1987)’s optimal adjustments into leverage dy-
namics, I recall that Equation 4.1 defines leverage as the ratio of total balance sheet and
equity. According to optimality conditions, an exogenous increase in risk spread triggers
a balance-sheet contraction and a simultaneous rise in equity which ultimately results
in a lower leverage ratio. My empirical analysis again features the three sets of liability
decomposition (see Figure C.1) : set I, the baseline splits the total balance sheet (TBS,
hereafter) into Equity, Bonds, Debt and Other liabilities. Set II adds a distinction between
foreign and domestic debt, while set III separates bank from non-bank debt.
Econometric Tools
Section 4.2.2 has pointed out that cointegration hinges on the assumption that liabilities
exhibit constant long-run equilibrium ratios. However, with banks facing financial market
turmoil and key ruptures in their funding conditions, Section 4.3.3 has shown that during
the sample period from 2002 to 2010, cointegration only exists after taking structural
breaks into account. To provide a proper view on the short-run adjustment mechanisms
in ordinary times, this section abstracts from structural breaks and limits its view on large
and small commercial banks a well as cooperative banks prior to the Lehman collapse in
2008. This procedure allows me to study how the risk-spread shapes short-run liability
adjustments in ordinary times.
Based on Granger’s representation theorem Engle and Granger (1987), Equation 4.6 gives
a VECM which captures the joint dynamics of liabilities and the total balance sheet:
∆xt = αβ
′xt−1 + Π∆xt−1 + εt (4.6)
In line with the stylized version previously presented, the total balance sheet tbst as well
as all individual liability items (equityt and efint) enter the vector xt as endogenous
variables. Following Lu¨tkepohl and Kra¨tzig (2004), the risk spread enters Equation 4.6
as weakly exogenous variable to model its potential persistence. Thus, xt denotes a
(K + 1)× 1 vector with K − 1 liability items (1, ..., k, ..., K − 1), the total balance sheet
tbs and the risk spread. εt denotes the (K + 1) × 1 vector of disturbances. In case of
r cointegrating relationships, α and β are parameter matrices of dimension (K + 1)× r,
whereas Π is a (K + 1)× (K + 1) matrix of parameters to estimate.
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As captured byβ′xt−1, I impose two cointegrating relationships on Equation 4.6 (i) the
risk spread in isolation and (ii) the balance-sheet identity. The first cointegration term
models the risk spread as weakly exogenous, persistent variable while muting all balance-
sheet variables. The second cointegrating term picks up the DOLS estimates (Table C.6)
of the long-run equilibrium relationship while muting the risk-spread. My intention to
study short-run dynamics during the pre-Lehman period, justifies the omittance of the
structural break and the reduced sample estimation.
In the presence of two cointegrating relationships (r = 2), matrix α can be decomposed
into two vectors of size (K+1) with the α1 relating to the risk-spread and α2 relating to the
balance-sheet identity. Parameter element α11 captures the persistence of the risk spread,
whereas elements α12...α1K inform about the sensitivity of endogenous variables towards
lagged values of the risk spread. Significant estimates of elements α22 to α2K indicate
whether these endogenous variables contribute to restore the long-run equilibrium ratios.
Further, the size of α22 to α2K tell about the speed of adjustment. Besides, parameter
matrix Π tells about the impact of lagged changes in the risk spread and balance-sheet
variables. Estimates of elements Π12...Π1K indicate whether lagged changes in the risk
spread shape contemporary changes in balance-sheet variables.
Apart from the VECM, I apply IRFs to examine the balance sheet dynamics given a
positive one unit standard deviation shock to the risk spread.
Results on Short-Run Adjustments
Tables C.7 to C.9 present the VECM results for liability sets I to III based on the limited
sample period from January 2002 to August 2008. The first panel of each table refers to
large commercial banks , the second panel to small commercial banks and the third panel
to cooperative banks .10
Each column in Tables C.7 to C.9 stands for the respective endogenous variable in
first differences. 11 The risk spread enters the VECM as weakly exogenous variable.
For expositional ease, I omit a separate risk-spread column. The cointegration terms are
denoted as coint spread to account for the persistence of the risk spread and coint identity
10As pointed out by the cointegration analysis, the first structural break for public banks occurs in
July 2005. This early break reduces the sample period too much to yield robust results in the short-run
analysis.
11D denotes first differences, L denotes lags and LD denotes lagged first differences.
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to account for the balance-sheet identity. Estimated coefficients of coint spread inform
about the sensitivity of the respective endogenous balance-sheet variable with respect
to exogenous financial market risks proxied by lagged values of spread risk. Estimated
coefficients on coint identity indicate which balance-sheet items correct for past deviations
from the long-run equilibrium.
Besides, two statistics reflect the fit of the model: First, the R2 statistic gives the
share of explained variation in each involved endogenous variable. Second, the p-value of
a Chi-square test indicates whether all estimated coefficients in a particular endogenous
equation jointly equal zero.
Figures C.9 to C.11 display impulse response functions induced by a one standard
deviation shock in risk spread. They show bootstrapped median estimates and the asso-
ciated 90% confidence bands based on the reduced sample period January 2002 to August
2008. To draw the parallel to the Baltensperger model, I reduce the impulse response
analysis to liability set III featuring the split into bank and non-bank debt.
Large Commercial Banks (bg1) The upper panel of Table C.7 presents the base-
line decomposition of the total balance sheet (tbs) into debt, bonds equity and other liabil-
ities. It points out that the model with risk spread as weakly exogenous variable explains
substantial shares in, for instance, tbs (33%) or debt (26.7%). According to the p-value
of the Chi-squared test12, coefficients are jointly significant at the 5% level in all equa-
tions except for bonds. The upper panels in Tables C.8 and C.9 confirm this overall fit
while splitting debt into foreign and domestic as well as bank and non-bank debt. As to
the error correction mechanism (coint identity), it turns out that all balance-sheet items
except for bonds contribute to restore the long-run equilibrium ratios. A closer look at
the debt components suggests that domestic debt, foreign debt (Table C.8) and bank debt
(Table C.9) correct for past deviations, whereas non-bank debt does not participate. The
fact that non-bank debt contains mainly deposits, might explain this outcome.
To shed light on large commercial banks’ sensitivity in view of financial market risks,
I look at the VECM estimates as well as the impulse response functions. Tables C.7
to C.9 point out that the total balance sheet (tbs) and equity equation carry significant
coefficients on coint spread throughout all specifications, while bank debt does also exhibit
12Denoted as Pval(df, chi2).
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some sensitivity in Table C.9.
Figure C.9 shows bootstrapped median estimates of endogenous variables’ impulse re-
sponses given a one standard deviation shock in risk spread. It broadly mirrors the VECM
estimates. Given an increase in risk spread, large commercial banks expand their balance
sheets while increasing bank debt, bonds, other liabilities and equity. These balance-sheet
dynamics lie at odds with the optimal suggestions of the Baltensperger model. In terms
of leverage, a clear-cut statement is hard to derive. Effects from a simultaneous increase
of the total balance sheet and equity might cancel and leave leverage unaltered.
Small Commercial Banks (bg2) The second panels in Tables C.7 to C.9 provide
VECM results for liability sets I to III with respect to small commercial banks. According
to the R2 statistic in Table C.7, the model explains up to 35.9% of the variation in the
total balance sheet and up to 30.6% of the variation in debt. Throughout all equations
of set I, the Chi-squared test points at jointly significant coefficients. Tables C.8 and C.9
strongly support this overall fit.
Turning to the error-correction mechanism, small commercial banks exhibit similar
patterns to large commercial banks. The significance of coint identity hints at the fact
that these endogenous variable contributes to restore the long-run equilibrium. Again,
the total balance sheet (tbs), debt and equity mainly perform this task. The split in Tables
C.8 and C.9 reveals that foreign and bank debt drive the result of debt as a contributor
to mean reversion.
As to the sensitivity towards financial market risks, evidence from small commer-
cial banks clearly contrasts with evidence from large commercial banks. Neither the
coint spread coefficient, nor lagged differences of the risk spread turn out to be significant
in the baseline liability set I (Table C.7). This picture changes slightly when considering
liability sets II and III. Table C.8 shows that equity might be affected by the risk spread,
Table C.9 states that the risk spread triggers adjustment in bank debt and issued bonds.
Figure C.10 presents the impulse responses of liability set III given a shock to the risk
spread. In line with the results of Table C.9, small commercial banks substitute bonds
for bank debt given a rise in the risk spread. These mechanisms again lie at odds with
the optimal suggestions of the Baltensperger model. Further, the liability swap does not
affect the leverage of small commercial banks. One reason for this behavior might be
4.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 121
found in the locus business focus of small commercial banks.
Cooperative Banks including their head institutions (bg4) The lowest panels
in Tables C.7 to C.9 give the VECM results for liability sets I to III with respect to
cooperative banks and their head institutions. As indicated by the R2 statistic, and the
Chi-squared test, the model performs very well in case of some variables and rather poorer
in case of others. For instance, up to 41.7% of the variation in bonds is explained by the
model (see the R2 in Table C.7), whereas all coefficients are hardly significant at the 10%
level as to the debt equation. Remarkably, jointly insignificant coefficients in the bank
and non-bank debt equation of set III (see Table C.9) state that the model fails to explain
variation in debt and its components.
To restore the long-run equilibrium ratios, only bonds seem to correct for past devi-
ations from equilibrium levels. Tables C.7 to C.9 show that this result is robust across
liability decomposition sets.
In view of changes in financial market risks, debt (Table C.7) and the total balance
sheet (Table C.8) exhibit significant coefficients on coint spread. In particular, foreign debt
and bank debt drive the result (see Table C.8 and C.9). Figure C.11 provides more details
on the mechanism triggered by a positive shock to the risk spread. Cooperative banks
reduce their non-bank debt and bonds while slightly increasing equity. The median impulse
response function on the total balance sheet suggest a slight balance-sheet contraction.
Overall, these mechanisms broadly suit the optimal adjustments of the Baltensperger
model. The adjustment mechanism as a whole suggests a reduction of leverage when
facing an increase in risk spread. A hint at the institutional background, the stakeholders
and domestic retail business might explain these results.
Summary To sum up, the VECM models short-run variation in the liability struc-
ture of banks quite well. Large and small commercial banks differ considerably from
cooperative banks with respect to the balance-sheet items which restore the long-run
equilibrium ratios. In case of commercial banks, the total balance sheet, equity and debt,
in particular foreign and bank debt, correct for past deviations. In the case of cooperative
banks, bonds restore the long-run equilibrium ratios. Further, considerable heterogeneity
governs the adjustment patterns of banking groups when facing a shock in financial mar-
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ket risks. Large commercial banks expand their balance sheet and raise equity which does
not have clear-cut implications for their leverage ratio. Small commercial banks substi-
tute bonds for bank debt and thus take a neutral stance on leverage. Solely cooperative
banks broadly act in line with the Baltensperger model, while reducing their leverage.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
This study separates the long-run from a short-run dimension in the analysis of leverage
and related liability ratios. If banks exhibit constant liability ratios, decomposed sets
of liabilities form cointegrating relationships. Hence, cointegration analysis absorbs the
long-run patterns and can test whether banks target certain liability ratios. My analysis
demonstrates that liability sets are only cointegrating when taking structural breaks into
account. I consider two possible structural break that might shape long-run ratios. The
Lehman collapse and the subsequent freeze of the interbank market in September 2008
serve as one structural break. In the case of public sector banks, I incorporate the abolition
of state guarantees in July 2005 as a second structural break. For the long run, this
procedure allows me to trace the channels that banks invoke to adjust their long-run
liability structure when facing key ruptures in their funding conditions. For the short
run, my results point at those liabilities that adjust for past deviations from the long-run
ratios as induced by changes in financial market risks. A tailored version of a banking
model by Baltensperger and Milde (1987) allows me to form hypotheses about the optimal
adjustment patterns to ruptures in banks’ funding conditions or risks in financial markets.
My long-run approach finds that the Lehman failure has led to major reallocations in
the liability structure and hence leverage of all banking groups. Large commercial banks
cut their leverage after the Lehman collapse with the effect mainly operating through a
decline in foreign, bank and bond finance. Small commercial banks provide weak evidence
of a slight increase in leverage operating through foreign and domestic debt. Public sector
banks increase their leverage after the termination of guarantees, but reduce it in the wake
of the Lehman collapse operating through foreign, bank and bond debt. Cooperative
banks take a neutral stance on leverage in view of changes in the funding conditions in
international banking markets.
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My short-run approach finds that considerable heterogeneity governs the adjustment
patterns of banking groups given changes in financial market risks. Large commercial
banks expand their balance sheets and raise equity which does not yield any clear-cut
implications for their leverage ratio. Small commercial banks replace bonds for bank
debt and thus take a neutral stance on leverage. Solely cooperative banks act broadly
in line with the Baltensperger model, by reducing their leverage. As public sector banks
experience two structural breaks, the first one as early as July 2005, the reduced estimation
sample does not leave enough observations to conduct a short-run analysis. A more
general consideration of the short-run suggests that VECMs reflect short-run variation in
the liability structure quite well. Large and small commercial banks differ substantially
from cooperative banks with respect to the balance-sheet items that restore the long-run
equilibrium ratios. In case of commercial banks, the total balance sheet, equity and debt,
in particular foreign and bank debt, correct for past deviations. In case of cooperative
banks, bonds restore the long-run equilibrium ratios.
To conclude, a proper analysis of banks’ liability structures requires to distinguish
between a short- and a long-run dimension. Heterogeneity governs the adjustment of
different banking groups when facing key ruptures in their funding conditions or changes
in financial market risks.
These results yield valuable insights for policymakers. In the wake of the Lehman
crisis some German banks enjoyed direct government support measures, others benefited
from concerted actions (see Buch et al., 2011a). Recently, the ECB has provided huge
amounts of liquidity by means of two long-run refinancing operations in December 2011
and February 2012. The aim was to keep banks afloat and secure the well functioning
of the interbank market. Even if not all German banks are immediately affected, these
initiatives have repercussions throughout the whole banking sector. For this reason it is
of key importance to bear in mind that changes in the funding conditions have different
impacts on different banking groups.

Appendix C
Risky Adjustments or Adjustments
to Risks
C.1 Log-Linearization
To derive the cointegration term in logs, I draw on set I of Table C.1 as an example
which features the total balance sheet tbst, non-securitized liabilities debtt, securitized
liabilities bondt, other liabilities lother and equity equityt. This procedure borrows from
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001); Hoffmann (2006) who found their argument on the inter-
temporal budget-constraint of households instead of the balance-sheet identity used in
this paper. As a starting point, I express these balance-sheet items in absolute terms
as evidenced by capital letters. The balance-sheet identity states that non-securitized
liabilities DEBTt, securitized liabilities BONDt, other liabilities LOTHERt and equity
EQUITYt sum up to equal total liabilities and thus the total balance sheet. Hence
TBSt = DEBTt +BONDt + LOTHERt +EQUITYt. To simplify the derivation, I will
reduce the focus on equity and external finance, with external finance capturing all the
remaining liability items EFINt = DEBTt +BONDt + LOTHERt.
This identity can also be rewritten as shares of total assets 1 = EFINt
TBSt
+ EQUITYt
TBSt
or
1 − EQUITYt
TBSt
= EFINt
TBSt
. An equivalent transformation of exponentiating and taking logs
yields 1 − elnEQUITYtTBSt = elnEFINtTBSt and substituting log expressions by small letters gives
1 − eequityt−tbst = eefint−tbst . After again taking logs on both sides, I will consider both
126 APPENDIX C. RISKY ADJUSTMENTS OR ADJUSTMENTS TO RISKS
sides of Equation C.1 separately:
ln
(
1− eequityt−tbst) = ln (eefint−tbst) (C.1)
The left-hand side of expression C.1 is a non-linear function of the log equity to balance
sheet total ratio equityt−tbst = xt. By analogy to the approach of Campbell and Mankiw
(1989), I apply a first-order Taylor expansion of the function ln (1− ext) around xt = x¯.
Put differently, I assume that banks target a fixed long-run equity ratio. The aim is
to get an approximation of the long-run ratios of particular liability types to the total
balance sheet based on the permanently valid balance-sheet identity. According to the
Taylor approximation yt w g(x) + g′(x)(xt − x), I obtain the following expression for the
left-hand side of C.1:
LHSt = ln
(
1− eequity−tbs
)
+
eequity−tbs
1− eequity−tbs
(
equityt − tbst −
(
equity − tbs))
Rearranging terms and subsuming time-invariant expressions by constants
c1 = ln
(
1− eequity−tbs
)
further c2 =
eequity−tbs(equity−tbs)
1−eequity−tbs and c3 = c1 − c2results in:
LHSt = c3 +
eequity−tbs
1− eequity−tbs (equityt − tbst) .
The fraction e
equity−tbs
1−eequity−tbs can equivalently be expressed as
EQUITY
TBS
1−EQUITY
TBS
= EQUITY
TBS−EQUITY to
obtain:
LHSt = c3 +
EQUITY
TBS − EQUITY (equityt − tbst) (C.2)
Now, I turn to the right-hand side of Equation C.1, namely ln
(
eefint−tbst
)
. Again,
I apply a first-order Taylor expansion, this time of the function ln (ext) around xt = x¯.
Now x¯ denotes a constant debt to total balance sheet ratio .
RHSt = ln
(
eefin−tbs
)
+
eefin−tbs
eefin−tbs
(
efint − tbst −
(
efin− tbs))
The first term cancels with efin− tbs in the second part such that I obtain:
RHSt = efint − tbst (C.3)
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Combining left-hand side C.2 and right-hand side C.3 yields:
c3 +
EQUITY
TBS − EQUITY (equityt − tbst) = efint − tbst
which can be solved for tbst as:
tbst
−TBS
TBS − EQUITY = c3 − efint +
EQUITY
TBS − EQUITY equityt
tbst = −c3TBS − EQUITY
TBS
+
TBS − EQUITY
TBS
efint +
EQUITY
TBS
equityt
which can be simplified by help of c6 = −c3 TBS−EQUITYTBS and denoting long-run shares
of equity to total balance sheet as γ = EQUITY
TBS
and long-run shares of external finance to
total balance sheet as 1− γ = TBS−EQUITY
TBS
. Finally, I obtain the cointegration term:
tbst = c6 + γequityt + (1− γ) efint (C.4)
Equation C.4 allows to analyze the local behavior of a non-linear expression by studying
the linear approximation given by its derivative a the steady state De la Fuente (2000).
C.2 Theoretical Model (Baltensperger Milde)
Assumptions and Setup
This section develops hypothesis about banks’ optimal responses to exogenous shocks. It
attempts to tailor the ideas of Baltensperger and Milde (1987) to my empirical setup and
suggests that banks simultaneously optimize the asset and liability structure of balance-
sheets to maximize profits on competitive markets. Hence, banks take interest rates (on
deposits and loans) as given and adjust their volume of loans and deposits, respectively.
Further, Baltensperger and Milde (1987) abstract from reserve requirements and any tem-
poral dimension. A coarse description of the balance sheet as in figure C.1 distinguishes
between cash and interest bearing assets on the asset side and external finance 1 and
1External finance in this context captures deposits, bonds and debt as borrowed funds from other
agents. The key intention is to contrast internal funds like equity with external funds. To be consistent
with the underlying approach of Baltensperger and Milde (1987), I restrict the terminology to deposits
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equity finance on the liability side. Banks form expectations about two types of random
variables: (i) their liquidity need v and (ii) their aggregate return r on interest-bearing
assets. These random variables introduce two types of risks to the model: (i) illiquidity
risk which is related to the random liquidity need v and (ii) insolvency risk associated
with the random aggregate return r. To deal with both risks, objective costs arise. Banks
can organize their balance-sheets such that they are more or less exposed to illiquidity
and insolvency risks. In this respect, the tradeoff between less profitable cash holdings
and interest-bearing assets shapes (i), the illiquidity risk. By analogy, the tradeoff be-
tween deposit and equity finance tunes the exposure to (ii) insolvency risks. At first, this
section introduces the objective function of banks which features solvency and liquidity
protection costs to cover a bank’s expectations about its liquidity need v and aggregate
return r. Exogenous financial market variables shape the objective function but initially
enter the model as fixed parameters. Based on this setup, first-order conditions allow me
to develop hypothesis about a banks optimal balance-sheet reallocation in response to
changes in these exogenous variables.
Objective Function A common objective function of banks describes expected profits
as the difference between asset revenues and costs. As cash holdings R do not carry any
measurable interest, the asset revenue only features µrK as revenue on interest-bearing
assets K with µr denoting the expected aggregate return. Costs consist out of payments
on deposits2 tD (t as deposit rate and D as deposit level) and equity ρW (with ρ as
cost rate of equity proxied by dividends and W as equity level), operation costs Ω (K,D),
liquidity protection costs X (R,D) and solvency costs Y (K,D). More details on various
types of costs follow below. At this stage, it suffices to state that operation, liquidity and
solvency costs depend on deposits D and either the volume of interest-bearing assets K or
cash holdings R. Equation C.5 gives the profit function and budget constraint expressed
as external finance in this theoretical part. Conclusions about debt in form of borrowed funds, however,
run in parallel.
2To simplify, I follow Baltensperger and Milde (1987) and use deposits as a proxy for any source
of external finance (ie borrowing from other banks, issuing bonds) with an explicit interest rate. My
intention is to contrast equity as internal with debt as external source of funding. This device does not
harm any conclusions and suits the model of Baltensperger and Milde (1987)
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in levels:
E [pi] = µrK − tD − Ω (K,D)−X (R,D)− Y (K,D)− ρW (C.5)
K +R = D +W
To remain consistent with Section 4.2.2, Equation C.6 restates the expected profit function
in terms of total balance sheet A and shares of balance-sheet items. Hence, the shares
of interest-bearing assets (α = K/A) and cash (1− α = R/A) add up to one and so do the
shares of deposits (β = D/A) and equity (1− β = W/A).
E [pi] = [αµr − βt− (1− β) ρ]A−X (A,α, β)− Y (A,α, β)− Ω (A,α, β) (C.6)
The term [αµr − βt− (1− β) ρ] gives a weighted average of incoming revenues and
paid cost rates. Benefits from cash holdings enter the function of liquidity costsX (A,α, β).
Liquidity need v, expected liquidity protection costs X and illiquidity risk
To service their depositors, banks themselves hold cash R. In this simplified setup, the
exact amount of demanded deposit corresponds to the banks’ unknown liquidity need v,
a random variable. Yet, cash holdings R are unprofitable. Holding more cash means
having a higher buffer against unexpectedly high liquidity needs. This, however comes at
the cost of forbearing profitable investment opportunities. The tradeoff between cash and
asset holdings tunes the degree of liquidity risk a bank is running. If cash holdings exceed
the liquidity need (R > v) a bank accepts forgoing interest on more profitable assets. If,
however, cash holdings fall short of the liquidity need (R < v), the bank has to borrow the
difference (v−R) from other agents at a penalty rate p. With γ (v) as probability density
function of the liquidity need, Equation C.7 describes the expected liquidity protection
cost X.
X = p
∞ˆ
R
(v −R) γ (v) dv (C.7)
As X declines in the level of cash XR < 0 (since
∂X
∂R
= −p ´∞
R
γ (v) dv) but marginal
liquidity cost increases in the level of cash XRR > 0 (since
∂2X
(∂R)2
= pγ (v)), the liquidity
costs are a convex function of the cash level R. Further, liquidity protection costs increase
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with a higher penalty rate p, hence Xp > 0.
The aim of what follows is to link liquidity protection cost to deposits. Banks service
many depositors which means that the liquidity need v ensues from the deposit demand
of many customers with different levels of deposits. To facilitate, let’s assume that all n
existing deposit accounts are of equal size D (withD = nD) but depositors’ individual
demands vary. A banks liquidity need can now be stated as sum of all individual deposit
demands v =
∑n
j=1 vjD. When assuming a common individually expected value E (vj) =
µv and variance V ar (vj) = a
2 of uncorrelated deposit demands for (j = 1...n), the
variance of the liquidity need at the bank level becomes3 V ar (v) = DDa2. Hence, the
variance (or standard deviation σv = [V ar (v)]
1/2 =
(
DD
)1/2
a) of a bank’s liquidity need
increases with its level of deposits (σvD > 0). A standardization of liquidity need v by help
of its mean µv and standard deviation σv explicitly alters the expression of the liquidity
protection cost in C.7 and results in
X = pσv
∞ˆ
uˆ
(u− uˆ) g (u) du (C.8)
with uˆ ≡ R
σv
and u ≡ v
σv
. Equation C.8 points out that liquidity protection costs X
increase in the deposit level (XD > 0) and decline in the level of cash holdings (XR <
0). A final restatement in terms of total balance sheet and shares puts forward that
liquidity protection cost X (A,α, β) positively depend on the share of interest-bearing
assets Xα = XR (−A) > 0, the share of deposits Xβ = XDA > 0 and total balance sheet
XA = XDβ > 0. The underlying reasoning is that a lower share of interest-bearing assets
relative to cash holdings α can absorb more deposit demands and thus reduces the risk as
well as the costs of illiquidity. On the liability side, a higher level of deposits relative to
equity (β) raises the variance of random liquidity needs and thereby raises the expected
costs of liquidity protection X. As distinct from the total balance sheet, α and β denote
the structural parameters of the model.
Aggregate return r, expected solvency costs Y and insolvency risk If a bank’s
total liabilities exceed the market value of its total assets, the bank becomes insolvent.
This might happen if the aggregate return r on interest-bearing assets, the second random
3as V ar (v) = D
2
V ar
∑n
j=1 (vj) = D
2
na2 = DDa2
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variable in this setup, falls below a certain threshold value rˆ which characterizes the
equality of total assets and liabilities. In the previous paragraph, cash holdings serve
as a buffer against uncertain liquidity needs which ensue from a multitude of unknown
individual deposit demands on the liability side. To draw the analogy, equity serves as
a buffer against uncertainty about the aggregate return r which subsumes loan defaults
or other losses on the asset side of the balance sheet. Once the aggregate return falls
below rˆ, a bank is threatened by insolvency if it does not take immediate action. It has
to undergo costly restructuring, be it in terms of organization, liquidation or be it in
terms of portfolio reallocation to avoid insolvency. These costs a bank has to incur in
order to remain solvent are termed solvency costs. Equation C.9 models the expected
solvency costs Y as function of interest-bearing assets K and a proportional cost rate η
while b (r)stands for the probability density function:
Y = ηK
rˆˆ
−∞
(rˆ − r) b (r) dr (C.9)
By analogy to the liquidity need, the aggregate return r can be decomposed into indi-
vidual returns ri on m individual interest-bearing assets Ki meaning that r =
∑m
i=1 ri
Ki
K
.
Using constant sizes, that is Kj = K (or K = mK), the aggregate return can be re-
stated as r = 1
m
∑m
i=1 ri. Further, when assuming a common individually expected value
E (ri) = h , common variance V ar (ri) = c
2 and independent outcomes (Corr(ri, rg) = 0)
for all i = 1, ...,m, the variance of aggregate return at the bank level is given by4
V ar (r) = c
2
m
. Recalling that m = K
(K)
and keeping K constant, the variance (or stan-
dard deviation σr = [V ar (r)]
1/2 = cm−1/2) of the aggregate return declines in the number
of assets m and even in the aggregate level K. This decline in variance alludes to a
diversification effect which strongly relies on the assumption of stochastically indepen-
dent outcomes. More telling, however, is the variance of aggregate interest-bearing asset
volume rK which increases in the volume of K as V ar [rk] = c2K2/m = KKc2.
To gain insights about the link between Y and the deposit level D, a standardization
of the aggregate return r by help of its expected value µr and standard deviation σr,
4as V ar (r) = 1m2V ar
∑n
j=1 (ri) =
1
m2
∑n
j=1 V ar (ri) =
c2
m
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suggests the expected solvency cost Equation C.10:
Y = ηKσr
τˆˆ
−∞
(τˆ − τ)h (τ) dτ (C.10)
Now τˆ (≡ r̂−µr
σr
) captures the threshold return level r̂ such that standardized returns
τ (≡ r−µr
σr
) below r̂ mark the threshold to insolvency. Further, h (τ) stands for the prob-
ability density function and σr points out that expected solvency cost depend on the
volatility of aggregate return. An increasing level of deposits D raises the threshold level
r̂ with r̂D > 0 and thus sharpens the menace of insolvency. For this reason, the expected
solvency costs also increase with deposits (YD > 0). The impact of a higher level of
interest-bearing assets K is less straightforward, as the threshold level r̂ adjusts simul-
taneously. Once keeping r̂ constant and hence assuming an optimally adjusted liability
structure, the expected solvency costs depend positively on K as Y dr̂=0K > 0. Maintaining
these assumptions, it turns out that expected solvency costs rise with the share of interest
bearing assets Yα = YKA > 0 , the share of deposits Yβ = YDA > 0 and the total balance
sheet YA > 0. As immediately evident from expression C.9 and C.10, expected solvency
cost increase the cost rate η with Yη > 0.
Operation Costs The real costs of running a bank bear similarity with running a non-
financial firm once hinting at for instance paying wages or maintaining an office network.
Hence, operation costs Ω (A,α, β) increase with the scale of business ΩA > 0, that is
the total balance sheet A. More customer-related banking services such as issuing loans
and collecting deposits are also costly such that operation costs increase in the share of
interest-bearing assets Ωα > 0 and the share of deposits in overall liabilities Ωβ > 0.
First and Second Order Condition of a Maximum
As put forward by Baltensperger and Milde (1987), banks optimize their expected profits
based on three endogenous variables: total balance sheet A, the share of interest-bearing
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assets α and the share of deposits β. The appendix C.1 provides the details.
E [pi]A = [αµ
r − βt− (1− β) ρ]− ΩA −XA − YA = 0 (C.11)
E [pi]α = µ
rA− Ωα −Xα − Yα = 0 (C.12)
E [pi]β = (t− ρ)A− Ωβ −Xβ − Yβ = 0 (C.13)
Equations C.11, C.12 and C.13 display the first-order conditions of profit maximiza-
tion given the balance sheet constraint C.6. Following C.11, a bank raises its total balance
sheet until net marginal revenue equals marginal costs. The second first-order conditions
C.12 with respect to α refers to the asset side and more specifically states that a bank
increases interest-bearing assets against cash holdings until gross marginal revenue bal-
ances marginal costs. The third first-order condition C.13 refers to the liability side and
demands that a bank increases the share of deposit relative to equity finance until the
interest-dividend differential corresponds to the marginal costs of deposit finance.
To accommodate the empirical setup of Section 4.2.2, I adopt the separation hypothesis
of Baltensperger and Milde (1987). The separation hypothesis states that a bank takes
the decision about the total balance sheet volume A independent from the structural
optimization of α and β. Put differently, a simultaneous equation system of C.12 and C.13
yields optimal values of mutually dependent α∗ and β∗. Their interconnectedness results
from the fact that standard deviations σr (D) and σv (K) link the structural parameters
of assets α∗and liabilities β∗. Comparative statics below show that a change in exogenous
parameters exercises a direct effect on α∗ or β∗(or instantly both) and an indirect effect
which runs through the adjustments of standard deviations (σr (D) and σv (K) ). As
distinct from that, responses of A∗and the structural parameters α∗ and β∗ are decoupled
by the separation hypothesis.
The second-order condition requires that the matrix of second derivatives, the Hessian
matrix, must be negative definite for expected profits C.6 to attain a local maximum (see
e.g. De la Fuente (2000)). In fact, the separation hypothesis has convenient implications
for the second-order condition. Expression C.14 displays the Hessian matrix.
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∆′ =
 E [pi]AA E [pi]Aα E [pi]AβE [pi]αA E [pi]αα E [pi]αβ
E [pi]βA E [pi]βα E [pi]ββ
 (C.14)
According to the separation hypothesis, interactions between the total balance sheet
and structural parameters are shut down (E [pi]Aα = E [pi]Aβ = 0 by symmetry E [pi]αA =
E [pi]βA = 0). For this reason, the second order conditions simplifies to:
∆ = E [pi]ααE [pi]ββ − E [pi]2αβ > 0 (C.15)
with
E [pi]AA < 0 E [pi]αα < 0 E [pi]ββ < 0
As elaborated by Baltensperger and Milde (1987), all elements on the main diagonal are
negative (E [pi]AA < 0, E [pi]αα < 0,E [pi]ββ < 0) on account of profit’s concavity and by
further assumptions do direct effects dominate indirect effects E [pi]ααE [pi]ββ > E [pi]
2
αβ
. Hence, a total balance sheet of A∗ and structural parameters α∗ and β∗ denote a local
maximum of expected profits under the separation hypothesis and further assumptions
related to cost functions Ω, X and Y .
Comparative statics
The total balance sheet elasticities C.16 to C.20 and structural elasticities C.21 toC.25
describe the optimal measures for a bank to take once facing the respective exogenous
developments on financial markets. A change in exogenous variables impacts differently
on the optimal total balance sheet A∗ and structural parameters α∗ and β∗. In case of
structural parameters, their mutual interplay due to standard deviations captures direct
and indirect effects. In case of the total balance sheet, the separation hypothesis mutes
any repercussion effects.
Impact on the optimal total balance sheet A∗ Expressions C.16 to C.20 list the
elasticities of the total balance sheet A∗ and rely on the independent first-order condition
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C.11, concavity E [pi]AA < 0 and the separation hypothesis.
ε (A∗, µr) = −αµ
r
A∗E[pi]AA
> 0 (C.16)
ε (A∗, t) = βt
A∗E[pi]AA
< 0 (C.17)
ε (A∗, ρ) = (1−β)ρ
A∗E[pi]AA
< 0 (C.18)
ε (A∗, i) = XA
A∗E[pi]AA
< 0 i = ∆σv, p (C.19)
ε (A∗, i) = YA
A∗E[pi]AA
< 0 i = ∆σr, η (C.20)
Hence, a higher expected return on interest-bearing assets µr induces the optimal total
balance sheet to expand (Equation C.16). This outcome clearly aligns with the intuition
that higher marginal revenues spur the activities of a bank. Disregarding any substitution
effects, higher deposit rates t and higher dividends ρ trigger a contraction (Equation C.17
and C.18) as higher marginal costs tend to reduce the business volume. A similar reasoning
applies to p and η as parameters which shape expected liquidity protection and solvency
costs: higher marginal costs downsize the optimal business volume A∗.
Impact on optimal structural parameters α∗ and β∗ The exogenous impacts on
optimal values of structural parameters α∗ and β∗are more complex to trace. They involve
a direct effect as obvious from the first-order conditions as well as an indirect repercussion
effect from the respective other side of the balance-sheet. This indirect effect arises from
the adjustments in variances and marginal costs.
ε (α∗, µr) > 0 ε (β∗, µr) < 0 (C.21)
ε (α∗, t) > 0 ε (β∗, t) < 0 (C.22)
ε (α∗, ρ) < 0 ε (β∗, ρ) > 0 (C.23)
ε (α∗, i) < 0 ε (β∗, i) < 0 i = ∆σv, p (C.24)
ε (α∗, i) < 0 ε (β∗, i) < 0 i = ∆σr, η (C.25)
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Penalty rate p and standard deviation of liquidity need σv The effects exercised
by a higher penalty rate p run in parallel to a positive shift in the standard deviation
of liquidity need∆σv. Both raise the marginal costs of liquidity protection (Xαi¿0 and
Xβi > 0 for i = p,∆σ
v) leading to a direct negative effect on α∗ and β∗. An indirect effect
emerges as relatively lower deposits reduce the variance of the liquidity need (σvD > 0)
which slightly mitigates the reduction in α∗due to lower marginal cost of liquidity. Overall,
a higher penalty rate p or a positive shift in the standard deviation of liquidity needs ∆σv
diminishes the optimal shares of interest-bearing assets α∗ and deposits β∗. One might
relate the Lehman failure to a lasting but sudden shift in the penalty rate p on interbank
markets or a structural break in the volatility of liquidity needs ∆σv.
Insolvency cost rate η and standard deviation of aggregate return σr A
higher insolvency cost rate η or a positive shift in the standard deviation returns ∆σr
imply higher marginal solvency costs (Yαi > 0 andYβi > 0 for i = ∆σ
r, η) . The immediate
effect reduces α∗ and β∗. This time, an indirect effect dampens the reduction of β∗ as the
substitution away from interest-bearing assets lowers the volume variance V ar (rK). To
sum up, a higher insolvency cost rate η or a positive shift in the standard deviation of
the aggregate return ∆σr reduce the optimal share of interest-bearing assets α∗ as well
as deposit finance β∗. Again, one might interpret the Lehman collapse as a permanent
shift in parameters: the subsequent firesale of toxic assets can be linked to a change in
restructuring costs η or a lasting change in the volatility of aggregate returns ∆σr.
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C.3 Data Appendix
All bank data are obtained from unconsolidated “Balance Sheet Statistics” and the “Ex-
ternal Position Report” collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Section 4.3.1 details on
my sample construction. The following list draws on Appendix C.2 displaying an official
reporting form whose items I refer to below. Descriptive statistics of all variables are
given in Table C.2.
Total Balance Sheet POS 330
Debt Non-securitized debt: POS 210, POS 220
Bonds Securitized debt: POS 230
Equity POS310
Lother Other liabilities: POS 240, POS 250, POS 260, POS 270, POS 280, POS 290,
POS 300, POS 320
Foreign Debt Worldwide non-securitized debt, indicated by the “External Position Re-
port”
Domestic Debt Difference between domestic and foreign debt.
Bank Debt Non-securitized debt vis-a`-vis banks, POS 210
Non-Bank Debt Non-securitized debt vis-a`-vis non-banks, POS 220
Risk Spread Difference between Moodys Baa-rated and AAA-rated bonds, see Gatev
and Strahan (2006).
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C.4 Graphs and Tables
Figure C.1: A Stylized Bank Balance Sheet
Table C.1: Liability Decompositions
Set Liability Decomposition
I TBSt = δ
I
1DEBTt + δ
I
2BONDt + δ
I
3EQUITY t + δ
I
4LOTHERt
II TBSt = δ
II
1 DEBT DOMt + δ
II
2 DEBT FORt + δ
II
3 BONDt + δ
II
4 EQUITY t + δ
II
5 LOTHERt
III TBSt = δ
III
1 DEBT BANKt + δ
III
2 DEBT NONBt + δ
III
3 BONDt + δ
III
4 EQUITY t + δ
III
5 LOTHERt
Notes: DEBTt non-securitized external debt, BONDt securitized external debt, EQUITY t eq-
uity, LOTHERt residual liability category, DEBT DOMt domestic debt, DEBT FORt foreign debt,
DEBT BANKt debt vis-a`-vis banks, DEBT NONBt debt vis-a-vis non-banks.
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Figure C.3: Total Captured by Banking Group
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Notes: This graph shows the share of each banking group’s total balance-sheet in the total across all
banking groups. Bg1 features large commercial banks, bg2 features small commercial banks, bg3 features
public sector banks, bg4 features cooperatives banks.
Figure C.4: Total Captured as Share of all German Banks
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Notes: This graph gives the captured share on the right-hand side axis and the total amounts of the
sample as well as the aggregate of all German banks on the left-hand side axis.
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Figure C.5: Share of Bank Debt: Cooperative Banks (bg4)
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Notes: This graph shows the share of bank debt to the total balance sheet of cooperative banks. The
Lehman collapse in September 2008 is indicated by lehman.
Figure C.6: Share of Bank Debt: Public Sector Banks (bg3)
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Notes: This graph shows the share of bank debt to the total balance sheet of public sector banks. The
Lehman collapse is indicated by lehman, the withdrawal of guarantees by grandpa.
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Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
tbs 400 619.709 397.414 171.312 1490.710
Liability Items
debt 400 418.367 237.251 125.570 933.779
bond 400 123.947 132.430 17.878 412.177
equity 400 24.533 14.685 5.637 57.575
lother 400 52.862 30.081 14.517 127.791
debt dom 400 288.31 161.305 104.568 720.555
debt for 400 130.053 99.244 18.469 376.526
debt bank 400 224.926 142.294 43.612 542.403
debt nonb 400 193.441 107.945 36.884 410.385
Exogenous Variable
spread risk 100 1.1937 0.5729027 0.62 3.38
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the total balance sheet (tbs) and all balance-sheet items
expressed in levels of EUR billions. Data is pooled across all banking groups with each containing
100 observations of monthly data ranging from January 2002 to April 2010. Risk-spread refers do the
difference between Moodys Baa-rated and AAA-rated bonds. Further explanations of the codes are
provided in Table C.1.
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Figure C.7: ADF Test of individual balance-sheet items: Liabilities
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Notes: This figure shows the ADF test statistics of individual balance-sheet items in the sets of Table
C.1. It plots the first difference in logarithms on the vertical axis against the log-level on the horizontal
axis. Numbers refer to banking groups while colors indicate the respective balance-sheet item. Critical
values for the rejection of a unit root draw on MacKinnon (2010) and state rejection at the 1% [10%]
level of significance at a value of -3.516. [-2.582]. Thus, dots above the 1% line on the horizontal axis
and below the 1% line on the vertical axis suggest that a time series has a unit root in log-levels but
is stationary in first logged differences. As recommended by Lu¨tkepohl and Kra¨tzig (2004), I rely on
the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion (SBIC ) to determine the optimal lag length of 3 periods.
Bg1 features large commercial banks, bg2 small commercial banks, bg3 public sector banks and bg4
cooperative banks.
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Figure C.8: KPSS Test of Individual Balance-Sheet Items: Liabilities
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Notes: This figure depicts the KPSS test statistics of individual balance-sheet items as described in the
sets of Table C.1. It plots the first difference in logarithms on the vertical axis against the log-level on the
horizontal axis. Numbers refer to banking groups while colors indicate the respective balance-sheet item.
Critical values for the rejection of stationarity draw on Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) and state rejection at
the 1% [10%] level of significance at a value of 0.739. [0.347]. Thus, dots above the 10% line on the
horizontal axis and below the 10% line on the vertical axis suggest that a time series is not stationary in
log-levels but is stationary in first logged differences. I choose a common bandwidth of 6 [5] month in case
of levels [first differences] theoretically based on Newey and West (1994). Bg1 features large commercial
banks, bg2 small commercial banks, bg3 public sector banks and bg4 cooperative banks.
Table C.3: Simple Cointegration Tests
Engle-Granger
Test
Shin’s KPSS Test Johansen Trace
Statistic
set I set II set III set I set II set III set I set II set III
bg1 -5.147* -4.452 -6.053* bg 1 0.062 0.064 0.068 bg 1 1 1 1
bg2 -1.931 -3.855 -3.990 bg 2 0.132* 0.039 0.146* bg 2 1 0 0
bg3 -3.322 -4.801* -2.956 bg 3 0.050 0.151* 0.058 bg 3 . 1 0
bg4 -3.675 -5.093* -4.381 bg 4 0.094 0.065 0.085 bg 4 0 1 1
crit(5%) -4.211 -4.558 -4.588 crit(5%) 0.121 0.097 0.097
H0 : Non-cointegration, critical values from MacKinnon (2010). H0 : Cointegration, critical values from Shin (1994) Because of multicollinearity, bg3, set I cannot be computed.
Notes: The asterisks denote rejection of the H0 at the 5% level of significance. Bg1 features large
commercial banks, bg2 small commercial banks, bg3 public sector banks and bg4 cooperative banks.
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Table C.4: DOLS: Liability Set I
bg1 bg2 bg3 bg4 bg3 bg3
debt 0.765*** 0.735*** 0.603*** 0.726*** 0.593*** 0.586***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0) (0.000)
bond 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.298*** 0.161*** 0.301*** 0.303***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0) (0.000)
equity 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.0422*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0) (0.000)
lother 0.088*** 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.094*** 0.0737*** 0.074***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0) (0.000)
iG debt 0.00749 0.027***
(0.207) (0.000)
iG bond -0.00272 -0.012***
(0.530) (0.001)
iG equity -0.00702 -0.036***
(0.315) (0.000)
iG lother -0.00174 -0.001
(0.697) (0.905)
iL debt -0.023*** 0.054*** -0.012* -0.039*** -0.012
(0.003) (0.002) (0.077) (0.000) (0.220)
iL bond -0.017* -0.016*** -0.022*** 0.059*** -0.018***
(0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)
iL equity 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 0.006 0.031***
(0.888) (0.324) (0.457) (0.199) (0.000)
iL lother 0.008* -0.005 -0.003 0.022*** -0.003
(0.064) (0.521) (0.435) (0.000) (0.306)
grandfa 0.0539 0.319
(0.774) (0.229)
lehman 0.615** -0.513 0.767*** -0.771*** 0.101
(0.011) (0.109) (0.000) (0.000) (0.635)
Constant 0.677*** 0.816*** 0.935*** 0.858*** 0.793*** 0.976***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0) (0.000)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97
carrion 0.08 0.057 0.045 0.046 0.048 -
chow 0.0001 0 0 0 0.0796 0
chi2 25.03 187.9 44.60 882.1 9849 186.7
Notes: Interaction terms of variables with the lehman [grandfa] dummy are coded as iL∗ [iG∗]. Leads
and lags of first differences are not reported but included. carrion gives the test statistic of i Silvestre
and Sanso´ (2006) and critical values rely on their simulations of model D: for column 1 to 4 critical
values (10%=0.0616; 5%=0.0791; 1%=0.1312) rely on 4 explanatory variables (m=4), and the break
fraction λ = 0.2 ( by symmetry(1− λ) = 0.8 ≈ 77/97). These critical values indicate rejecting the H0
of cointegration in the presence structural breaks. chow presents the p-value of the Chow test, based
on the test statistic chi2 and df chow degrees of freedom. Bg1 features large commercial banks, bg2
small commercial banks, bg3 public sector banks and bg4 cooperative banks. This table relies on HAC
standard errors. Significance indicated by * =10% level, **=5% level, ***=1% level.
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Table C.5: DOLS: Liability Set II
bg1 bg2 bg3 bg4 bg3
debt dom 0.384*** 0.637*** 0.445*** 0.586*** 0.437***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
debt for 0.388*** 0.111*** 0.164*** 0.152*** 0.168***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bond 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.288*** 0.157*** 0.293***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
equity 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
lother 0.084*** 0.105*** 0.069*** 0.080*** 0.070***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
iG debt dom 0.019**
(0.022)
iG debt for -0.007
(0.150)
iG bond -0.009
(0.130)
iG equity -0.036**
(0.025)
iG lother 0.001
(0.928)
iL debt dom 0.033*** 0.049*** 0.006 -0.012 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.693) (0.196) (0.914)
iL debt for -0.071*** 0.040*** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.034***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
iL bond -0.023* 0.007 -0.020** 0.051*** -0.009
(0.061) (0.275) (0.034) (0.000) (0.374)
iL equity 0.006 0.040** -0.009 0.010 0.017
(0.596) (0.016) (0.151) (0.360) (0.247)
iL lother 0.008 -0.020** -0.017** 0.014*** -0.019**
(0.214) (0.030) (0.019) (0.002) (0.026)
grandfa 0.537
(0.194)
lehman 0.931*** -2.114*** 1.461*** -0.336 0.910**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.170) (0.043)
Constant 1.172*** 1.074*** 1.457*** 1.322*** 1.220***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97
chow 0 0 0 0 0
chi2 214.1 230.7 130.4 222.9 284.2
Notes: Interaction terms of variables with the lehman [grandfa] dummy are coded as iL∗ [iG∗]. Leads
and lags of first differences are not reported but included. chow presents the p-value of the Chow test,
based on the test statistic chi2 and df chow degrees of freedom. Bg1 features large commercial banks,
bg2 small commercial banks, bg3 public sector banks and bg4 cooperative banks. This table relies on
HAC standard errors. Significance indicated by * =10% level, **=5% level, ***=1% level.
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Table C.6: DOLS: Liability Set III
bg1 bg2 bg3 bg4 bg3
debt bank 0.425*** 0.216*** 0.352*** 0.531*** 0.343***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
debt nonb 0.343*** 0.514*** 0.249*** 0.190*** 0.246***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
bond 0.103*** 0.113*** 0.297*** 0.162*** 0.299***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
equity 0.051*** 0.049** 0.031*** 0.017*** 0.039***
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lother 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.070*** 0.099*** 0.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
iG debt bank 0.019***
(0.000)
iG debt nonb -0.005
(0.565)
iG bond 0.005
(0.418)
iG equity -0.027***
(0.006)
iG lother 0.016***
(0.003)
iL debt bank -0.029*** -0.005 -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.032**
(0.000) (0.672) (0.007) (0.000) (0.013)
iL debt nonb 0.013 0.077 -0.003 -0.006 0.010
(0.150) (0.119) (0.619) (0.271) (0.202)
iL bond -0.009 0.006 -0.028*** 0.061*** -0.049***
(0.486) (0.686) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
iL equity -0.009 0.024 -0.009 -0.005 0.016
(0.241) (0.410) (0.301) (0.395) (0.272)
iL lother 0.007* -0.020* -0.006 0.020*** -0.013*
(0.063) (0.083) (0.192) (0.000) (0.079)
grandfa -0.196
(0.515)
lehman 0.547* -1.544 1.484*** -0.670*** 1.361***
(0.086) (0.156) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007)
Constant 1.200*** 1.385*** 1.403*** 1.274*** 1.696***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 97 97 97 97 97
chow 0 0.0188 0 0 0
chi2 51.26 15.20 186.0 504.8 643.6
df chow 6 6 6 6 12
Notes: Interaction terms of variables with the lehman [grandfa] dummy are coded as iL∗ [iG∗]. Leads
and lags of first differences are not reported but included. chow presents the p-value of the Chow test,
based on the test statistic chi2 and df chow degrees of freedom. Bg1 features large commercial banks,
bg2 small commercial banks, bg3 public sector banks and bg4 cooperative banks. This table relies on
HAC standard errors. Significance indicated by * =10% level, **=5% level, ***=1% level.
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Table C.7: VECM Liability Set I
D.tbs D.debt D.bond D.equity D.lother
bg1
L.coint spread 0.020* 0.022 0.022 0.022** -0.004
L.coint identity -4.029*** -4.393*** -2.211 -3.253*** -2.506*
LD.spread risk 0.049 0.047 0.122* 0.008 0.016
LD.tbs 6.614* 9.019* 0.941 3.648 -5.490
LD.debt -4.957* -6.797* -0.688 -2.626 4.287
LD.bond -0.706* -1.001* -0.046 -0.390 0.849
LD.equity -0.275 -0.375 0.274 -0.168 -0.088
LD.lother -0.785** -0.968** -0.332 -0.517* 0.206
Constant 0.000 -0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.001
Observations 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.000 0.003 0.339 0.015 0.005
R2 0.330 0.267 0.128 0.228 0.255
bg2
L.coint spread -0.004 -0.008 -0.009 0.002 0.025
L.coint identity -2.893* -4.248** -6.156 5.457*** 5.747
LD.spread risk 0.011 0.014 0.017 -0.063 0.024
LD.tbs 0.331 2.102 -0.621 -2.074 -6.904
LD.debt -0.375 -1.629 0.235 1.444 4.669
LD.bond -0.031 -0.207 0.046 0.216 0.706
LD.equity 0.103 -0.055 1.062* 0.115 0.071
LD.lother -0.029 -0.202 0.259 0.196 0.466
Constant 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.008 0.006 0.015*
Observations 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.012
R2 0.359 0.306 0.241 0.272 0.235
bg4
L.coint spread -0.013 -0.024** 0.012 -0.001 0.019
L.coint identity 0.225 -0.013 1.458*** -0.169 -0.141
LD.spread risk 0.041 0.035 0.047 0.060** 0.090
LD.tbs -1.170 2.248 -10.654** -2.330 -9.955
LD.debt 0.889 -1.708 8.026** 1.741 7.711
LD.bond 0.180 -0.317 1.335 0.421 1.842
LD.equity -0.065 -0.216 0.092 0.005 0.973**
LD.lother -0.002 -0.262 0.721* 0.209 0.629
Constant 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.004
Observations 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.005 0.099 0.000 0.033 0.017
R2 0.257 0.176 0.417 0.208 0.226
Notes: This table shows the result of a VECM estimation. D denotes first differences, LD denotes lagged
first differences, L denotes one lag. Results rely on the reduced sample prior to the structural break of the
Lehman collapse in 2008m9. Bg3 provides too few observations prior to its first structural break in July
2005 and is hence omitted. Risk-spread is modeled as weakly exogenous variable subject to constraints
in order to allow for the persistence of the variable. Estimation results on the risk-spread equation
are however not reported. coint spread refers to the first cointegration term featuring the and imposed
coefficients of zero on the balance-sheet variables. The coint identity refers to the second cointegration
term which features only balance-sheet variables and an imposed zero coefficient on risk-spread. Pval(df,
chi2) gives the p-value of the test of joint significance of all included variables in the respective equation;
R2 gives the share of variance explained by included variables in the respective equation. Bg1 features
large commercial banks, bg2 small commercial banks and bg4 cooperative banks. Significance is indicated
by *=10% level, **=5% level, ***=1% level.
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Table C.8: VECM Liability Set II
D.tbs D.debt dom D.debt for D.bond D.equity D.lother
bg1
L.coint spread 0.023* 0.018 0.031 0.024 0.028*** -0.003
L.coint identity -3.067*** -1.998* -4.772*** -1.178 -3.124*** -2.012*
LD.spread risk 0.045 0.083 -0.002 0.126* 0.012 0.034
LD.tbs 4.744** 4.382 6.630 7.707* 0.291 -2.962
LD.debt dom -1.859** -1.911 -2.371 -3.230** 0.010 1.288
LD.debt for -1.727** -1.458 -2.603 -2.704* -0.071 1.129
LD.ln vewp -0.497** -0.429 -0.784 -0.802* -0.023 0.549
LD.equity -0.219 -0.008 -0.495 -0.128 -0.004 -0.194
LD.lother -0.578** -0.551 -0.652 -0.936** -0.219 -0.045
Constant 0.002 0.007* -0.004 0.007 -0.003 0.002
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.001 0.021 0.057 0.063 0.002 0.010
R2 0.306 0.236 0.208 0.205 0.287 0.255
bg2
L.coint spread 0.012 0.008 0.054 0.018 -0.034*** 0.020
L.coint identity 1.718** 0.941 11.409*** 2.952 -4.242*** -0.457
LD.spread risk -0.009 -0.040 0.153 -0.026 -0.042 0.058
LD.tbs 1.161 1.104 3.398 3.941 2.703 -2.444
LD.debt dom -1.018 -0.933 -2.423 -2.971 -1.685 1.109
LD.debt for -0.077 -0.052 -0.326 -0.339 -0.360** 0.230
LD.ln vewp -0.116 -0.110 -0.277 -0.406 -0.257 0.199
LD.equity 0.115 0.057 -0.038 0.903*** -0.221 -0.143
LD.lother -0.128 -0.078 -0.544 -0.233 -0.318* -0.024
Constant 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010 0.001 0.012*** 0.027***
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.000 0.031
R2 0.409 0.380 0.247 0.266 0.361 0.226
bg4
L.coint spread -0.016** -0.007 -0.101** 0.001 0.001 0.012
L.coint identity -0.203 -0.081 0.010 -1.317*** 0.136 0.494
LD.spread risk 0.050* 0.007 0.205 0.044 0.053** 0.108
LD.tbs 1.059 1.619 1.777 0.866 -0.836 -1.527
LD.debt dom -0.721 -0.866 -2.319 -0.604 0.568 1.160
LD.debt for -0.117 -0.173 -0.416 -0.087 0.121 0.337
LD.ln vewp -0.222 -0.137 -0.990 -0.556** 0.198 0.554
LD.equity -0.094 -0.060 -0.705 -0.214 -0.047 0.798**
LD.lother -0.151 -0.333** 0.367 -0.103 0.076 -0.010
Constant 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.005*** 0.004
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.062 0.026
R2 0.335 0.260 0.255 0.410 0.206 0.231
Notes: This table shows the result of a VECM estimation. D denotes first differences, LD denotes lagged
first differences, L denotes one lag. Results rely on the reduced sample prior to the structural break of the
Lehman collapse in 2008m9. Bg3 provides too few observations prior to its first structural break in July
2005 and is hence omitted. Risk-spread is modeled as weakly exogenous variable subject to constraints
in order to allow for the persistence of the variable. Estimation results on the risk-spread equation
are however not reported. coint spread refers to the first cointegration term featuring the and imposed
coefficients of zero on the balance-sheet variables. The coint identity refers to the second cointegration
term which features only balance-sheet variables and an imposed zero coefficient on risk-spread. Pval(df,
chi2) gives the p-value of the test of joint significance of all included variables in the respective equation;
R2 gives the share of variance explained by included variables in the respective equation. Bg1 features
large commercial banks, bg2 small commercial banks and bg4 cooperative banks. Significance is indicated
by *=10% level, **=5% level, ***=1% level.
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Table C.9: VECM Liability Set III
D.tbs D.debt bank D.debt nonb D.bond D.equity D.lother
bg1
L.coint spread 0.017 0.044* -0.015 0.020 0.019* -0.003
L.coint identity -3.177*** -6.008*** -0.310 -1.611 -2.443*** -2.200**
LD.spread risk 0.045 0.043 0.046 0.114 0.005 0.007
LD.tbs 3.993 10.191* 1.062 1.828 3.011 -7.893*
LD.debt bank -1.627 -4.143* -0.503 -0.779 -1.180 3.378**
LD.debt nonb -1.398 -3.430* -0.598 -0.447 -0.972 2.739**
LD.bond -0.428 -1.283* 0.028 -0.123 -0.326 1.095**
LD.equity -0.144 -0.108 -0.358* 0.206 -0.141 0.034
LD.lother -0.547* -1.194* -0.103 -0.443 -0.465* 0.443
Constant 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.001
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.401 0.033 0.001
R2 0.341 0.285 0.260 0.133 0.224 0.297
bg2
L.coint spread 0.017 0.108** 0.007 -0.082* -0.005 0.005
L.coint identity -0.287 -2.036*** -0.036 1.146** 0.085 0.226
LD.spread risk -0.010 0.044 -0.053* -0.029 -0.030 0.067
LD.tbs -1.228 -1.222 -2.239 4.075 -1.617 -1.304
LD.debt bank 0.286 0.611 0.466 -0.971 0.289 0.049
LD.debt nonb 0.345 -0.226 0.964 -2.340 0.871 0.714
LD.bond 0.132 0.033 0.268* -0.357 0.126 0.110
LD.equity 0.242* 0.637* 0.176 0.450 0.114 -0.271
LD.lother 0.122 0.178 0.206 -0.221 0.141 -0.105
Constant 0.013*** 0.009 0.015*** 0.003 0.010*** 0.022***
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Pval(df,chi2) 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.003 0.076 0.027
R2 0.378 0.234 0.462 0.280 0.199 0.230
bg4
L.coint spread -0.017** -0.028* -0.001 -0.020 0.003 0.014
L.coint identity -1.336 -1.333 -0.390 -5.429*** 0.060 6.390**
LD.spread risk 0.044* 0.062 -0.054 0.083** 0.053** 0.087
LD.tbs -0.317 -1.824 1.202 2.631 -1.316 2.856
LD.debt bank 0.217 0.894 -0.289 -1.336 0.745 -1.457
LD.debt nonb 0.050 0.399 -0.541 -0.439 0.299 -0.476
LD.bond 0.055 0.285 -0.164 -0.637 0.218 0.026
LD.equity -0.087 -0.065 -0.404 -0.143 0.001 0.594
LD.lother -0.073 0.038 -0.134 -0.334 0.106 -0.313
Constant 0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.002 0.005** 0.003
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78
Pval (df,chi2) 0.008 0.280 0.100 0.005 0.090 0.006
R2 0.260 0.151 0.190 0.273 0.194 0.267
Notes: This table shows the result of a VECM estimation. D denotes first differences, LD denotes lagged
first differences, L denotes one lag. Results rely on the reduced sample prior to the structural break of the
Lehman collapse in 2008m9. Bg3 provides too few observations prior to its first structural break in July
2005 and is hence omitted. Risk-spread is modeled as endogenous variable subject to constraints in order
to allow for the persistence of the variable. Estimation results on the risk-spread equation are however
not reported. The ce term 1 refers to the first cointegration term featuring risk-spread being cointegrated
with itself and imposed coefficients of zero on the balance-sheet variables. The ce term 2 refers to the
second cointegration term which features only balance-sheet variables and an imposed zero coefficient on
risk-spread. Pval(df, chi2) gives the p-value of the test of joint significance of all included variables in
the respective equation; R2 gives the share of variance explained by included variables in the respective
equation. Bg1 features large commercial banks, bg2 small commercial banks and bg4 cooperative banks.
Significance is indicated by *=10% level, **=5% level, ***=1% level.
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Figure C.9: Impulse Response Functions: Large Commercial Banks
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
tbs
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
debt_bank
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
debt_nonb
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
bond
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
equity
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
lother
bg1
Notes: This figure shows bootstrapped impulse response functions of liability set III induced by a one
percent change in the risk spread for large commercial banks. The green (blue) dashed line marks the
upper (lower) bound of the 90% confidence interval based on a horizon of 12 months and 1000 replications.
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Figure C.10: Impulse Response Function: Small Commercial Banks
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Notes: This figure shows bootstrapped impulse response functions of liability set III induced by a one
percent change in the risk spread for small commercial banks. The green (blue) dashed line marks the
upper (lower) bound of the 90% confidence interval based on a horizon of 12 months and 1000 replications.
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Figure C.11: Impulse Response Function: Cooperative Banks
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Notes: This figure shows bootstrapped impulse response functions of liability set III induced by a one
percent change in the risk spread for cooperative banks. The green (blue) dashed line marks the upper
(lower) bound of the 90% confidence interval based on a horizon of 12 months and 1000 replications.

5Concluding Remarks and Outlook
As Bank of England governor Mervyn King1 recognizes “... most large complex financial
institutions are global – at least in life not in death.”. In line with this telling state-
ment, my thesis has pointed at the key role of banks’ international activities once revising
regulatory standards after the financial crisis. However, without loss of generality, het-
erogeneities among banks in terms of their business model, their funding structure and
institutional background form the nuances of my results.
The first paper has pointed out that bank-level productivity shapes banks’ ventur-
ing abroad. As distinct from small non-financial firms, even small banks conduct some
kind of international business. Our findings suggest that more complex and more costly
modes of internationalization demand greater productivity. Gravity variables, portfolio
considerations and bank-level risk factors matter as well.
More complex modes of foreign activity broaden a bank’s scope of funding sources
as well as markets to service. Most foreign operations are not self-contained. Foreign
affiliates can tab local sources of liquidity and thereby contribute to the well functioning
of a bank’s internal capital market. Yet, recent work (see e.g. Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2011) has pointed at the role of internal capital markets in the global propagation of
shocks. As to emerging markets, their banking authorities recognize that parent banks
in developed countries can be a source of support as well as instability. Regulators aim
to “ring-fence” foreign commercial presence of banks, meaning that funding operations
of foreign subsidiaries do neither draw resources from parent banks nor does money flow
1Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Second Bagehot Lecture,
Buttonwood Gathering, New York, 25 October 2010.
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out of the host country. These policy initiatives would paralyze internal capital markets
and more distinctly split foreign from domestic operations. One might interpret these
initiatives as a step towards financial market disintegration. The effect on the parent
bank’s business model and lending practices is an interesting topic for future research.
The second paper studies the risk-market power nexus for banks from an international
angle. As regards the nexus in isolation, it finds a negative correlation between market
power and risk. As regards the impact of international activity in terms of higher volume
(intensive margin), we find that a higher intensity of foreign operations raises both market
power and risk. As regards the impact of entering more foreign markets (the extensive
margin), we find that banks venturing in more countries see their market power decline at
home and further do they experience fewer distress events. Yet, evidence on the impact on
bank risk is rather weak and our core results seem to be driven by international operations
of foreign branches rather than cross-border activities.
Common knowledge suggests that financial market integration goes along with two
effects. On the one hand, banks become more diversified. On the other hand, banks
are exposed to more risks. The banking crisis has demonstrated that the benefits of
financial integration in terms of a more efficient international risk allocation are fairly
illusive. Further, understanding the mutual interplay of market power and risk in light
of financial market integration is important for policy makers. Repercussion effects from
international operations crucially impact the unfolding of macroprudential policy tools
such as procyclical capital buffers. Further, resolving global banks is difficult with foreign
subsidiaries being subject to foreign supervision. So-called “living wills” jointly drafted
by banks and regulators shall provide a manual of how to handle severe distress events
or even the resolution of global banks. Future research might discuss how these “living
wills” shape the risk-market power nexus.
The third paper addresses the short- and long-run view on leverage and other liability
ratios. My long-run approach finds that key ruptures in the funding conditions of banks
trigger major reallocations in the liability structure and hence leverage. My short-run
approach finds that considerable heterogeneity governs the adjustment patterns of banking
groups in view of changing financial market risks.
Besides immediate effects of shock events or changes in financial market risks, indirect
157
effects emerge. Apart from the intrabank and interbank market, risk panics, firesales
and more generally speaking the devaluation of collateral reinforce these shocks. Lucas
and Stokey (2011) state that the financial market freeze in September 2008 was a type
of modern bank run. Regulatory standards have to cope with these reinforcing external
effects. Ever since, the inter-bank market has not fully recovered. To ease the euro-area
strains, the ECB has provided huge amounts of liquidity. Small international business
and trade finance crucially rely on banks. With banks withdrawing from the international
stage, financial markets seem to disintegrate suggesting harder times to finance cross-
border trade and foreign direct investment. One might ask whether banks prioritize
domestic customers and whether the ECB initiative has achieved the aim to re-animate
cross-border lending. All these questions provide fruitful avenues for future research.
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